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This study examines participatory budgeting (PB) as an important kind of citizen 
participation in the Dominican Republic (DR) and the implications of this recent practice 
for agency, democracy, and development. PB is a process that intends to drive change with 
specific outcomes: through deliberative decision-making, ordinary citizens select well-
being- and agency-enhancing projects that ideally lead to more local and authentic 
development. Together with the attainment of these tangible outcomes, valuable subjective 
states may also come about: people feel more in charge of their own lives, community 
groups become more collaborative and cooperative, and more and better democracy is 
fostered. Taking a step forward from previous studies that only focus on PB from an urban 
planning or public finance perspective, the overall objective of this study is to provide a 
deeper understanding and assessment of how PB works in the localities under analysis, its 
association with different measures of agency, the characteristics that drive its success or 
failure, and its general impact on the lives of individuals and communities. Drawing on 
normative and policy-based literatures and specifically following an agency-oriented 
capability approach, this study uses a mixed-methods approach to analyze interview, 
survey, and direct observations of PB public assemblies, and archival data with respect to 
the 2013 budget cycle in four DR municipalities. A regression analysis finds that 
participation in and awareness of PB are both significantly correlated with individuals 
reporting higher levels of individual and collective agency when compared to non-
participants and unaware individuals. These measures of agency are contextualized to the 
municipal budget-planning cycle. A process tracing analysis concludes that PB is likely, 
under certain conditions, to increase democratic participation and deliberation. However, 
due to certain democratic deficits, PB in two DR municipalities does not always increase 
agency, group cooperative functioning, and good development. Thus, PB must be analyzed 
on a case-by-case basis because differences in the characteristics of each PB assembly may 
lead to different outcomes. It is finally argued that rather than condemning democracy 
because of the failures of the current PB system, we should advance PB’s democracy 
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Growing up in the Dominican Republic (DR), a country where the state often lacks 
competent ways to provide public goods and services, I watched my fellow citizens 
individually “adjust” to inefficiencies, rather than collectively demanding or trying to 
affect change. It was (and still is) common to see households—often with minimal 
economic capacity to pay—seek private solutions to public problems: since electricity is 
not reliable, let’s buy generators; since public schools’ quality is extremely low, let’s send 
our children to private schools; since public transportation is a disaster, let’s buy private 
vehicles and use them at all times; and the list goes on. In sum, the common scenario has 
been one of people acting independently to create a decent private version of what an 
acceptable provisioning of public goods and services should be. I cannot say that I have 
never seen groups of people acting together as a strong, united front to request credible 
change from the authorities, but such actions were usually related to costs (e.g., protests 
because gas or food prices have increased) rather than the mediocre provision of public 
goods and services. As a result, most, if not all, improvements that have finally come about 
have been the result of delayed political action, often conveniently provided near election 
times for the purpose of gaining votes, and not due to civic pressure.  
Due to our lack of awareness of our rights as citizens and our limited ability 
successfully to influence public policies, we still suffer from many old problems. I can only 
presume that these repeated disappointments, together with the typically negative 
incentives that make achieving collective action difficult, have restricted the type of citizen 
participation that drives changes. Even with our democratic system in place, we have 
stopped believing in the power we have as “the people” and hence, we “adjust.”  
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These personal interpretations of Dominican society are the ones that have inspired 
my research. However, I acknowledge from the very beginning that I will not try to tackle 
this triangular issue of citizen participation, the ability to affect change, and effective 
change from the perspective of citizen involvement directed towards the solution of macro-
level issues. Instead, I examine citizen participation within local participatory and 
democratic settings that seeks answers for strictly local problems. I argue that such local 
participation is the first step in the generation of citizen awareness of the importance of 
being agents of change and the gradual achievement of not only a kind of development that 
is sustainable and led by politicians, but also one that is authentic and in which citizens 
play conscious and active roles. 
When I first became interested in studying the phenomena and forums of 
participatory democracy, and particularly one mechanism known as participatory 
budgeting (PB), in which communities have a voice in the way local resources are spent 
through deliberative dialogue and/or voting, I initially concentrated on Nicaragua, Peru, 
and other Latin American experiences. The last thing I imagined was that some 
municipalities in my very own DR were already conducting PB. And I was even more 
surprised when I discovered that since 2007, there has been a municipal law that mandates 
PB in all municipalities. Given the novelty of the process in DR and its very limited 
publicity, I was not the only one in the dark—many of my relatives, friends, and ex-
colleagues whom I informally polled in the fall of 2011 had never heard of it either.1 Before 
proceeding, however, I had to consider an important trade-off: I could study a well-
1 I became aware of the practice of PB in the DR in the fall of 2011, when an official of Santiago’s local 
government came to a conference in Washington, DC, and asked me about my research, which lead to a very 
informative discussion about the subject.  
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documented locality where PB has been established for a longer period, and therefore 
would have more noticeable effects, or, with the hope of throwing new light on PB, I could 
investigate an unstudied and relatively new PB in a different setting, one in which I had 
easy access to both sources and sites. 
After visiting different communities within four municipalities 2  in the DR, 
conducting interviews, observing public consultation processes, analyzing survey data, and 
seeing the diversity of local PBs, I have concluded that PB should be understood and 
evaluated in relation to their differing local contexts. This research has not radically 
changed my views about citizen participation as a whole in the DR, for I still believe that 
Dominican society is largely passive and conformist. Nonetheless, this study, although 
based on a micro-level perspective, gives me some reason to believe in the positive 
prospects of a direct democracy framework to increase people’s control and sense of 
control over issues that matter to them. This work also speaks to the way in which varying 
community-level characteristics can shape its inhabitants’ degree of integration and their 
ability to influence change. 
It is also pertinent to acknowledge that while a government agency might be 
interested in a cause-effect relationship between PB and some sort of monetary efficiency 
or political support variables, I am more interested in the relationship between PB and 
agency—peoples’ ability to make decisions about things that they care about and, thereby, 
influence change. It is my normative belief that this is an empirical relationship important 
enough to inform the creation of evidenced-based policies in support of PB as an official 
2 The territorial division of the DR is as follows: the country is divided into provinces, provinces into 
municipalities and/or municipal districts (these are the equivalent of cities), municipalities into towns, and 
towns into communities/neighborhoods. 
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political tool for budget planning. In other words, I believe that projects and practices that 
bolster agency, as does PB at its best, should be seriously considered when designing 
institutions and making policies in a democratic society. I argue these practices can lead to 
the type of authentic development that this study supports. 
Although very limited in its scope, this work aspires not only to enrich the 
institutional performance of local governments so that governments, citizens, and civil 
society organizations (CSOs) can increasingly forge better public policy, but also to 
document and analyze people’s individual perspectives, regardless of whether or not they 
participate in a PB, with respect to their power to bring about positive change in their cities. 
Do people believe that their participation in or access to a PB enables them to bring desired 
change to their communities? More precisely, do they believe that their involvement in the 
decision-making process, which distributes a portion of the local budget, has this beneficial 
impact? Alternatively, do participants tend to see the process as one which they cannot 
fully trust, one in which local leaders manipulate them or simply one that is interesting for 
a while but eventually becomes boring? In the worst of cases, do participants in a PB see 
the process as so useless that it does not merit their attendance? By answering these and 
other questions, assisted by quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis, I hope to 
contribute to recent literature that assesses participatory forums, such as PB, their 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
1.1 Research Framework 
This is a study about citizen participation—particularly about citizen participation 
through participatory budgeting in the Dominican Republic and its implications for agency, 
democracy, and development. Let us provisionally define agency as the capability to have 
a say in things one cares about, to be able to act on such choices, and to make a difference 
in the world. The worldwide incidence of participatory expenditure programs has increased 
significantly in recent decades; participatory budgeting, with its participatory and 
deliberative features, is a case in point.  
Since at least the 1970s, democratic activists and scholars of democracy have 
increasingly identified deliberative and participatory practices as a means of deepening and 
invigorating the political lives of ordinary people, an ideal that lies at the very heart of the 
notion of democracy. 3 Philosopher Peter Levine (2003), for example, presents three key 
reasons why an enriched democracy requires such processes:  
(1) to enable citizens to discuss public issues and form opinions,  
(2) to give leaders insights on the issues that the public cares about, and  
(3) to enable citizens to explain and justify their opinions in order to separate good 
ideas from bad ones and optimize public policy. 
To these points, a fourth might be added: to go beyond diversity of opinions to (more 
3 There is a long and healthy debate in the literature as to when “deliberative democracy” began as a 
conceptual framework. Baiocchi et al. (2010) trace its roots back to Aristotle, noting periodic revitalization 
of the concept in “the works of Rousseau, Carole Pateman, and most recently Habermas among many others.” 
(p. 1). See also Dryzek (2010). 
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or less) unity in action. 
Spurred on by such advocacy, numerous governments—especially at the municipal 
level—have experimented with participatory processes, most frequently in the domains of 
budgeting and public planning. Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva (2010) succinctly define one 
such practice known as participatory budgeting, as “the idea ... that citizens can and should 
play a direct role in shaping the budget of the towns and cities in which they live.” (p. xi) 
As a relatively recent phenomenon, however, there have been few systematic studies of 
PB. Most, like Baiocchi et al.’s Bootstrapping Democracy, have focused on the 
effectiveness of PB compared to more traditional models of urban planning, and not on the 
procedure’s normative justification.  
Important approaches have included not only Porto Alegre’s (Brazil) pioneering model 
of an open and deliberative budgeting process, but also other innovations in consultative 
decision-making. The key concept is that during the public consultations that accompany 
PB processes, citizens engage in a reason-giving discussion and negotiation about what 
they believe should be the priorities for their communities. Because the key stakeholders 
contribute to the budgeting process, this process adds democratic value to the expenditure 
decisions and increases the likelihood that basic necessities are met and that the participants 
gain ownership (also referred to as “buy-in”) with respect to the process and its results. In 
other words, at least theoretically, a better allocation of resources can be ensured when 
participatory practices like PB are included in local governmental structures. Furthermore, 
with stakeholder ownership comes a commitment to the legitimacy of the procedure and 
results. My aim is to investigate an example of this democratic innovation and its logic. 
My motivation is the belief that citizen participation can lead to authentic development—
 2 
a kind of social change in which citizens play a direct role in the setting and achievement 
of goals. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
Taking a step forward from previous studies that only focus on PB from an urban 
planning or public finance perspectives, the overall objective of this study is to provide a 
deeper understanding of how PB works in the various localities under analysis, the 
association between PB and different measures of agency, the characteristics that drive its 
success or failure, and its general impact on the lives of individuals and their communities. 
This analysis is performed based on observations of the 2013 budget cycle in four 
municipalities in the DR (Santo Domingo Este, Santo Domingo Oeste, Santiago, and La 
Vega).  
This work is organized in six chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
literature that serves as the theoretical framework. Specifically, this chapter addresses 
notions of civic participation and the potential or existing link between forms of citizen 
participation, like PB, and normative ideals of agency, democracy, development, mainly 
based on the capability approach. This chapter also presents a background for PB, including 
specificities of the Dominican context, in order to contextualize the rest of the study.  
Chapter 3 presents an empirical assessment of how participation in PB is positively 
correlated with individuals’ perceptions of agency. The focus on agency as an outcome is 
significant because of its advantageous consequences, both normatively and practically. 
As development ethicist David Crocker explains, “when people or communities are in 
charge of or have ownership over their own enterprises, they are more apt to be responsible 
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for them, be invested in them, and benefit from them.” (2012, p. 49) If this holds true, then 
agency should be a critical factor to consider when making development policies in 
democratic settings, so that the type of development achieved is of the kind where those 
affected take reasoned action (i.e., Crocker’s authentic development).  
Chapter 3 also discusses the use of subjective well-being measures for empirical 
analysis and what strategies have been previously employed to measure the relationship 
between citizen participation and agency. This part of the thesis explores whether 
individuals who participate in PB report higher levels of perceived individual and/or 
collective agency than similar individuals who do not have such PB option available.  This 
is done with the application of quasi-experimental methods of analysis, specifically, 
propensity score matching and differences in differences. The analysis is performed on 
newly collected survey data from the four municipalities in the DR alluded to earlier, two 
of which employ PB and two of which do not. 
A multiple regression analysis explores whether awareness of PB is positively 
correlated with non-participants’ perceptions of collective agency. Such analysis teases out 
spillover effects of PB to those who do not participate in the assemblies. The main findings 
are that participation and awareness are both significantly correlated with individuals 
reporting higher levels of agency.   
With the objective of moving beyond correlations, Chapter 4 presents process 
tracing tools of analysis to track enabling conditions that link citizen participation in PB 
with normative outcomes such as the ones evaluated in Chapter 3. The chapter proposes 
(and defines each component of) the following hypothesis: if the subsequent conditions of 
the PB process are met—assemblies are fair, effective, inclusive, and deliberative, and civil 
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society actors share at least minimal initial principles of cooperation—PB participants 
become agents (in the PB context), increase their cooperative group functioning, become 
witnesses to more and better local democracy and protagonists of authentic development.   
Chapter 5 applies the qualitative methodology presented in Chapter 4, and presents 
an evaluation of the PB public consultations at the community and block levels. The 
analysis concludes that how the PB system increases (or does not increase) agency, 
empowerment, group functioning, democracy, development, and so forth, must be 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis because differences in the characteristics of each PB 
assembly may lead to different outcomes. The chapter presents detailed evidence of such 
different characteristics and how they may affect the intended results of PB. The general 
conclusion is that rather than condemning democracy because of the failures of the current 
PB system, we should advance PB’s democracy further by improving it in various ways. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents the main challenges and limitations of the PB process 
and proposes pertinent policy recommendations. The final evaluation addresses (from the 
normative grounds of this study) what is good, what is bad, and what can be improved in 
the PB process. A way forward regarding future research is briefly presented. This robust 




It is important to study forms of citizen participation like PB in order to help build 
democracy by transforming, through deliberation, the preferences of ordinary citizens and 
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transmitting them to government officials, which in turn reduces conflict, increases social 
cohesion, and eases the process of political decision-making.4 Young (2010) argues that 
deliberative democracy is different from aggregative democracy, where preferences are 
grouped merely by voting, because it is “not only a means through which citizens can 
promote their interests and hold the power of rulers in check. It is also a means of collective 
problem-solving which depends for its legitimacy and wisdom on the expression and 
criticism of the diverse opinions of all the members of the society” (p.6). I echo Young’s 
support for inclusive democracy: it promotes more just outcomes through mutual 
persuasion among participants about the “justice and wisdom” (p.4) of their arguments, 
tolerance for different opinions, and the willingness to let views be transformed through 
deliberations. 
Although the literature presents many assessments of PB’s impact on governance 
indicators (such as the management of resources, transparency, services delivery, and the 
likelihood of an individual paying taxes), most studies are highly skewed to the Porto 
Alegre experience and there is a specific analytical gap that can benefit from further 
evaluation—namely, the actual association of civic participation in a forum like PB with 
agency, and how it differs from the experience of agency felt by non-participants. The 
latter, especially when understood as a notion of empowerment, has become an important 
goal in development policy and direct practice due to its association with community-
organizing, health, social work, social policy, ethnic minority groups, among others 
measures and aspects (Speer & Peterson, 2000). To fill such gap, in this study I assume 
4 Young (2010) explains that “active participation and political representation do not exclude one another, 
and sometimes even work together to produce policy outcomes” (p.3). 
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(but also explain) a normative foundation (based on the agency-based capability approach) 
and then examine cases of PB in the DR with respect to what happens in the PB process 
and in participants’ lives. I later ask what are the implications for policy of these empirical 
findings. 
The empirical claim at the core of the argument in favor of participatory processes 
like PB, and for which tests are at best scarce, is that their implementation not only 
positively affects governance, but also may improve individual citizens’ and communities’ 
quality of life through the political agency they sustain, the democracy they deepen, and, 
most significantly, the authentic democracy to which they lead and contribute. The problem 
is that policy experts are ambivalent about how to approach this knowledge gap, which 
involves quantifying concepts that are normative in nature.  
Crocker (2012) contends that “policy and institutional proposals for a better future 
can and should be normatively guided as well as empirically based” (p. 48). Similarly, but 
citing current empirical deficits, PB experts Baiocchi et al. (2010) posit that “ideas of 
participatory democracy are strong on theory and moral-philosophical founding, but rather 
weak on evidence and empirical testing” (p. 1). Steiner (2012) also suggests that while 
empirical data cannot by itself answer normative questions, they can certainly enlighten 
them. Although that necessity has been repeatedly set out, other scholars, such as 
Mansbridge (1999), have expressed skepticism concerning the ability of social science 
instruments to measure such changes in character.5   
5 Frank Bryan and Jane Mansbridge have studied town hall meetings in the United States for several decades, 
and as a result have made significant contributions to this literature, including descriptive and empirical ones. 
These authors have looked at aspects such as rates of participation, the distribution of such participation, 
characteristics of attendees, and topics discussed.  I build on their work, hoping to advance the discussion by 
looking at the specific link between a kind of institution similar to that which they observe in town hall 
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Because of this skepticism, and the fact that the question of whether participation 
in PB correlates with increased perceptions of agency, remains scarcely tested, this portion 
of my work is largely exploratory and advances an initial attempt to approach the normative 
concept of agency with a quantitative method.6 In particular, to my knowledge, no one has 
previously attempted this study’s effort to assess the spillover effects of PB to non-
participants who are aware of PB.  
From a theoretical standpoint, this study thus contributes to the literatures of 
deliberative/participatory democracy, PB, community-level politics and community-
driven development by empirically testing the existence of a link between participation in 
and awareness of PB and measures of perceived agency. A substantial contribution is the 
finding of a positive externality for awareness of PB (regardless of participation)—an 
indirect path to agency for the PB context. Another specific contribution is that, advancing 
Baiocchi et al., I use their city-pairing approach, but instead of doing qualitative research, 
I use the contrast structure for quantitative analysis. This use of statistical tools has special 
value as they drive us away from misleading interpretations based on a few observations 
of people involved in the process, and also it allows for drawing comparisons among 
contrasting cases. Such observations represent municipalities with and without PB, 
individuals with and without the option to participate, individuals who participate and do 
not participate, and individuals who are aware or unaware of the PB process/assemblies. 
(Note that previous studies have usually focused only on observing participants/delegates 
during community meetings). The empirical findings and the pragmatic recommendations 
meetings, and agency and different dimensions of democracy. See Bryan’s Real Democracy (2004) and 
Mansbridge’s Beyond Adversary Democracy (1980) for a detailed account of US participatory processes. 
6 The initial interest was to assess causality, but unfortunately, the data is not suitable for detecting impact.  
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derived therefrom can have an important impact in the role of participatory institutions in 
advancing a type of social change that responds to citizens’ demands.  
The in-depth assessment of the quality of the participatory democratic process 
(what works, what doesn't, and why and what should be the criterion of “works”) is also 
valuable for policy-making purposes, as my findings may lead to the improvement of such 
participatory practices in the interest of inclusive governance and “deeper” citizen 
participation in decision-making. Advancing previous findings by Wampler (2007, 2012) 
and Selee and Peruzzotti (2009) about the Brazilian and Mexican cases, respectively, I find 
that the informal and strategic bargaining that occur prior to PB meetings, as well as the 
analysis of incentives and disincentives for successful inter- and intra-group relationships, 
are important contributions to the literature of participatory institutions in regards to the 
non-linear trajectory that they follow. This finding implies that for the DR case the process 
of building agency is more community-based than based on a wide and vibrant civil society 
connected to political channels. This result is also of interest because even though most of 
the political science and public policy literatures focus on studying formal institutions, this 
research shows that for the cases studied most of the decision-making is occurring 
informally. In other words, the agency that is enhanced through PB is “genuine” in the 
sense that it does not take place through the traditional political structures, such as political 
parties, as happens in other well-known cases of participatory institutions, such as in 
Brazil’s PB or Venezuela’s community councils.  
An additional contribution is that although in the DR a vast number of 
municipalities have started implementing participatory practices of this kind, to my 
knowledge, no scholarly studies have analyzed the policy and normative issues as applied 
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to these cases. This thesis sets a precedent that hopefully will motivate future research 
about the link between participatory governance and normative values or perceptions. 
Three clarifications of what this thesis does not address are imperative. First, 
although important, this study does not try to infer or prove causality with respect to 
whether PB can explain other broad characteristics of the municipalities, such as aggregate 
income, number of development projects, provision of basic services, or corruption (or its 
absence).  That is, this study looks at PB from the perspective of an agency-oriented 
capability approach, for which outcomes such as individual and collective agency and well-
being matter, rather than income variables. Similarly, this research is not about 
decentralization in the sense of a transfer from the central government to the municipality 
of funds, the responsibility for the generation of tax revenue, or service provision. Instead, 
this study deals exclusively with decentralization of decision-making power—that is the 
empowerment of the citizens over local-level expenditure programs. I make a case not only 
on instrumental grounds, for example, PB as conducive to better development, but also on 
intrinsic grounds, for example, as an expression of self-determination.  
Second, the intention of this study is not to provide an in-depth literature review of 
the political science and psychology discussions of citizen political participation and public 
deliberation. The literature (including empirics) is quite extensive in this regard, and a 
thorough review would be a thesis in itself. Instead, I present a selection of works that are 
relevant to the PB context and specifically to the normative theoretical framework upon 
which the analyses are based. The quantitative portion of the study incorporates an 
empirical review, which focuses not only on citizen participation empirics, but also on the 
measurement of subjective well-being notions. For a comprehensive summary of the 
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empirical literature on citizen participation, see Delli Carpini, Cook and Jacobs (2004); for 
a compendium of the empirical literature on deliberative democracy, see Steiner (2012). 
Third, as a professional trained in economics, development, and policy analysis, 
when dealing with normative and political concepts and premises (as it is done for much 
of this study), I make no attempt to contribute directly to current normative philosophical 
and political theory with respect to the normative foundations of deliberative democracy 
or citizen. Concepts relevant to the context of PB and inspired by the capability approach 
literature are introduced, and alternative accounts are presented in the theoretical 
framework section as the basis for the policy analysis that follows. The main purpose is to 
apply practical evaluation methodologies (in both qualitative and quantitative ways) to 
better understand an issue that is both empirical and normative at its core, while making 
meaningful contributions to the policy literature. What can we learn about the impact of 




Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework and Background to Participatory 
Budgeting in the Dominican Republic 
“When [people] participate, thereby becoming active subjects of 
knowledge and action, they begin to construct their properly 
human history and engage in processes of authentic development” 




Participatory Budgeting can be studied from different perspectives. Regardless of 
PB’s institutional and pragmatic nature, this chapter focuses on its normative, rather than 
purely practical aspects. With this interest, it becomes relevant to introduce a theoretical 
framework that provides such a normative analytical component and is transferable from a 
philosophical view to a policy application. Such a framework is the so-called “capability 
approach,” and I emphasize its normative ideals of citizen participation, democracy, 
agency, empowerment, and development. Later, I will examine specific details of the PB 
process. The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 introduces the notion of citizen 
participation in a space like PB; Section 2.2 covers the theoretical framework of the 
capability approach; Section 2.3 presents a brief literature review of participatory and 
deliberative democracy; Section 2.4 presents an overview of participatory budgeting as a 
tool for local budget planning and a direct democracy practice; and Section 2.5 covers 




2.1 The Starting Point: Citizen Participation 
In recent normative theory, the concept of citizenship7 often has been used to define 
7 Soltan (1999) defines citizenship as “a bundle of rights that the state grants to some people (and refuses to 
others), allowing those persons to influence the policies of the state and the choice of its top decision-makers” 
(p. 2). More broadly, Kymlicka and Norman (2000) establish that the concept of citizenship combines the 
ideas of citizenship as legal status (defined by civil, political, and social rights), as political agents who 
actively participate in a society’s political institutions, and as persons with a sense of belonging to a political 
community. 
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the idea of individuals belonging to a political community. In turn, a citizen is called a 
member of a political community, because the latter recognizes him/her as such (Posas, 
2003). The aggregate of citizens makes up what is called the civil society. The concept is 
often used to contrast a society’s state or government with the people who make up that 
society. Civil society groups include families, religious and cultural groups, and advocacy 
groups.8 The actions (or lack thereof) of civil society are critical to the development of any 
democratic community and to the achievement of desirable social change. 
When defined with a social justice component, the result is the conception of the 
citizen not only as an individual who possesses an identification card or passport, but also 
as one who participates in deliberations and decisions that are taken in respect to political 
affairs that affect him/her and the community to which he/she belongs. Bottomore and 
Marshall (1998), when referring to the conception of “social/critical citizenship,” argue 
that building a just society is impossible without the responsible and active participation of 
a strengthened civil society that accepts citizens’ role as protagonists of change. CEPAL 
(2000) adds that citizenship goes further than only demanding rights, since it also entails 
the capacity of acting as an agent of one’s own development.9  
Scholars understand such active participation in many different ways. Leonardo 
Avritzer (2009), in his book Participatory Institutions in Democratic Brazil, presents a 
summary of different conceptualizations of participation as a way of highlighting the 
8 Social theorists have also offered a threefold composition of society: the state, civil society, and the market 
(also called the private or commercial sector), the latter demarcating institutions that are for-profit as well as 
non-state (see Michael Edwards, Civil Society, 2014).   
9 I take these latter definitions of citizen as given and use them when referring to the citizenship evoked by 
participation in the PB process. I offer no further philosophical or political discussion concerning the 
definition of “citizenship” or the “good citizen.”  However, this is a possible topic for future work.  
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importance of definitions: 
Abers refers to participation as “increasing citizens’ control over the state 
and improving the capacity of ordinary people to understand and decide 
about issues affecting their lives” (2000: 5). Nylen refers to democratic 
participation as “the exercising of real power over decisions” (2003: 28). 
Baiocchi links the origins of participation in Brazil to social movements that 
challenge “representative democracy by calling for participatory reforms” 
(2005: 11). For Fung and Wright, participation refers to “the commitments 
and capacities of ordinary people to make sensible decisions” (2003: 5). (p. 
3, citations in original)  
From a political, rather than sociological point of view, and within the context of a 
democracy like the DR (defined in its constitution as participative and pluralist), citizen 
participation can be understood as a constitutional right that Dominicans have actively to 
participate in decision-making on matters that affect their economic, political, and social 
surroundings. More specifically and with relevance to the focus of this study, the 
Dominican Federation of Municipalities (FEDOMU) understands citizen participation as 
the essential participation of all men and women who would like to get involved in the 
problems that affect them by contributing points of views, concerns, and solutions. For 
FEDOMU, such participation serves as the best mechanism of social control and collective 
integration that strengthens local management and the links of trust between communities 
and institutions (Jorge et al., 2012). Although citizen participation can take many different 
forms, ranging from a mere nominal participant—for the present case that could be an 
individual who belongs to a neighborhood council but does not attend the PB assembly—
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to a deep deliberator who engages in reason-giving for arriving at decisions,10 the type of 
participation pertinent to the succeeding analysis is of a “micro” type. That is, this study 
does not focus on civic or social participation where matters of broad, national interest, 
such as Dominican culture, politics, or economics, are concerned. Instead, it focuses on 
communal participation, through which residents from a locality come together and 
organize to demand significant change in their communities, regarding their specific local 
interests and needs. Communal participation, in its ideal form, concerns citizens who are 
respectful of and relate to each other as equals. 
Ideally, PB, as a participatory institution, enables a form of citizen participation 
that looks a lot like the kind of citizen participation described above. Moreover, as a 
practice of direct democracy, when certain enabling conditions are present, it is likely to 
empower and makes agents out of individuals and communities, and can lead to enhanced 
well-being and authentic development. Crocker argues that policies that lead to 
development should be assessed not only on the basis of the results they generate but also 
on their success in—and potential for—promoting, protecting, and reinstating agency. In 
general agreement with such an outlook, let us address the literature that deals with these 
and related concepts and ideas, particularly focusing on the works of Sen and Crocker, who 
advance the theoretical framework selected for this study—an “agency-oriented capability 
approach.” 
 
2.2 A Brief Introduction to the Capability Approach 
10 These two extremes (i.e., nominal and deliberative participation) are part of Crocker’s (2008) distinction 
of seven modes of participation. I address such modes later in this study. 
 15 
                                                 
The capability approach is a philosophical framework that rests on two normative 
claims: “First, the claim that the freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral 
importance, and second, that freedom to achieve well-being is to be understood in terms of 
people’s capabilities, that is, their real opportunities to do and be what they have reason to 
value” (Robeyns, 2011, para 1). The approach, which Amartya Sen pioneered, has been 
used beyond the philosophical realm, and social scientists have recently recognized its 
transferability and practical value for development studies and policy-making (among 
other fields). In its narrowest form, the capability approach provides an analysis of human 
functionings (beings and doings) and capabilities (the opportunity to accomplish such 
functionings), allowing for cross-unit comparisons of well-being. This feature of the 
approach is of use in this study, as I can draw comparisons among those who engage in PB 
and those who do not.  
 
2.2.1 Sen 
Let us analyze further Sen’s framework and reasoning. In his 1999 book, 
Development as Freedom, Sen proposes that (good) development be conceived as the 
expansion of the capabilities of persons to lead the kind of life they value and have reason 
to value. The more valuable freedoms people have, the greater their ability to help 
themselves and to make significant changes in the world. The freedom to prioritize and 
decide on freedoms, to act freely, and to have an impact on the world—is a special kind of 
freedom that Sen calls “agency freedom”. This agency aspect of the capability approach, 
which Crocker emphasizes and discusses in more depth, will be central for the rest of my 
study. Sen believes that valuable capabilities can be promoted and protected by public 
policy, but he also clarifies that citizens’ exercise of their agency freedom can influence 
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public policy.  In this matter, he argues that people should have the liberty to participate in 
social choice and in the making of public decisions that they have reason to value. For him, 
this collective agency is a key part, as we shall see later, of what he calls “process freedom” 
as a fair decision-making process (in contrast to “opportunity freedom” which has to do 
with capabilities). Sen adds that exercising agency entails people making their own 
decisions about their individual and communal well-being and freedoms, rather than 
acquiescing to the “force of circumstances” or letting scientists and politicians make all the 
decisions.11   
Exercising agency also implies active deliberation (that prioritizes valued 
capabilities), decision, and implementation processes that enable individuals and 
collectivities to make a difference in the world. For Sen, the exercise of agency is 
instrumentally valuable (when it leads to well-being of self and others) and constructively 
valuable (when it shapes and forges values). In addition, agency is intrinsically valuable 
insofar as it is intrinsically good that people are authors of their own lives and not mere 
effects of internal or external causes. Thus, it is fair to say that if PB works as it should, 
then Sen would be a fan because, among other things, it expresses agency, shapes values, 
and has good consequences with respect to individual and communal well being  (the 
realization of valued capabilities). 
11 It is necessary to point out that Sen is not against assistance coming from other groups, for example, 
scientists or officials, as long as their help promotes rather than compromises the agency of the agents.  Also, 
these views of exercising personal agency have important links to the previously discussed concepts of 
citizenship. Sen (1999) believes that the idea of citizenship highlights the necessity to consider people as 
agents in and of their own lives, rather than as beings who are determined by external for internal forces, or 
whose “administered” well-being or advantage is the only actual or desirable goal. In harmony with Sen’s 
views, Posas (2003) explains that “to achieve human development as freedom, individuals have to use or 
exercise their capacity for agency (a sort of supercapability, one by which the agent prioritizes and decides 
on lower level capabilities or freedoms). Individuals must believe themselves not as passive recipients of aid, 
but rather as active agents of their own development, as the driving force of change, as social subjects able 
to transform their own situation and the society where they live” (p. 15).  
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When individuals have power, Sen adds, they can and should participate in the 
process of creation and implementation of social justice. When they lack power, they 
should contest and gain power, that is, become “empowered.”12 This idea of becoming an 
agent includes not only planning projects that promote social justice (equality of basic 
capabilities), but also being involved in the formulation and determination of moral values 
on which such programs are based. From this, one could conclude that agency freedom and 
achievement is the link that connects human development and an active, responsible, and 
creative citizenship, which in turn should be a key aspect in a democratic society. 
Nonetheless, for this link to exist, society must count on an open and receptive government, 
in which citizens have a say in the administration of public matters, including the 
improvement of their own well-being (Jorge et al., 2012).  
In the democracy sub-section of this chapter I shall have more to say about how 
these normative notions link to the vision of, an inclusive and deep democracy. But for 
now, I note that Sen (1999) views not only agency but also democracy as intrinsically, 
instrumentally, and constructively good. Sen does not understand democracy merely as 
elections or majority rule; instead, he believes that the ideal of democratic governance 
implies much more than the right to vote and the duty to respect election outcomes.13 Some 
12 In a recent essay Empowerment, Agency and Power (2013), Canadian philosopher and development 
ethicist Jay Drydyk establishes that empowerment has three dimensions. The first is agency: “people are 
empowered insofar as they are better able to shape their own lives” (p. 260). Although agency is necessary 
for empowerment, it is not sufficient, for empowerment also is connected—as agency alone is not—to certain 
notions of well-being and power (the other two dimensions). A person or group is not empowered if it 
exercises its agency to decrease others’ well-being. Moreover, an individual or group is not empowered if it 
fails to contend with and seek to overcome domineering powers. Drydyk argues that any development change 
that fails to deliver one of these three dimensions is less empowering than an alternative scenario where all 
three dimensions prevail. Drydyk’s ideal of empowerment will be particularly useful in future analysis that 
concerns not only the participatory decision-making stage of PB, but also its project execution stage, during 
which results that ultimately increase or decrease well-being are achieved (or not). 
13 Similarly, in his essay “When is Development More Democratic” (2005), Drydyk explains that common 
definitions of democracy—in which only voting in general elections or electing representatives are the sole 
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examples of those implications are the protection of liberties and freedoms, the right of free 
speech, and the respect for legal entitlements. Sen considers democracies to be better than 
other governance systems in the sense that democracies put greater emphasis on responding 
to people’s needs/preferences and as well as on enabling members to exercise agency. He 
believes that democracy has constructive value because it provides institutions and 
processes that allow people to construct and decide on the values and priorities they have 
as a society. The problem is that even in countries recognized as democracies at the national 
level, local-level politics, which is the level at which civil society members can more easily 
influence outcomes, might fall short of the democratic ideal. This work highlights different 
kinds of local settings in the DR to explain and defend this last point. 
Finally, let’s turn to Sen’s views of development. Sen understands development 
from a broad perspective: an appropriate conception of development must not only look at 
conditions considered for labeling a system democratic—are too narrow. Such conceptualization leaves out 
too many people and too many activities from the scope of democracy. (It should also be mentioned that 
recent studies examine cases in which authoritarian regimes have employed “elections” to camouflage and 
justify authoritarian control. See Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid 
Regimes After the Cold War, 2010). If a conception of democratic activity should include citizen involvement 
in more ways than merely voting, then Drydyk asks two important questions: To what extent would political 
activism constitute enhancement of democracy? Should activity only within democratic institutions be 
deemed as democratic activity? To answer such interrogations he introduces a criterion of democratic 
functioning in which he emphasizes the role the degree of citizen influence when evaluating how democratic 
a system is. He argues that “not all participatory schemes make development more democratic, and those that 
do may do so incompletely, reducing some democratic shortfalls while leaving or creating others. Therefore, 
merely calling for development to be more participatory is not adequate. What we must call for is making 
development more democratic” (p. 249). The core idea behind this notion goes back to the capability 
approach; for Drydyk, no democracy in which people are deprived from influencing social conditions that 
affect them and impede them from living in ways they have reason to value is a worthy social goal. He goes 
further, positing that what matters is not the presence of participation and deliberation, but the extent to which 
people can actually and effectively make the desired difference (a real impact), and impede further damaging 
of the capabilities they have reason to value. From this latter claim, it can be noted that he values the 
availability of democratic activities, on the one hand, and the effectiveness of such activities (influence), on 
the other hand (Crocker’s soon-to-be-presented idea of running one’s own life and making a difference in the 
world). That is, PB in itself does not make the municipalities that implement it more democratic; it is its 
existence combined with the well-being and agency freedom and achievement that people acquire through it 
that makes PB more democratic.  
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economic measures and income-related variables. Instead, he suggests that without 
ignoring these matters, the development of a society also depends on social and political 
arrangements, and on civil rights.  For Sen, expanding freedoms and agency becomes the 
end of development and economic growth its means. Sen explains that “what people can 
positively achieve is influenced by economic opportunities, political liberties, social 
powers, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic education, and the 
encouragement and cultivation of initiatives” (p. 5). PB, in this context, would constitute 
one of such institutional arrangements. 
Sen posits that development is a process that allows people to expand the real 
freedoms they enjoy. From the notion of freedom, we have seen that he differentiates 
between the process and the opportunity aspects of freedom.  The process aspect is what 
allows people to be free to act and to decide what they believe is better for them and their 
group. The opportunity aspect refers to the opportunities for well-being (one’s own and 
that of others) made feasible by one’s actual personal and social circumstances. The 
application of these ideas to my topic is that while actively participating in PB represents 
the process aspect of such political liberty and social power, the opportunity aspect would 
be that of being a resident in a municipality that does PB, and being eligible and enabled 
to participate meaningfully in deciding priorities for individual and communal well-being. 
Among the real valued opportunities might be the capabilities to be healthy, adequately 
nourished, and adequately informed/educated. On the other hand, the opposite concept—
unfreedom—can come about because, for example, a person is denied the right of voting 
or because inadequate opportunities, such as involuntary starvation, may impede the 
individual from achieving his/her minimum goals or basic capabilities. Again, in the PB 
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context, the absence of such participatory bodies (or the absence of any other means to 
constitute a forum with a similar reach), where citizens can deliberate about what their 
priorities are and hold politicians (and themselves) accountable for the implementation of 
such priorities, is an unfreedom when compared to those who have such forums available.  
Because unfreedom impedes individuals from attaining their minimum goals, Sen 
understands poverty as a lack of opportunities, a social deprivation, and, finally, a deficit 




David Crocker has broadened the scope of the capability approach to feature a more 
explicit and nuanced accounts than Sen of agency and democratic participation and their 
implications for ethically-based development. As such, his contributions can be 
characterized as an “agency-oriented” capability approach.  
In his book Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability and Deliberative 
Democracy, Crocker (2008), in agreement with Sen, presents his view that development 
should be studied by considering not only measures of growth and economic progress, but 
also by considering its normative aspect, which includes posing moral questions and 
providing answers through public discussion and deliberation. From this perspective, 
Crocker argues that a developed society “is one whose established institutions realize or 
approximate (what the proponent believes to be) worthwhile goals. These goals include the 
overcoming of economic and social deprivation” (p. 42). He stresses that development 
should not treat human beings as tools for development; instead, human beings are the 
center and reason for development.   
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Regarding capabilities, Crocker’s view is similar to Sen’s—he views capabilities 
or freedoms as the set of functionings open to the person, given the person’s personal 
characteristics as well as economic and social constraints. Agency, for him (following Sen), 
is a super-capability that enables an agent to select and prioritize other freedoms or 
capabilities and implement them in the world. Moreover, agency, which comes in kinds 
and degrees, is something all human beings should have at least at a basic level (as well as 
be over a basic threshold of well-being). Exercising agency implies an active deliberation 
about values and options for action, as well as choice making and impact on the world. For 
Crocker “individuals and communities are agents to the extent that they scrutinize reasons 
for various courses of action, decide for themselves, act, and have an impact in the world” 
(2012, p. 48). From this latter ideal, one could infer that the more an individual or a 
community is able to move beyond being a mere effect of impersonal causes or the passive 
recipient or the actions of others, and instead conceive of, deliberate about, decide on, and 
realize goals and policies on their own, the more agency they enjoy.  Although agency can 
be exercised to do bad things, such as reduce the agency and violate the rights of others, 
when used responsibly and informed by an ideal of moral equality, agency results in the 
achievement of valuable functionings for the agent and others. By engaging in a public 
deliberation and making decisions concerning proposals for policy and action, a setting, 
such as PB can—and is likely to—serve as a platform for groups to realize and protect 
valued capabilities.14 If such ideal is realized, then authentic development is attained—
14Connecting the idea of agency with that of citizenship, Posas (2003) makes an important point: the condition 
of citizenship should not only be analyzed from the angle of belonging to a political community; instead, it 
should also be analyzed from the capacity to act and have the ability to produce significant changes, and such 
changes should be judged based on the values and objectives of the social subjects. This capacity to choose 
and accomplish goals is what Sen and Crocker identify as agency, and recognize as essential for a full sense 
of citizenship in a democratic society. For Posas, it is agency, indeed, that allows citizens to confront 
successfully the existence of inequality, social exclusion and poverty in our societies. He explains that agency 
 22 
                                                 
“Authentic development occurs when groups at whatever level become subjects who 
deliberate, decide, and act in the world rather than being either victims of circumstance or 
objects of someone else’s decisions, the tool of someone else’s designs” (2008, p. 339). 
As a way to better conceptualize agency, Crocker derives from Sen’s works four 
elements:  
(1) self-determination: the person decides for himself or herself rather than 
someone or something else making the decision to do X; (2) reason 
orientation and deliberation: the person bases his or her decisions not on 
whims or impulses but on reasons, such as the pursuit of goals; (3) action: 
the person performs or has a role in performing X; and (4) impact on the 
world: the person thereby brings about (or contributes to bringing about) 
change in the world. (2012, p. 80) 
For Crocker, a person is an agent and exercises agency to the extent that his or her 
actions realize each and all of these components. I will come back to these criteria when 
evaluating PB’s effect on individuals and communities perceptions of their own agency. 
I see the freedom for and achievement of agency as the link that connects human 
development and an active, responsible, and creative citizenship, which in turn should be 
a key aspect in a democratic society. Now to use this framework for the evaluation of the 
democratic quality of PB, let’s turn to Crocker’s views on democracy. He believes that 
democracy should be analyzed not as an either/or affair, but rather as a more-or-less 
phenomenon. He explains that groups are more or less democratic along five dimensions: 
breadth, depth, range, control, and separation or plurality of institutional powers. The 
enables citizens to: 1) effectively participate in the political decisions that govern their lives, 2) participate 
together with the other citizens, in the decisions about “what,” “how” and “for whom” the decisions and 
changes are made, and 3) establish the required social links to act—with a spirit of tolerance, respect and 
negotiation in differing solutions—on their surroundings and transform them.  
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dimension of breadth refers to the degree of inclusiveness,15 that is, a more inclusive 
democracy is that which has wider participation from various groups and individuals, for 
example, the least advantaged. Depth refers to the modes of participation, a democracy 
where only voting occurs is not as deep as one in which other modes, such as free 
discussion and deliberation, also take place. To illuminate some of the different modes of 
participation, Crocker proposes—in relation to the degrees to which citizens exercise 
agency—the following classification for participation in decision-making:16 (1) nominal 
participation, (2) passive participation, (3) consultative participation, (4) petitionary 
participation, (5) participatory implementation, (6), bargaining, and (7) deliberative 
participation. “The further we go down the list, the ‘thicker” is the participatory mode in 
the sense of more fully expressing individual or collective agency” (Crocker, 2008, p. 344).  
Going back to democracy’s dimensions, range alludes to the kind of questions that 
citizens can have a say on, and to the kinds of institutions that are democratic (which may 
include non-governmental institutions/groups). The control dimension is about the extent 
to which individuals can influence decisions and make a difference in the world. Finally, 
the separation of power refers to institutional balance among governmental institutions and 
between them and non-governmental bodies, such as a free press, political parties, unions, 
and independent advocacy groups. To avoid domination, in which some unfairly diminish 
the agency of others, it is important in democracy that there be countervailing powers.17 
15 It must be noted that even inclusive democratic models differ with respect to which inhabitants are counted 
as (full) citizens.   
16 For specific definitions of these modes of participation see Annex one. 
17 Anticipating some of the dimensions set forth by Crocker, Carson and Hartz-Karp (2005) characterize 
deliberative democracy as a process that requires: “Influence: capacity to influence policy and decision-
making; Inclusion: representative of population, inclusive of diverse viewpoints and values, equal 
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There may be limits to each of these dimensions and more of one may mean less of 
another. For example, more inclusiveness may result in less depth. Similarly, there may be 
plenty of democratic deliberation regarding a wide set of issues, but little impact is 
achieved. One democratic task is to decide—in a particular context—on the limits of each 
dimension, the balance of the different dimensions, and the demands as well as the limits 
of that decision-making process.  
Crocker argues that democracy is, in addition to its instrumental and constructive 
value, intrinsically valuable because it provides citizens with agency 
freedom/achievement. For democracy provides citizens with opportunities to exercise the 
intrinsic good of agency both individually and collectively, shape public policies, and 
influence beneficial change. As an advocate of deliberative democracy, Crocker puts 
emphasis on the exchange of reasons in the making of democratic decisions—the 
democratic process of debate and deliberation aims to identify and solve concrete problems 
and to provide a fair way in which free and equal members of a group can present proposals 
justified in a way that others can understand and accept. In this way, members can 
overcome their differences and reach more or less agreement about action and policy (see 
pp. 310-12).  Sometimes, agreement is unanimous; more often, it involves voting, but the 
winning majority often seeks to do justice to the minority’s concerns. In Chapter 5, I 
discuss the ways in which PB succeeds and fails to realize these features of Crocker’s 
model of democracy, and the ways it presents problems that could be overcome by evolving 
more and better democracy within the PB context. 
opportunity to participate; and Deliberation: open dialogue, access to information, space to understand and 
reframe issues, respect, movement toward consensus” (p. 2). 
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The capability approach is without question broader and more complex than what 
the previous lines suggest, but the explanations of agency, democracy, and development as 
understood by capability scholars like Sen and Crocker capture a lens by which DR’s PB 
will be analyzed, hence making this literature review an appropriate theoretical framework. 
However, I believe that we must add to our lens by appealing to some additional ideas from 
the literatures of participatory and deliberative democracy. Hence, I will take a step outside 
the capability approach to include a discussion of both models of democracy. 
 
2.3 Participatory and Deliberative Democracy 
No matter how history is read, one can definitely find different types of relations 
between the state and civil society. Since the emergence of nation-states, both the state and 
society have fought for their own autonomy and power, arriving at situations such as 
absolutism, in which civil society has little to say; democracy, in which civil society plays 
a role in the political affairs and governance; and anarchy, in which state governance is 
altogether absent. Democracy, the type of governance of interest here, is not understood or 
practiced in the same manner across time or geography.18 Today, one can talk of different 
views of democracy that range from a minimalist perspective, which only embraces voting, 
individual liberty, and the rule of law; to a maximalist one, which emphasizes empirically 
and promotes normatively the relationship between the state and the citizens, as well as 
18  Regardless of the different ways in which democracy is carried out, Dahl (2010) synthesizes three 
necessary conditions for democracy, in general: “1) control of military and police by elected officials; 2) 
democratic beliefs and political culture; and 3) no strong foreign control hostile to democracy” (p. 147). He 
also sets forth two non-necessary, yet favorable conditions for democracy: “1) a modern market economy 
and society; and 2) weak subcultural pluralism” (p. 147). See, Chapter 12 of Dahl’s (2010) On Democracy, 
to expand on these conditions to democracy. 
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their civic, political and social rights. Due to these differences, the literature has made 
distinctions among models of democracy, and their correspondent characteristics.19 In the 
current study I focus on two models: participatory and deliberative democracy (P/DD). 
These two models of democracy can be tracked back to antiquity, especially to 
ancient Greece. Different from contemporary politics where citizens are usually passive 
subjects in policy-making, Ober (2010) explains that in classical Athens, especially, policy-
making needed to satisfy not only experts, but also the community, from which vital 
information was gathered and taken as useful knowledge for policy-making. This use of 
innovative participatory institutions of self-government made ordinary Athenian citizens 
just as responsible for public affairs as experts, making the former group politically capable 
without becoming political masters of all government practices.20  
Since the 1960s, the notions of P/DD have re-emerged. Hendriks (2010) defines 
participatory democracy as an integrative (non-majoritarian) and direct or face-to-face 
(self-governing) type of democracy; it combines direct self-governance, with integrative 
decision-making in a face-to-face power-free dialogue where people deliberate over issues 
together. In a participatory democracy model, citizens play a role of player/speaker (i.e., 
voting is not the only task of citizens). As a result, speaking in public, cooperating, and 
participating actively are crucial citizen activities/responsibilities. Hendriks (2010) states 
that one of the main characteristics of participatory democracy is that, “it is shaped 
interactively from the bottom up,” which refers to how the democratic process consists 
19 See David Held’s Models of Democracy, 2006, and Frank Hendriks’ Vital Democracy: A Theory of 
Democracy in Action, 2010. 
20 Ober (2010) explains that one of such innovative institutions was the Council of 500: a group of 500 elected 
citizens representing the different tribes/demes, with the responsibility of deciding which matters to discuss 
and decide in the full Assembly of Athenian citizens (which was open to all men in good standing). 
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largely—if not entirely—of citizens’ active participation rather than rule by elected 
politicians and appointed technocrats. According to Ober (2010), one valuable normative 
outcome of this model of democracy is that it expands “the scope for human flourishing 
through the exercise of individuals’ political capacity to associate with others in public 
decision making” (p. 5). 
In the case of deliberative democracy, Baiocchi (2003) refers to it as a 
substantive—in contrast to a normatively neutral, purely procedural—version of 
democracy based on public justification. “It calls for the deliberation of citizens as 
reasonable equals in the legitimate exercise of authority. It offers a way of transforming 
the preferences and intentions of citizens to enhance the possibilities for social 
cooperation” (p. 46). Developing the concept of deliberative democracy, Crocker (2008) 
states that “the point of deliberation is to provide a fair way for morally free and equal 
group members to cooperate together and forge... a reasoned agreement about their goals, 
values, policies, and actions.21 As a result, deliberative democracy publicly ‘transforms’ 
rather than merely aggregates preferences” (p. 312). Deliberative democracy encompasses 
a justification and transformation of preferences, rather than taking them as given, as occurs 
in merely aggregative forms of democracy, where what matters is only stated preferences 
and not reasons (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004).22 By comparing this definition to that of 
21  Ober (2010) adds that a “democratic commitment to deliberation requires decisions to be made by 
persuasive discourse and reciprocal reason-giving, while democratic tolerance for political dissent allows 
critics to expose inconsistencies between core values and current practices” (p. 4). 
22 Without a doubt, aggregative forms of democracy have important advantages, among which can be 
highlighted their ability to produce determinate outcomes and the uncontroversial way in which disagreement 
can be handled; these advantages show the neutrality embedded in such models. One of the main 
disadvantages, however, is that aggregative democracy may reinforce existing inequalities in society and 
does not offer principles to contest whether a result is or is not unfair (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004).  
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an aggregative and representative democracy,23 in which citizens participate by merely 
electing their representatives and other leaders, it is then clear how deliberative democracy 
enables the functioning of a more active and engaged citizenship in public affairs.  It should 
be noted that in deliberative democracy, deliberation can and should take place within 
representative or appointed bodies as well as between representatives and their 
constituents. 
Fung and Wright (2003) sum up the principles of participatory democracy in a way 
that brings together participatory and deliberative democracy (P/DD). They argue that what 
they call “empowered participatory governance” is participatory in its practical 
orientation—bottom-up participation, and face-to-face solution-generation. For example, 
in Brazil’s PB, face-to-face deliberation about local problems takes place in neighborhood 
assemblies. However, these groups also elect representatives to city-wide bodies that in 
turn deliberate about city-wide priorities and policies. Gutmann and Thompson, two 
vigorous proponents of deliberative democracy for the US, identify a multiplicity of sites 
for governance by deliberation, for example, the US Senate and the Supreme Court. 
Even though one of the clear differences between participatory and deliberative 
democracy is that the former only occurs in face-to-face relationship, while the latter also 
can involve deliberators who themselves are elected (with or without prior deliberation), it 
might also be noted that some scholars—for example, Hendriks—insist that participatory 
23 I hereby summarize some of the main differences between an aggregative (voter) democracy and a 
participatory one, as in Hendriks (2010), Figure 6.1: a) In a voter democracy an aggregation of individual 
preferences forges public opinion, while in a participatory democracy this happens by more than just adding 
individual preferences; b) bigger populations are better for statistical aggregation in voter democracy, 
whereas quality matters more for participatory democracy rather than quantity; c) the best match in a voter 
democracy is made between consumers and suppliers of public goods, while in  a participatory democracy 
the main match is between citizens who engage in deliberation; free speech of free agents fuels a voter 
democracy, whereas committed dialogue does the same for participatory democracy (see p. 108). 
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democracy always employs decision-making by absolute consensus. Most theorists and 
practitioners of deliberative democracy, in contrast, argue that absolute consensus often 
has the defect of either protecting the status quo or giving a minority unfair power. Hence, 
deliberative democracy sometimes endorses majority rule, but only following efforts to 
reach consensus and to embody minority concerns in the result of voting.  In the rest of this 
dissertation I will emphasize DR’s PB processes as examples of face-to-face participation 
in which deliberation is a prominent feature.  
Gutmann and Thompson (2004) set forth four necessary conditions for deliberative 
democracy:  
(1) Deliberative democracy needs to be reciprocal—the reasons behind each side’s 
arguments should be acceptable to free and equal individuals interested in fair cooperation;  
(2) Deliberative democracy needs to be accessible—reasons must be expressed in 
public and communicated in a language that can be equally understood by all stakeholders;  
(3) Deliberative democracy needs to be binding—whatever the decision that is 
made with deliberations, it should be enforced for some period of time (in other words, 
deliberations are not just talk, but instead a process that leads to action by a responsible 
party); and  
(4) Deliberative democracy needs to be dynamic or provisional—participants’ 
ideas can be transformed through reason-giving dialogue, and such transformation of ideas 
may change previous decisions.  
Based on these conditions, Crocker (2008) follows Gutmann and Thompson and 
proposes three deliberative ideals that should regulate deliberations:  
(1) reciprocity—“each group member makes proposals and offers justifications in 
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terms that others can understand and can accept” (p.312);  
(2) publicity—each member is free to engage in the deliberative process, which 
must be transparent to all; and  
(3) accountability—each group member must offer acceptable reasons and be 
accountable to other deliberators.  
I revisit these necessary conditions and ideals when assessing the democratic 
quality of PB assemblies in Chapter 5.  
Just as there is no formation in football that does not have merits as well as 
weaknesses (an aggressive attacking offense leaves a side vulnerable to counter attacks), 
so any approach to governance will have strengths as well as weaknesses, the latter which 
may to some extent be mitigated by institutional designs. In Table 1, which now follows, I 
summarize current views of the promises and advantages, 24  as well as the risks and 
disadvantages of participatory/deliberative institutions.  
Table 1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Participatory/Deliberative Democracy (P/DD) 
Advantages Disadvantages or Risks 
• P/DD creates equal opportunities for all members of a group to make 
meaningful contributions to the decision-making process. That is, it 
illustrates and promotes a form of egalitarianism. 
• P/DD increases people’s perception of the legitimacy of the political 
system and it increases faith in the democratic process since people who 
deliberate become authors of the process, become empowered, and feel 
that the political system is indeed “of the people” (Fishkin, 1995) 
• P/DD seeks to broaden the range of people who have access to such 
opportunities That is, it increases Crocker’s breadth dimension of 
democracy, especially those previously marginalized or without voice 
• P/DD allows communities to solve issues that affect each of them directly, 
and that the solution are likely to result in better quality of life, at least in 
distributive terms. That is, it promotes the common good and social 
• When participation is not fair, 
discussion-based decision-
making may be affected by the 
existence of powerful groups 
(e.g., the elite) who may 
manipulate the conversation by 
enhancing their own position 
to advance their own interests 
• Ordinary citizens are 
sometimes happy to leave 
political decision-making to 
the authorities, since most have 
no time for lengthy nights of 
democratic participation and 
24 Luigi Pellizzoni summarizes the positive consequences of deliberation by claiming that “it produces ‘better 
citizens: individuals who are more informed, active, responsible, open to the arguments of others, 
cooperative, fair, able to deal with problems, [and] ready to alter their opinions” (as in Steiner, 2012, p. 222).  
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justice. One reason justice is more likely than in aggregative democracy 
is that participants must consider how acceptable and fair one’s views and 
votes will be in front of other people, rather than just in relation to one’s 
own interests. 
• P/DD allows people to discover the benefits and enjoyment of collective 
efforts 
• P/DD increases transparency and accountability, since decisions are made 
publically and representatives and local authorities are held accountable 
• P/DD widens knowledge about one’s own and other people’s needs, 
experiences, and ideas (Delli Carpini et al., 2004) 
• P/DD produces greater levels of consensus and increases tolerance for 
opposing points of view (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996) 
• P/DD fosters win-win situations for most if not all participants 
 
• P/DD promotes both the most justifiable conceptions when dealing with 
moral disagreements among the participants (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2004) 
 
• P/DD recognizes and promotes human dignity because it expresses 
individual and collective agency (Crocker, 2008) 
 
• P/DD represents one means of democratizing in the larger national 
sphere, as it provides access to the disadvantaged to engage in democratic 
participation and to be part of social change (Dreze & Sen, 2002) 
• P/DD creates formal linkages of responsibility, resource distribution, and 
communication, in a way that local units of empowered ordinary citizens 
are connected to other super-ordinate centralized authorities (Fung & 
Wright, 2003) 
• P/DD balances the importance of what happens before and after voting in 
the decision-making process (Crocker, 2012) 
deliberation—cost of 
participation is high 
(Mansbridge, 1980) 
• Most citizens lack the skills 
and/or opportunities to take on 
deliberations in an effective 
manner, and as a consequence 
a deliberative process can 
produce unintended results  
(Delli Carpini et al., 2004) 
• Similarly, for highly technical 
issues that require specialized 
knowledge, a decision arrived 
at by an ignorant group of 
average citizens might be 
detrimental 
• Class, educational, caste, 
ethnic, and other inequalities 
can be reproduced and even 
accentuated (Baiocchi, 2003) 
• Indeterminacy—there are too 
many power imbalances that 
make it difficult for 
deliberation to occur 
• The success of deliberations 
(including people’s 
motivations and capabilities to 
do so) is context dependent on 
cultural and institutional 
conditions. (Delli Carpini et 
al., 2004) 
 
In the following analysis, I proceed as if deliberative democracy is a case of 
participatory (face-to-face) democracy in which deliberations are a crucial step in the 
aggregation and transformation of preferences. 
 
2.4 Understanding Participatory Budgeting 
When PB is analyzed in places where it has been implemented, its experimental, 
innovative, and flexible nature becomes apparent. Although the exact process of PB varies 
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from one place to the other, generally it can be described as one of democratic participation 
and deliberation in decision-making, in which ordinary citizens have a direct voice in the 
way a portion of a municipal budget is allocated. More formally, according to Shah (2007), 
PB is “a tool for educating, engaging, and empowering citizens and strengthening demand 
for good governance” (p. 1). PB follows a bottom-up design, in which all citizens, rather 
than a selected few, can participate in their respective community assemblies. As Avritzer 
(2009) explains, PB is also bottom-up because the government does not have a vote, only 
a voice—the municipal governments bounds itself to facilitating the process of deliberation 
and leaves—at least some—decisions to the people.  
The first experience of PB is usually tracked back to 1989 in Porto Alegre, Brazil. 
It came about as a citizen and institutional response to local problems—such as sanitation 
and infrastructure—and the limited resources and competence of the local government, 
often caused by income and social inequalities in the municipality.  
Defined as a democratic practice and a participatory institution, PB has features of 
both direct and representative democracy approaches in the making of budgets.25 PB is 
direct because it offers citizens an open entry and face-to-face opportunity to influence the 
allocation of public resources by deliberating, negotiating, and engaging in decision-
making; and PB is also representative as communities elect representatives to the second 
level (the municipality). To highlight these mixed features, it is important to note that in 
some PB experiences, such as in Brazil and the DR, it is individual citizens who vote in 
25 Selee and Peruzzotti (2009) present two interesting remarks about this dual democratic characteristic of 
PB: on the one hand, that a direct democracy practice like PB is likely to work well in smaller communities 
since it enables face-to-face interaction and the creation of strong social norms among residents. The authors 
also claim that modern and complex societies require representation as a way to safeguard political equality, 
a feature that is a fundamental idea of democracy. In chapter 5 I present evidence that validates this double 
perspective. 
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PB, at least in the first-level assemblies, and then represent their neighborhoods in second 
or higher level assemblies; whereas in other cases, for instance, Peru, participation follows 
a “corporate model” from the start, where voting participants are strictly representing 
CSOs.  
It is also important to highlight the link between the academic literatures of PB and 
P/DD, both of which have as objectives prompting more effective citizen participation in 
the development of policies and political decision-making (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). 
In many instances, and certainly in the case of the DR to be studied in the following 
chapters, PB includes deliberative processes, in which ordinary citizens are given a voice, 
within a respectful and egalitarian process, that enables them to influence social change. 
However, and as pointed out by Wampler and Hartz-Karp, such deliberation in PB is not 
as robust as it is in programs that focus primarily on deliberative processes.. The authors 
find that “deliberative practices associated with PB often fall short of the standards set in 
the academic literature for high-quality public deliberation” (p. 1).26 The questions of 
interest become whether the limited decision-making power that is transmitted to ordinary 
citizens via PB can influence the way in which local authorities allocate resources, and 
whether purely deliberative processes can overcome the failure of past experiences in 
achieving substantive change. I revisit these questions in subsequent chapters. 
With PB’s link between participation and deliberation, it is necessary to understand 
the deliberation that occurs within PB not only as the public debate that takes place during 
assemblies, but also as “part of a broader ongoing conversation among citizens and 
26 Regardless of such relative failure of deliberations within PB, Wampler and Hartz-Karp still believe that 
deliberative practices within PB are relevant to deliberative democracy scholars given its widespread 
expansion that have transformed PB into one of the “most widely used form od deliberative, participatory 
policymaking in the world” (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012, p.1). 
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government officials” (Wampler, 2012, p.9). Wampler explains that deliberations provide 
important lessons for participants who may never have had access to political power before: 
they gain information, learn how authority is exercised, gain a glimpse of the decision-
making process government officials go through when facing difficult trade-offs, and make 
bonds with other citizens whom they would otherwise most likely not have met.  
The nature of PB deliberations can be very different, and in some communities—
when compared with ideal public deliberation—it looks a lot like “strategic bargaining”.27  
Chapter 5 will analyze the variety of such strategic and deliberative interactions that take 
place in the DR before, during, and after PB assemblies, and where and how such bonds of 
solidarity and alliances are formed. The analysis will show the equal (and even greater) 
importance of informal deliberations outside of PB’s structured meetings when compared 
to official deliberations. As Wampler explains, and as the evidence will show later for the 
DR case, “PB depends on the crafting of these alliances because the success of these 
programs depends on having a robust number of citizens who are willing to participate 
each year” (Wampler, 2012, p. 11). This discussion could be summed up with the idea that 
deliberation should be analyzed not only based on the content of what is said and done 
during PB public consultations, but also on the growth of the public sphere and its wider 
societal effects (Wampler, 2012).  
Another important normative implication of PB is that it serves as a tool for 
decentralizing or local decision-making power—PB “contributes to democratic deepening 
if and when it expands the scope and depth of citizen participation in public decision-
27 Andrew Selee (2009) documents a similar finding for deliberations in participatory institutions in Tijuana, 
Mexico, without disregarding how such “strategic deliberations” still “increase the range of issues and voices 
involved in the debate” (p. 13). 
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making” (Heller, 2001, p.140). However, such expansion of power is not guaranteed by 
the mere existence of the process. Wampler (2012) explains that when PB is analyzed as a 
social change tool, two types of processes should be distinguished: one designed to produce 
desired social change and one led by the government and its CSOs allies to make nothing 
more than marginal improvements that minimally serve their purposes of holding onto 
power.  Regardless of the reason behind the design of a PB, Wampler assumes that citizens 
tend to support it insofar as they are able to identify beneficial changes due to their 
participation. In contrast, when citizens do not perceive tangible and good change in their 
lives, participation is unlikely to continue. In Wampler’s terms “support for improving 
democratic legitimacy is not an abstract ideological position, but it is linked to increasing 
individuals’ empowerment and improvements in social well-being” (p.2). Although this 
study, unfortunately, does not observe the stage of project execution that leads to such 
improvements, later chapters do analyze participation in terms of the dimensions alluded 
to in the preceding lines (i.e., depth, breadth, control and range). 
Let us now turn to discuss briefly the benefits and risks of PB. If done right, as 
shown in Table 2, PB presents many benefits, both pragmatically and from a social justice 
perspective: (a) it enhances transparency and accountability, (b) it reduces patronage and 
clientelism, (c) it strengthens local social capital,28 (d) it produces more egalitarian social 
policies by inserting civil society (a grassroots dimension) into the broader polity, (e) it 
strengthens inclusive governance by allowing the least advantaged to voice their opinions 
and influence decision-making and (f) it enables governments to move beyond political 
28 Putnam (1993) defines it as the “glue” in social life that enables “participants to act together more 
effectively to pursue shared objectives” developing in the process trust, norms and networks (p.167).  
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parties and informal networks to obtain information about citizens’ preferences.  As a 
bonus, PB can also help change the way citizens think about problems, moving individuals 
to a belief in the importance of collective solutions to public or common problems.  
Regardless of the attractiveness of this list of strengths, PB also comes with major 
risks, which are summarized below. Among them is the danger that elites may capture the 
process and results. These elites are of various kinds, such as economic, political, 
intellectual, ethnic/religious or gender (Shah, 2007). This capture can perpetuate—through 
manipulation and other abuses of power—existing social injustices by eclipsing or 
overriding the participation of marginalized groups. Another danger is that people may 
view PB as yet another consultative exercise with no real delivery of solutions for basic 
needs. Also worrisome is that the information that governments obtain through PB 
regarding citizens’ political and policy preferences, could be used not to affect social 
change positively, but to reinforce government maintenance of and control over the status 
quo (Wampler, 2012).  Finally, as we shall see, there is also the risk of the DR version of 
PB, for it may create unrealistic expectations that all communities will be winners when, 
in fact, only a limited number of communities have their proposals funded. 
Here is a summary of the advantages and risks of PB: 
 
Table 2. Advantages and Risks of PB 





• Be hijacked by elites/interest groups who may 
abuse it by exercising illegitimate and unjust 
power29 
29 This includes the case of autocratic leaders presented by Cameron, Hershberg and Sharpe (2012) when 
referring to potential antidemocratic pitfalls in the expansion of participatory processes like PB: “ autocratic 
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• Absence/avoidance of patronage and 
clientelism 
• Social Capital 
• Egalitarian social policies 
• Inclusive governance 
• Direct communication of citizens’ 
preferences 
• Collective action 
• Exclude groups from decision-making 
(especially the most vulnerable or deprived) 
• Perpetuate existing social disparities 
• Be viewed as a bandwagon 
• Elevate the expectations of all participants, 
when not all can win 
• Decrease participation (and public learning) 
over time if focused on specific public works 
(i.e., people stop participating after the 
improvements they need have been made) 
 
With these benefits and risks in mind, it is now useful to explore possible pre-
requisites for the success of PB. Heller (2001) argues that “the building of local democratic 
government, even under the most favorable conditions, is anything but linear. It requires 
not only that a favorable political alignment be maintained but that a delicate and workable 
balance between the requirements of institution building and grassroots participation be 
struck” (p. 133). Analyses of different countries’ experiences highlight the importance of 
such historical, legislative, and cultural contexts—which not all may look the same—for 
the success of PB settings, For example, Goldfrank (2007) identified lessons from Latin 
American cases in Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru. He found that despite 
significant design challenges for PB, it has succeeded across localities with very different 
underlying conditions. Without claiming them as necessary and sufficient conditions, 
Goldfrank finds that the following five factors typically correlate with PB success: (1) the 
majority of participants are of an indigenous ethnicity, from a party of the left, or both;30 
(2) there is weak or non-existent opposition from local political elites; (3) national or 
leaders may deploy these institutions not to buttress citizen autonomy but to maximize their own power at 
the expense of their opponents” (p. 6). 
30 These two factors are not relevant to consider in the case study that follows, since in the DR there is no 
significant difference in ideology between the two major political parties, both of which have center-left 
political discourses and together have about 97% of the national vote. Moreover, in the DR there are no 
indigenous peoples or other minority ethnic groups. 
 38 
                                                 
international aid agencies provide funding or technical assistance; (4) the municipality has 
enough revenues to make significant investments in projects and programs; and (5) there 
is a strong sense of civic engagement, and civil society organizations (CSOs) that have not 
been destroyed by guerrilla warfare31 or clientelist politics. Goldfrank carefully clarifies 
that even though PB has succeeded in some dimensions, there is no evidence of dramatic 
reduction of poverty levels. 
For the Brazilian case, Baiocchi et al. (2010) find that PB increases transparency, 
encourages innovation, improves accountability, strengthens the political capacity of civil 
society, and incentivizes agency by providing tangible returns in the form of investment 
projects that the participants have chosen. The authors find that PB has potential to realize 
pragmatic and normative goals as long as there is a “high” willingness from civil society 
to participate and “high” willingness from the municipal power to not just foster a 
consultative and non-binding participation, but to delegate authority to ordinary citizens in 
a way that they can truly influence policy-making. 
Folscher (2007a) examines a different region, Central and Eastern Europe, and 
finds that citizens are skeptical of the prospects of PB and collective action because 
historically they have been detached from decisions that affect them. She explains that 
these informants, seeing themselves to be merely passive recipients of public services, 
believe that they cannot affect what local governments do about their problems.  This 
suggests that people in Folscher’s study would report low levels of agency (certainly low 
agency achievement, but possibly, low agency freedom as well). At the same time, another 
31 This is yet another factor non-relevant in the DR scenario, since DR has had no internal conflict since the 
1960’s. 
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factor that characterizes PB in this region is that, with few exceptions, NGOs have initiated 
PB and funded it, which, according to Folscher, makes PB and the collective decisions it 
generates less valuable and less sustainable. This evidence confirms the assumption that 
local government autonomy and local resource availability are favorable enabling 
conditions for successful PB. 
Folscher (2007b) also examines Asian experiences and finds that whether PB 
programs are successful depends both on environmental factors, such as public actors 
willing to listen to each other, and on the design and implementation of PB, such as well-
designed mechanisms that allow citizens direct access to participate. She finds that 
participation is counterproductive in cases where local officials and office holders have no 
real interest in aligning policy and spending with citizens’ preferences. This evidence 
shows that the political support of the authorities is vital to the success of PB and that not 
only the quality of deliberation and participation among citizens matter. Folscher’s findings 
for Asia are in line with what He (2011) finds for the particular case of China, where 
officials seem to be using programs like PB to solidify their power, rather than to expand 
that of citizens’ (as in Wampler, 2012).  
Finally, also adding to the importance of the political context, Heller (2001) finds 
that bottom-up and grassroots democratic initiatives in Kerala (India) and Porto Alegre 
have had successful expansion and results because they were part of a political project and 
counted with strong local government support. 
The brief summary I have presented depicts the strong potential of institutional 
reforms of this participatory kind to produce transformative consequences. However, this 
result only happens where decision-making power is at least partially given to citizens, so 
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that they become authors of their own lives. Moreover, some prior conditions, such as a 
strong civil society and the political willingness of local authorities, seem to be clear 
determinants that favor the success of such inclusionary practices. It is important to note, 
however, that these enabling conditions are helpful or favorable rather than necessary prior 
conditions, for they can also develop in and through PB itself. I will subsequently evaluate 
whether these conditions enable PB in the DR context. 
 
2.5 Participatory Budgeting in the Dominican Republic  
Before explaining how PB is done in the DR, it is necessary to provide a brief 
country overview. Note that in Chapters 3 and 5 I will provide a more detailed description 
of the characteristics of the municipalities and the local PB processes under analysis. 
2.5.1 The Dominican Republic – Brief Country Overview 
The DR is a developing country with the largest economy in the Central America 
and Caribbean region. It occupies two thirds of an island shared with Haiti and has a surface 
area of 48,442 square kilometers (about 16,000 square kilometers larger than the state of 
Maryland). The country is divided in 32 provinces, which, as I have noted, are then divided 
into municipalities or municipal districts (which are equivalent to cities). Municipalities 
are divided into zones, zones into blocks, and blocks into communities/neighborhoods 
(barrios).  
The Dominican population approximates 10.28 million inhabitants. This population 
is predominantly of mixed European and African origin. No ethnicities derived from 
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indigenous groups persist.32 Highlands and mountains with fertile valleys dominate the 
geography of the Dominican side of the island. The main industries are tourism, sugar 
processing, mining (ferronickel and gold), textiles, cement, and tobacco.  
The country has been governed by a representative democracy (heavily 
presidentialist). For the last 18 years the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (Dominican 
Liberation Party) and the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (Dominican Revolutionary 
Party) have held power (the latter only for four years, 2000-2004, of the 18). There are no 
significant ideological differences between these two political parties. 
According to World Bank indicators for 2012, the DR’s current (US$) gross 
domestic product increased to 59.05 billion and its current (US$) gross national income 
per capita to $5,740. Between 1991 and 2012, the Dominican economy grew at an average 
rate of 5.8 percent per year. Nonetheless, such economic growth has not translated into an 
equal progress in human development indicators. By 2011, around 40% of the population 
was considered poor, a situation aggravated by a declining access to basic public services 
and significant problems in service delivery. The 2013 World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Index placed the country in the 105th position (out of 144 countries); the 
low scores responded to problematic factors such as government corruption (which 
includes clientelism and nepotism as well as embezzlement of public funds), wastefulness 
32 The Hispaniola or Santo Domingo island was populated in pre-Columbian times by an indigenous group 
called Taínos. The Taínos, however, became quickly extinct due to forced labor and diseases brought by the 
Spaniards, who discovered the island in Christopher Columbus’ first voyage. Columbus imported African 
slaves, so that production could be kept at similar levels regardless of the decrease in numbers of indigenous 
laborers. Spain made Santo Domingo the first city of the new world. In 1697, Spain conceded the Western 
part of the island to France, hence, Haiti or Saint Domingue (as it was then known) emerged. Haiti claimed 
its independence from France in 1804. The oriental portion of the island, or Santo Domingo Oriental, 
remained under Spain’s dominion until 1821. In 1822, after separating from Spain, Haiti invaded the eastern 
half if the island. It was not until 1844 that Santo Domingo obtained independence from Haiti, and used the 
name of Dominican Republic for the first time.  
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in government spending, organized crime, inefficient police services, trade and tax barriers, 
and an extremely low quality of electricity and public education. 
 
2.5.2 The Dominican Practice of PB 
According to Juan Castillo, a Fundación Solidaridad, 33 expert on the topic of 
citizen participation in the DR and PB, beginning in the 1990s, CSOs, NGOs and citizen 
participation in general took a new shape in the DR. These initial steps included the creation 
of neighborhood councils. This emergence of citizen participation was the result of 
substantial reforms to education and labor as well as DR’s transition to a new democracy 
after strongman Joaquín Balaguer’s exit from power. Before the 1990s the degree of 
integration of civil society depended largely on a mayor’ willingness to encourage such 
associations or on internal characteristics of a given community. The people’s participation 
in budget and investment decisions was not structured, and mostly negligible. Nowadays, 
however, such citizen involvement is seen as a right of citizenship and civil society, and 
no politician would ever pronounce himself against this sort of participation. However, 
Castillo believes that there is usually a disconnect between politicians’ discourse and 
reality, a claim that finds support in my observations from the case studies to be presented 
later.  
The origin of PB in the DR cannot be summarized as a single story for the whole 
nation—different municipalities have had different experiences. According to Allegretti et 
al (2011), PB emerged as an initiative of civil society in 85% of the municipalities that 
33 Fundación Solidaridad is a Dominican NGO based in Santiago that develops projects to strengthen the 
capacity of CSOs to produce change, projects of participatory democracy and transparency promotion, and 
training for CSOs and local governments in topics related to local development It has been a pioneer in the 
implementation of PB in the DR (see www.solidaridad.org.do). 
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employ it,34 and as an initiative of a public figure (e.g., a mayor) in 15%. The authors 
explain that the first experiences of PB in the DR can be traced to the late nineties when 
communities and leaders wanted to replicate the success of PB in other countries in the 
region, particularly Brazil, as well as to respond to increased interest in democratizing 
municipal governments and making them more effective. The first PB was held in the 
municipality of Villa González (in the province of Santiago), with assistance from 
Fundación Solidaridad, and technical support from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and several other international agencies.  
In 2005, as a result of efforts of different mayors, a coalition, which included the 
National Council for State Reform (CONARE), the National Federation of Municipalities 
(FEDOMU), and other national and international organizations, established a National Unit 
for the Technical Supervision and Assistance to Participatory Budgeting. This unit, with 
quarters in FEDOMU, would serve as the main body responsible for providing technical 
assistance to PB processes all over the country (Allegretti et al., 2011). Different 
institutions in this coalition would assist PB in different regions of the country. For 
example, Fundación Solidaridad took over the northwest, which included the already 
mentioned Villa González, and other institutions helped specific municipalities in the 
adoption of PB (Coalición, 2005). 
In 2007, as a consequence of a dramatic increase in the number of municipalities 
performing PB (see Table 3),35 the Dominican government enacted a new Municipal Law, 
34 Allegretti et al (2011) clarify that for the Dominican context the notion of civil society encompasses 
FEDOMU, NGOs, INGOs, foundations, and international agencies, rather than specifically local social 
actors.   
35 Although the increasing pattern is evident, FEDOMU as yet has provided no explanation of the dramatic 
decrease in the number of municipalities doing PB from 2010 to 2011.  
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Ley 176-07. FEDOMU suggests that such increase was due to good communication among 
municipalities, FEDOMU and other key players, methodological flexibility, political will, 
and the fact that municipalities have not prevented, avoided, or—waiting for ideal 
conditions—delayed the PB process.  
The Municipal Law establishes the process of PB as a mechanism of citizen 
participation—within all communities and neighborhoods—for the discussion, making, 
and monitoring of municipal budgets. 36  The law also specifies that forty percent of the 
budget for each municipality must be used for capital and investment expenditures.37 From 
this portion, (by consensus of local governments), 40% should be allocated by the people 
through PB assemblies for infrastructure and development projects that enhance the 
socioeconomic conditions of each locality.38 According to FEDOMU, of the annual PB 
investment, municipalities spend an average of 65-85%.  PB projects must belong to a fixed 
pre-approved list, which the government puts together for the whole country. This list 
includes such items as schools, road pavement, parks, and libraries; see Annex 2 for 
Santiago’s list as an example. Only in rare cases do PB processes have agendas with a 
thematic focus, such as youth opportunities or gender equity.  
36 The new Constitution of 2010 also establishes that municipal investments would be made through the 
progressive development of PB processes in order to foster the integration and co-responsibility of citizens 
in the definition, execution, and control of local development policies (Art 206).  
37 Most of the budget for a municipality comes from the 10% of the state’s revenues, which, as stipulated in 
the Law 166-03, must be transferred to the local governments. The capacity of municipalities to generate 
their own revenues is highly limited and represents, on average, less than a 13% (Allegretti et al., 2011). In 
any case, data from the National Office of Statistics (ONE) shows that municipalities on average have spent 
less than the 40% established by the law for non-financial assets. Also, it should be noted as a feature of the 
DR context, that municipal spending has represented around 3.5% of total public spending, which is already 
pretty low when compared to other countries, representing only an average of 17% of the GDP (data from 
ONE, 2004-2010). With such low figures, Allegretti et al (2011) conclude that the monetary capacity of 
Dominican municipalities is very low, both in relative and absolute terms (p. 141).  
38 I have extracted the 40% figure from report of SDE’s 2013 budget presented by the local government’s 
department of planning and programming. 
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Table 3. Expansion of PB in the Dominican Republic, 2003-2013 











Source: Reyes (2014, personal electronic mail communication) and Allegretti et al. (2011), based on Reyes 
(2010). 
 
The government’s reasons for mandating PB are found in the preface of the above-
mentioned law, and the following are some of the reasons especially relevant to the 
normative focus of this study:  
(a) a need exists for a new democratization process that facilitates the generation of 
a citizenry that is more aware, critical, and demanding;  
(b) based on a citizen’s right to establish municipal priorities for public projects and 
services, it is important to create channels for people’s direct participation;  
(c) it is important to inaugurate a new kind of municipal power based on citizen 
participation and transparency, institutionalized in a permanent process of consultation so 
that the population and the local government can jointly make decisions; and 
(d) it is important to provide local governments with indicators of the priorities that 
should be taken into account when elaborating budgets. 
The law also declares that it is a responsibility of local governments to provide all 
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means necessary for the organization of, invitation to,39 and celebration of all activities 
related to PB. One requirement would be the training of specialists and officials to facilitate 
all stages of the process, with special emphasis on the feasibility studies of proposed 
projects.  
Let us consider now the structure and process of a DR PB. A PB is divided into 
three stages, and the Law clearly sets forth the processes involved in each: 
Stage 1: Preparation, Diagnosis of Communal Problems, and Generation of the 
Strategic Vision for Development (Solving the Problems) 
This stage typically occurs between the months of July and September each year. 
During this time, the local authorities and organizations establish how and when the PB 
will be carried out, and determine the amount of money available (the latter is highly 
discretional). Resources are pre-allocated to groups of communities (so-called blocks) in 
the municipality based on their population size. Local government employees, who will 
serve as the PB facilitators, are also trained during this stage, and finally, the calendar of 
assemblies is distributed through various means of communication. 
Stage 2: Public Consultations  
This stage usually takes place annually between the months of September and 
December. Based on the available budget per block, the people identify their priorities and 
decide on the projects they want the local government to execute for their communities 
during the next fiscal year. Three sets of assemblies occur in sequence:  
39 The invitation to assemblies is usually done by sending letters to local organizations, putting up publicity 
signs, and/or uploading the calendar of assemblies to the local government’s website (when existent and 
functional). In Santo Domingo Este, according to the Memoirs of 2013 of the Vice-Mayor 
(http://www.asde.gov.do/Memorias%202012-2013/parte1.pdf), information about the 2013 PB assemblies 
were distributed through a publicity spot from the mayor in three radio stations, eight television channels and 
advertising signs placed in strategic places throughout the municipality. 
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- First, community assemblies (in localities with more than thirty families)40 give 
highest priority to three projects and elect four delegates who will represent them in 
subsequent block assemblies;  
- Second, block assemblies are held, and community representatives vote to select 
the projects for a block; and  
- Third, municipal assemblies meet, select municipal wide projects, and approve a 
Municipal Investment Plan.  
  The way in which local governments organize this sequence of assemblies 
diverges significantly from one municipality to the next. Each municipality has room to 
innovate with respect to its own way to do PB, but its selection is always founded on the 
three-stage basic process. Particular differences observed between the two PB 
municipalities evaluated will be highlighted in the multiple case studies presented in 
Chapter 5.  
In regards to the participation that is expected in these assemblies, four criteria are 
applied (in theory) to ensure broad participation: 1) representativeness: participation from 
at least one member of each family or household, 2) gender: balanced participation of 
women and men, 3) age: participation of people of different ages, and 4) leadership: 
participation of recognized leaders in the neighborhood or block (Allegretti et al., 2011, p. 
76). My observations of many assemblies suggest that these four criteria are neither binding 
nor always fulfilled (more on this later on). 
After the public consultations, and during the municipal assemblies, follow-up 
committees are formed. According to the law, among others responsibilities, the follow-up 
40 Santo Domingo Este also considers CSOs that meet the minimum size requirement.  
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committee:  
(a) supervises the progress of the local government in executing the annual 
investment plan approved through PB (and each project in particular) and evaluates it 
periodically;  
(b) knows the budget and nature of the PB projects;  
(c) encourages communities to participate in the execution of the projects and make 
sure they do what has been asked of them in accordance to the established agreements; and  




Stage 3: Transparency and Follow-up of the Municipal Investment Plan and 
Projects Execution  
This stage lasts for the whole calendar year; it starts in January after the second 
stage concludes in December of the previous year.  PB projects are executed throughout 
the year following a calendar that establishes when each project would be started. 
Communities elect a Social Auditing Committee to supervise construction works and 
maintenance of projects, once they are finished. Twice a year the mayor must publicly 
deliver reports to PB representatives.  
 
2.5.3 Normative Implications of PB based solely in the Law 
While implications derived from the field research done for this study will be 
presented later on, some brief and anticipatory notes are pertinent here about the normative 
implications of PB based solely in the normative expectations of a DR PB. On this point, 
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Allegretti et al (2011) remarks that although the law promotes the notions of local 
development, balanced civic participation, access to information, and gender equality, 
explicit objectives regarding social justice are in fact often disregarded (p. 67). Such 
shortcomings do not necessarily mean that PB participants seek no social justice, since 
many municipalities make special mention in their individual PB guides that they are 
directing resources towards the poorest and most vulnerable groups/sectors.  
Based on Goldfrank (2006), Allegretti et al also point out that the existence of a 
national legislation requiring PB is not necessarily entirely positive, since overly formal 
institutions can result, and, consequently, only existing and powerful organizations benefit 
from the process. Open debate and deliberation are more common when the process 
originates from local initiative. Another issue is how binding the law is: what is decided in 
a public consultation should be respected; but, in practice, it is common that a local 
government faces no legal sanction if it chooses not to carry out an already approved 
project. In a similar way, no repercussions tend to occur if local authorities get substantially 
delayed, beyond the annual cycle of each PB, in the execution of projects or choose to 
forgo PB completely in a given year. For example, conveniently, the breaking of ground 
for the 2012 projects approved in Santo Domingo Este occurred during the same week that 
was leading to the public event in which the mayor details public spending (rendicion de 
cuentas) during the previous cycle. Similarly, the mayor of Jarabacoa decided to skip 
altogether the PB in 2013 because the municipality had not been able to start the 2012 
works by the time the 2013 assemblies were supposed to have started. People thought 
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skipping the current year’s PB would allow them to sustain the credibility of the process.41 
Other critics, such as Castillo, also argue that including PB in the larger reformed municipal 
law has not been entirely positive, because, for him, at least, the discourse that PB 
empowers people has become highly politicized and is nothing more than a publicity stunt 
perpetrated by municipal authorities. 
Regardless of the organizational differences and the legal enforcement 
shortcomings, the PB process is likely to improve the quality of the democracy at the 
grassroots level, for the public consultations serve as participatory (and sometimes 
deliberative) forums for community/section members to voice (ultimately with a vote) what 
they believe the priorities of the community should be and use such priorities to try to 
influence the allocation of resources within the municipality. Consequently, public 
consultations give civil society an important role in the creation of development plans and 
implementation strategies and supervision (Ausland, 2010). One could then infer that, in 
theory, PB assemblies are empowering and give more agency (control over life) to 
community members who participate in them—and possibly even to community members 
who do not participate but have indirect exposure to and involvement in the PB system. 
These latter claims are tested on the next chapter. 
In the present chapter I have presented the theoretical and practical frameworks that 
inform the rest of the thesis. I have explained what are the characteristics of a P/DD, in 
which the practice of PB fits, and the characteristics of the Dominican PB model. With 
these general and specific models of democracy and PB, respectively, in mind, I now move 
41 Personal communication of 10/24/12, with Deyanira Pérez, who is the main PB official of Jarabacoa’s 
municipal government.  
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to tracking to what extent PB is linked to the occurrence of normative outcomes of 
interest—agency, more and better democracy, and more and better development. The first 
way in which I do this is with a quantitative and comparative analysis of survey data—
specifically focusing on the outcome of agency—regarding two PB and two non-PB 







Chapter 3. Participatory Budgeting and Perceptions of Agency: An 
Empirical Evaluation  
 
Town hall meeting expert Frank Bryan (1999) has acknowledged that “the study of 
real democracy is in desperate need of data” and of a development of empirical parameters 
(p. 197). Similarly, as noted in Chapter 1, participatory budgeting experts Baiocchi, Heller, 
and Silva (2010) have contended that “ideas of participatory democracy are strong on 
theory and moral-philosophical founding, but rather weak on evidence and empirical 
testing” (p. 1). While that desideratum has been clearly set out, other scholars, such as 
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Mansbridge (1999), have expressed doubts about measuring such changes in character with 
social science instruments. Because of this skepticism, there have been few previous 
studies addressing the specific relationship between citizen participation and measures of 
subjective agency from a quantitative point of view. Subjective agency is only one feature 
of an individual’s doing and being that might be the object of empirical investigation.42 
The concept refers to a survey-based measure of agency, based on “people’s self-evaluation 
of whether or not they are free to act as agents” (Alkire, 2005, p. 218).  Moreover, given 
that there are indeed many limitations with respect to data, this part of the current study is 
largely exploratory. My objective is only to advance the scholarly discussion about a 
quantitative way to evaluate the relationship of interest, and I do so by using a different 
dataset, research context, and methods than those used in previous works by other scholars. 
Because the approach I use is far from ideal, I believe that more resources conducive to a 
better evaluation design could be set up in the future for a more rigorous assesment—one 
that leads us to less biased estimators and some evidence of causality, rather than only 
correlations. In my concluding remarks, I return to possible and desirable future research 
directions. 
This chapter is largely empirical but draws on the normative concepts previously 
introduced in Chapter 2. Specifically, this chapter presents the application of empirical 
methodologies to test, primarily, the relationship between citizen participation in PB and 
individuals’ perceptions of individual and collective agency, and secondarily, the 
42 There are two recent examples of similar uses of subjective measures in the PB context. First,   McNulty’s 
(2012) study “An Unlikely Success: Peru’s Top Down Participatory Budgeting Experience” for relies on 
different perception measures of PB participants regarding the process. Second, Wampler’s (2007) study, 
“Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability,” in which he looks at PB 
delegates and their attitudes about decision-making power in PB. 
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association between awareness of PB and agency. I find that a) participants, on average, 
report higher levels of individual and collective agency than non-participants, and b) that 
non-participants who are aware of the community assemblies report higher levels of 
collective agency than non-participants who are unaware of the meetings.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: section 3.1 covers the research 
context; section 3.2 presents the data; sections 3.3 and 3.4 cover the applied methods and 
results, and section 3.5 concludes.  
 
3.1 Research Context 
 
3.1.1 Research Questions 
Let us assume that when people have greater access to political life in a democratic 
manner and forge political consensus through dialogue (as in PB), such opportunities 
correlate with—and perhaps affect—what people value as part of a good life (more 
agency). I have decided to test such an assumption empirically. 
More precisely, the main hypothesis under test is that participants in PB report, on 
average, higher levels of feelings of agency than their counterparts. The specific questions 
are: “Do individuals who participate in PB report higher levels of perceived individual 
agency, when compared to similar individuals who do not participate?” 43 And “Do 
individuals who participate in PB report higher levels of perceived collective agency, when 
compared to similar individuals who do not participate?”  For simplicity, I will refer to 
43 Please note, however, that the question that has been included in the instrument to measure perceptions of 
agency does not use the word “agency”, which may escape many respondents’ understanding; instead, it 
makes reference to being able to making a difference, as it will be shown later. 
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the questions from now on as Q1a (participants report higher individual PB agency 
scores?), and Q1b (participants report higher collective PB agency scores?).  
A secondary hypothesis, and a more novel one, derives from Helliwell and 
Putnam’s (2004) claim that social networks have value, they embed a norm of trust, and 
they have positive externalities. About externalities, they elaborate with an example 
suggesting that “dense social networks in a neighborhood—barbecues or neighborhood 
associations, etc.—can deter crime, for example, even benefiting neighbours who do not 
go to the barbecues or belong to the associations. Social capital can be embodied in bonds 
among family, friends, neighbours, in the workplace, at church, in civic associations….” 
(p. 1436). Inspired by this argument/example, I explore the possibility of an indirect 
relationship between PB and agency that can come through social networks. That is, people 
may not directly participate, but feel indirectly more like agents (as part of a collectivity) 
if the participation of their peers enables the non-participants to feel that they too can better 
achieve their goals. The specific question is: Q2 “Do non-participants who live in PB 
municipalities and are aware of PB report higher levels of perceived collective agency 
when compared to those who are not aware of the process?” The idea here is that some 
people for various reasons cannot or might not want to participate in a PB, but still value 
having the option to participate, and having that capability available may make them feel 
more like agents, even if they choose not to exercise such agency; 44 I argue that this may 
happen especially if members of their social network, in whom non-participants may trust, 
44 Crocker (2008) may call this type of participation “nominal”—“the weakest way in which someone 
participates in group decision-making is when someone is a member of a group but does not attend its 
meetings. Some people, of course, are not even members. Some are members but are unable to attend, because 
of other responsibilities, or are unwilling to attend, for instance because they are harassed or unwelcome” (p. 
343).  
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have exercised such agency and contributed to bringing about mutually desired change.  
Please note that in this chapter I will be drawing from the literature on 
psychological empowerment, given its (almost) equivalent conceptualization to that of 
agency. 
 
3.1.2 Empirical Research Framework 
Empirical analysis studying the relationship between measures of empowerment 
and community participation (CP) is shaped by the field of psychology. In this discipline, 
empowerment has been conceptualized as psychological empowerment (PE), which is 
defined as “a mechanism by which individuals gain greater control over their lives, 
participate in democratic decision-making processes, and gain critical awareness of their 
social and political environments” (Perkins & Zimmerman, 1995, p. 570). The authors 
claim that “empowering processes at the community level might include collective action 
to access government and other community resources. . . . Empowered outcomes for 
individuals might include situation-specific perceived control and resource mobilization 
skills” (p. 570). Given the similarity of this definition to the one of agency employed in 
this study, I use the findings, which Christens, Peterson and Speer (2011) summarize from 
an array of work in psychology, as a starting point.  
Christens et al. explain that when analyzing the relationship between CP and PE, 
most studies have been of the cross-sectional type. From the few that have used 
longitudinal data, interesting results are those of Gutierrez (1995), who finds, for Latino 
populations, that empowerment can result from participation in discussion groups; and 
those of Itzhaky and York (2000), who find that the more time an individual engages in 
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CP, the higher PE he/she reports. Particularly Itzhaky and York find that CP over time 
makes residents more involved in, more loyal, and more identified with their community. 
These two researchers also find that experienced activists are less euphoric than new 
activists (the latter report higher feelings of well-being). Because their study does not have 
a control group of non-activists, Itzhaky and York make no claims about whether CP is 
that which is responsible for increasing such feelings of well-being and empowerment, but 
only conclude a correlation exists.  
Because of serious endogeneity issues are rightly suspected in the relationship of 
citizen participation and (subjective) agency, significant correlation cannot be equated with 
directional causality from participation to agency, or vice versa. Christens et al. do explain 
how there are many studies providing significant evidence of an existing relationship 
between CP and PE, but more research is needed to understand the principles behind such 
relationship, such as the direction of causality. 45 The authors fill this void using a cross-
45 Christens et al.’s study highlights three hypotheses with respect to theorized causal relationships between 
CP and PE. These hypotheses help contextualize my first set of research questions: 
1) Socialization: CP precedes PE. 
The understanding is that “people gain knowledge and skills that lead to psychological advantages through 
participation in community activity” (p. 340). This goes in line with the idea that agency/empowerment is 
more than just a personality trait; instead, structural influences also matter for perceived control.  
2) Selectivity: PE leads to CP.  
People who already have or value agency put themselves in settings in which they can exercise this agency. 
The understanding is that “the selectivity mechanism hinges on the tendency of people to avoid putting 
themselves in situations or environments whose demands outstrip their capabilities, and to exercise agency 
when their self-perception lead them to believe they will be successful” (p. 340). The authors also explain 
that this mechanism refers to differences in skills, resources or internal individual attributes / beliefs / attitudes 
/ perceptions, that determine different motivations for participation. 
3) Reciprocal Causality: The causal relationship between CP and PE is bi-directional.  
People who have and relish their agency select settings to exercise their agency and, in turn, their (subjective) 
agency is enhanced. The understanding is that there is mutual influence over time between CP and PE, as 
part of a developmental process that embodies both cognitive and behavioral change. The reader can consult 
Christen et al. for a list of works that support each of these hypotheses. 
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lagged panel analysis based on pre-test and post-test data involving participants in the 
People Improving Communities through Organizing’s (PICO) National Network (i.e., the 
treated), and community residents screened as non-participants (i.e., the comparison 
group).46 Christens et al. find support for the hypothesis that CP precedes PE. Moreover, 
they stress that their “findings reinforce conceptualizations of empowerment as a social 
process that takes place in a community and organizational contexts rather than a 
characteristic of individuals or a precursor to action. Skill acquisition and attitudes 
undoubtedly predispose certain people to participate in certain settings, yet the findings 
reported here point toward an understanding of PE as an outcome or byproduct rather than 
a precursor to participation” (p. 343). In other words, empowerment is more part of a 
community and organizational process, and less a psychological trait that directs people’s 
behaviors. The authors also touch upon the relationship of motivations and actions with the 
exercise of human agency. Using the PICO data, they show that what people choose to do 
in public and political life is likely to precede higher feelings of agency, rather than follow 
such perceptions.  
With the research questions at hand, it would be ideal to count on longitudinal or 
experimental data so as to be able to tease out causality. However, the latter was not 
possible for this portion of the present study. Once again, the current study tests, only the 
relationship between CP and perceptions of agency, but within the specific context of PB, 
and using a new dataset and using quasi-experimental techniques—specifically, propensity 
46 Investigating five different communities across the United States, these researchers measured CP with 
Speer and Peterson’s (2000) five-item scale that assessed the frequency of individuals’ involvement in 
community activities. They measured PE using Zimmerman & Zahniser’s (1991) Sociopolitical Control 
Scale, which assesses individuals’ perceptions about their ability to mobilize people within their communities 
and influence policy-making. 
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score matching (PSM) and differences in differences. Although these techniques are 
usually applied for teasing out causality, I use them to provide evidence that further 
advances the discussion of the relationship between participation and agency, and that may 
lead me to better estimates of the correlation coefficients than a simple regression.  
Given the data limitations, my results suffer from being context specific. There are 
potential biases introduced by self-reported measures and by not being able to account for 
unobservable characteristics of the respondents that are endogenous to the relationship of 
interest. As well, the lack of a longitudinal design across more than two waves of data does 
not allow me to show patterns over time in the relationships between participation and 
agency.47 To supplement these quantitative (albeit, limited) findings, Chapter 5 tries to 
move beyond correlation and presents a qualitative analysis that examines the different 
enabling conditions that may govern the relationship between PB and agency as applied to 




3.2.1 Data Collection Process: Sites Selection 
Although I am not able to fully isolate the “PB effect,” as Baiocchi et al. (2010) 
claim to do with qualitative tools, in this quantitative analysis I follow their approach of 
pairing same-sized and same region PB and non-PB municipalities. I study four 
47 Another constraint in establishing causality is that differences in the way that the PB process is conducted, 
even at the community level, might introduce variations to the impact pathways from participation to agency 
for each individual assembly. Nonetheless, the worry about character unobservables from individual 
participants is here assumed to be a more serious concern. 
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municipalities (2 pairs)—Santo Domingo Este (SDE), Santiago de los Caballeros (STI), 
Santo Domingo Oeste (SDO) and La Vega (LVG).  As indicated in Table 4, the first two 
municipalities carry out PB, and the other two do not.  
 
Table 4. Municipalities under Study 
PB  Non-PB  
Santo Domingo Este (SDE) Santo Domingo Oeste (SDO) 
Santiago (STI) La Vega (LVG) 
 
The municipality of SDE is the capital of the Santo Domingo province, and STI is 
the capital of the Santiago province, which are the first and second most important 
provinces respectively, in the country, based on population sizes48 and contributions to 
GDP (excluding the National District). SDE and STI are appropriate for a multiple case 
study of PB because neither is a new adopter of the process. Baiocchi (2003) finds, for the 
case of Porto Alegre, that inequalities between citizens and normative features of PB were 
a problem in the beginning stages, but these issues were offset after repeated participation 
over time. Folscher (2007a) also highlights that localities learn by doing.  Based on this 
evidence, priority of selection was given to municipalities that adopted PB early on. The 
rationale is that responses will be guided by lived experience rather than (merely) by early 
enthusiasm for PB based on philosophical attraction to the idea.49 SDE has officially 
48  According to the 2002 Census, the population of the Santo Domingo province of 1,821,218, represents a 
21.27% of the national population, and that of Santiago of 908,250, represents 10.6% of DR’s total 
population.  
49 Although, theoretically, the selection of early adopters would allow, among other things, decreasing the 
risk that inexperience from the organizers/facilitators and/or the participants would be the reason behind a 
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implemented PB since 2006, and STI has done so since 2005.  
To work as controls, I selected SDO in the Ozama region, as a comparison group 
for SDE, and LVG 50 in the Cibao region as a comparison group for STI. As shown in Table 
5 below, which summarizes some key characteristics of these four municipalities,51 SDO 
and LVG present observable characteristics that are similar to that of SDE and STI, 
respectively, except for the presence of PB in the latter cities but not the former. In other 
words, after considering that there is no other closer match for each PB city than each 
selected pair, the main difference between them is that citizens (who are not part of the 
mayor’s cabinet) in the non-PB cities have no regular or extended access to policy-making 
(in regards to formally influencing budget allocation). 
 
 
Table 5. Profiles of PB Municipalities 
 SDE STI SDO LVG 
Population Size1 948,885 591,985 363,321 248,089 








Territorial Size 169.2 km2 474.1 km2 54 km2 526.2 km2 
Poverty Rate (percentage of poor households; 
includes extreme poverty)3 
19.1% 19.9% 20.7% 38.4% 
Illiteracy Rate Population of age 15+4 7.4% 10.4% 8.1% 12.1% 
Unemployment Rate5 7.0% 5.6% 7.0% 5.4% 
Percentage of participation in 2010’s municipal 40.0% 48.0% 48.0% 60.9% 
frustrated assembly, I observed that regardless of the amount of years conducting the process of PB, many 
facilitators still lack adequate experience. 
50  A caveat: LVG and SDO in fact do a version of PB, but it is neither widespread nor inclusive.  Hence it 
cannot be said that no PB occurs in such municipalities. The process, however, is not systematically 
advertised or applied throughout the municipality; and, hence, for practical purposes, it can be categorized 
as non-PB. This echoes Baiocchi et al.’s (2010) claims that a) “the mere existence of PB structures does not 
translate into participation as such” (p. 70) and b) “even in the absence of institutional reform from above, 
an organized and engaged civil society can impact governance” (p. 79), which (as I note subsequently) seems 
to be a plausible case for LVG’s arrangements.  
51 In regards to size, it is interesting to note that these municipalities are significantly larger than those 
analyzed in Baiocchi et al. (2010). In their case, the largest municipality, Diadema (Brazil), has an electorate 
of 220,292. While the figures presented in Table 5 correspond to all inhabitants, which includes children 
unable to vote, the difference is drastic enough to conclude that they would still be larger, even if only the 
electorate was considered. 
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elections6 












Percentage of capital spending account that is 
allocated through PB (2013)8 
22.83% 12.8% N/A N/A 
Sources: 1-6: ONE provincial profiles, based on: 1,2: 2010 Census; 3: Focalización de la Pobreza en RD 





As Figure 1 shows, SDE is located in the south central part of the country, next to 
the east side of the National District, and it belongs to the Ozama region. The municipality 
is divided in three zones (circunscripciones), which are subdivided into a total of 23 blocks. 
There are 460 neighborhood councils registered at the municipal government. Santo 
Domingo Oeste, is also located next to the National District, but to the west. The 






municipality is not divided first into zones but is directly divided into 14 blocks. Only 52 
neighborhood councils are registered in the local government archives. Both of these 
municipalities were created in 2001 and started functioning in 2002. This new arrangement 
occurred following a restructuring of the national territory, established in the Law 163-01.  
Commerce is the main economic activity in both localities. These two cities are 
very similar in terms of many human development indicators, and they have reasonable 
access to everyday life services.  However, the main large-scale differences between these 
two municipalities are related to the quality of urban planning and implementation. While 
both municipalities have areas that are equally underdeveloped, SDE’s center is more 
structured than SDO’s, in the sense that the streets are wider, in better condition, cleaner 
and more organized (including home residences, buildings and businesses); SDO’s center, 
in contrast, is more chaotic, convoluted (extremely limited space for further expansion), 
rather filthy, and streets are narrower.  
STI is located in the north-central part of the country, belonging to the Cibao region. 
The municipality is divided in eight planning zonal units, which together contain 62 blocks. 
STI’s economy is mostly based on the trade of agricultural and livestock products, finished 
goods, and the production of goods in free zones. The municipality has 1,177 neighborhood 
councils registered as of September of 2013. LVG is located next to STI’s south-east 
boundary, and 120 kilometers away from the nation’s capital. The municipality’s main 
industries are also agriculture and livestock. Despite our best efforts to obtain the number 
of neighborhood councils registered in LVG’s municipal government, the quantity is still 
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unknown.52 Both of these municipalities enjoy having good transportation access, as the 
Duarte highway, the main road in the country, goes through both cities. While, in 
comparison, LVG is the closest to STI, it must be noted that the latter is a larger and more 
developed city, which means everyday life in STI looks somewhat different from its 
counterpart in LVG, where life is less affected by the mixed blessing of such big city 
“perks” as more traffic, more businesses, and more entertainment options.  
Besides the already discussed criteria of early adoption for the PB cities, when 
selecting the pairs, population size and density53 have been taken into account because of 
a collective-action rationale—it could be expected that the smaller and more concentrated 
the population (at least when it is subdivided at the town or neighborhood level), the easier 
it is to engage in participatory practices, as “everybody knows everybody” (and presumably 
each other’s priorities), information travels faster, everybody can express themselves more 
easily (as there are fewer people hoping to participate), and so forth (see Selee and 
Peruzzotti, 2009). Differences in poverty levels have also been taken into account because 
previous results have found that on average the very poor and the very rich tend not to 
participate. Thus, I selected municipalities that were as close as possible in their poverty 
ranges.   
Note that in contrast to Baiocchi et al.’s (2010) object of study  (Brazil), the DR is 
a small country where geographical characteristics are very similar throughout the country, 
where political ideology for both majoritarian parties is very similar, and where there is no 
52 LVG is also significantly poorer than STI, and besides the population density and rural/urban composition 
differences, this responds to the fact that LVG has grown in the shadow of STI.  
53 Although the population densities of STI and LVG are significantly different, this match was the closest 
possible. 
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significant ethnic diversity. Hence, in contrast to Baiocchi et al., it has not been necessary 
to select based on such factors. It is also necessary to point out that these four municipalities 
do not represent all the (albeit, limited) diversity of Dominican municipalities, especially 




3.2.2. Data Collection Process: Sampling Design 
The sampling design for this study is a combination of stratified random sampling 
and choice-based sampling. Different populations are involved: one of such populations 
consists of participants of PB in the chosen PB cities. Because the number of participants 
is not very large in relative terms, efforts were made to survey as many of them as possible. 
I did so by targeting these PB participants when visiting communities, and then 
randomizing whenever possible those to survey among the participants pool. As a result, 
participants have been oversampled in relation to their actual frequency in the population. 
Ideally, I would have been able to completely adopt a sampling approach like Christens et 
al.’s (2011). These authors were able to randomize fully the sample of participants due to 
the existence of databases containing the information of participants/members of the 
organization they were studying. Unfortunately, a similar database does not exist listing 
PB participants; hence, that degree of randomization was simply not possible under the 
circumstances in which I collected data. 
Apart from the targeted surveys of participants in the two PB municipalities of SDE 
and STI, the research team also surveyed other groups of individuals: (a) adults residing in 
PB municipalities, regardless of their participation or non-participation in PB; and (b) 
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adults residing in the non-PB municipalities, who by definition are not participants, but 
who were also surveyed for control purposes, as explained earlier. For the unrestricted 
populations, the sampling frame design consisted of all occupied private households 
(proxy: houses) within the geographical boundaries of the municipalities. In households 
where more than one eligible adult lived, only one could make it into the sample. Some 
households turned out to be located in remote/unsafe areas, and had to be excluded from 
the sampling frame due to being inaccessible to the research team. The sampling method 
followed was that of “the Nth house on the block.” This was a viable selection method 
because many areas in the studied municipalities have grown without any urban planning; 
consequently, house listings for a potential computerized random selection were 
impossible to obtain.  
Once a house was selected, the respondent was chosen with the probabilistic 
approach of the next birthday54 (only adults, which in DR stands for 18+); the research 
team applied this selection method during the screening stage.55  
 My selection of the data collection mode responded to several aspects of local 
conditions. In spite of the higher costs of face-to-face interviews, when compared to web 
or telephone surveys, I selected the former because of concerns regarding technology 
access constraints, the education level of respondents, sampling frame issues, and lack of 
access to filtered contact data. To collect the responses, the team used pen and paper 
interviews (PAPI) with a printed questionnaire. Interviewers were trained to make two 
54 A potential challenge to this selection procedure is the lack of knowledge of the individual being screened 
about the birth dates of the other adults in the house; however, according to the information given to me by 
the research team, this only happened a handful of times, and in such cases interviewers asked interviewees 
to use their best guess on whose birthday was next. 
55 Using this selection procedure, rather than a more “convenient” one, such as interviewing the person who 
opens the door, should produce better estimates of the population composition.  
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attempts per household, covering communities of all income levels, and as distributed in 
the municipality. The research team made such attempts during different days of the week 
(including weekends), and at different hours. They put a certain emphasis on conducting 
visits after regular work hours, in hopes to decrease the amount of missed opportunities to 
interview the selected respondent due to him/her being at work. To minimize interviewer 
effects, the field team was trained to follow a script, and to avoid any deviations from it. 
Such script incorporated definitions and clarifications that I presumed some respondents 
could bring up during the interview. A power analysis to determine the required sample 
size led me to conduct a minimum of 980 surveys (245 per municipality).56  I was able to 
collect answers from a total of 1,039 respondents who answered in a voluntary, 
independent, and anonymous manner. Data was collected between January and April of 
2013, and the PB related questions in the questionnaire correspond to the assemblies for 
the 2013 budget cycle, which occurred during the Fall of 2012. Table 6 below summarizes 
the distribution of the data across the populations of interest.  
 









Participants n=52 n/a n=82 n/a 
Non-Participants n=202 n=248 n=190 n=265 
All n=254 n=248 n=278 n=265 
56 I estimated the sample size using a sampling error of +/-5%, a confidence level of 95%, and an estimated 
variability in regards to participation in PB of 20%. This later estimation is only representative in the sense 
that it is known that the percentage of the residents of a municipality who participate is usually around 1% 
of the population.  Hence, coming up with a representative sample would be prohibitive in terms of the cost. 
Because of this, the research team targeted part of the sample (around 20%) exclusively to known 
participants, and randomized at the community level (e.g., choose a community randomly, and then look 
there for participants). Also, non-PB municipalities do not have this characteristic of interest but I assumed 
that if PB had been available participation levels would have been similar. Based on these parameters, the 
sample size resulted in 245 for each municipality. I did not consider non-response rates in the estimations of 
the sample since survey efforts would be continued until the desired sample was reached.  
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3.2.3 Use of Subjective Variables in Empirical Analysis 
Helliwell and Putnam (2004) call human well-being, especially well-being as 
defined by the individual him/herself, as the ultimate dependent variable in social science. 
In line with this assumption and if we for the moment assume that agency is a feature of 
human well-being, the main dependent variables in our empirical exercise are not objective 
measures of agency, but subjective ones based on people’s reporting of feelings of such 
phenomena. Ibrahim and Alkire (2007) argue that “while we support the direct use of 
objective information for policy purposes, it may nonetheless be valuable to obtain 
information on people’s views, and interpret them carefully to inform the analysis” (p. 28). 
According to Ibrahim and Alkire, perceptions of the self can inform whether the individual 
values the domain of agency that the question is alluding to, it can help explain different 
patterns of decision-making, and it also informs policy makers if changes are needed in 
order to nudge views in a new direction.  
The use of subjective measures of well-being (and agency, if this normative notions 
is included in well-being) is not new. Graham and Lora (2009) explain how the use of 
survey data on expressed subjective responses of well-being measures has become more 
accepted in recent years. They posit that this has happened due to the availability and 
application of statistical methods that allow researchers to control for unobservable features 
of the polled units, such as personality traits, that otherwise might introduce bias into the 
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measurements. Without claiming it as a panacea,57 and recognizing existing problems and 
limitations, Graham and colleagues have succeeded in explaining the relationship between 
subjective measures of well-being and variables like income, migration decisions, 
inequality, insecurity, employment, marital status, health, social networks, access to 
information and other measures.  
Another warning for working with subjective well-being measures is that of 
question framing. Graham (2010) and Graham and Lora (2009) explain how question 
framing can be a problem when dealing with subjective well-being survey data.  Therefore, 
they recommend that certain well-being questions be placed at the beginning of the 
instrument, before other questions, such as employment status and financial situation, 
might bias the answers. In the present case, I asked general well-being questions before 
any other socio-demographic question. However, subjective well-being measures for the 
PB context were placed after several questions regarding the PB process itself. I decided 
to proceed in that order given that it was necessary to establish that the individuals knew 
what PB was before proceeding with opinion questions about the process and the outcome 
measures. Given the limited advertisement of the process, at least in one of the studied 
municipalities, the fear was that some individuals had a general idea about these 
assemblies, but did not recognize official terms or were basing their perceptions on 
imperfect information. Besides the potential bias due to question placement, given the 
57 In various writings, Graham provides a detailed account of possible perception paradoxes that must be 
recognized when dealing with opinion survey data. See, for example, Graham and Chattopadyay (2008) and 
Graham and Lora (2009), both of which summarize such paradoxes. 
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political openness in the DR, I expect that sampled individuals presented no constraints in 
answering faithfully as to their real preferences/beliefs (even after the systemic framing).58 
Once we decide to move forward with the use of subjective measures, we need 
careful interpretation of the responses, since there may exist endogeneity (e.g., those who 
already feel like agents are the ones who participate), and in order to identify potential 
habituation effects and adaptive preferences 59  that cannot be controlled for, hence 
introducing bias to people’s self-evaluations. This latter notion of adaptive preferences 
reflects one’s unconscious downgrading of one’s desires for things one cannot access (e.g., 
the happy peasant/the frustrated achiever, the optimistic poor, the realistic agent, or the 
educated women who feels low levels of autonomy). Moreover, we should take into 
account the inter-temporal problem that may exist in measuring agency through PB. While 
I reserve a detailed analysis of this problem for Chapter 5, it is useful to introduce it 
succinctly here: a participant may live in a community that has won a PB project in the 
assemblies and, in turn, feel a certain level of agency at the time when surveys were 
conducted, which corresponds to the early months of the execution stage, when many 
58  Given previous findings by Graham and collaborators about how Latin Americans tend to report 
remarkably positive well-being measures (possibly due to cultural optimism or the aspiration paradox), it is 
interesting to see how people’s attitudes toward PB compare to the more general trends previously found. 
59 The following passage from Sen (1984) is useful for understanding the idea of adaptive preferences:  
The most blatant form of inequalities and exploitations survive in the world through 
making allies out of the deprived and the exploited. The underdog learns to bear the burden 
so well that he or she overlooks the burden itself. Discontent is replaced by acceptance, 
hopeless rebellion by conformist quiet, and—most relevantly in the present context—
suffering and anger by cheerful endurance. As people learn to survive to adjust to the 
existing horrors by sheer necessity of uneventful survival, the horrors look less terrible in 
the metric of utilities. (p. 309)  
Recently, Serene Khader (2011) has made a case for revising the classic concept of adaptive preference, 
based on a number of normative claims. She suggests that we think of it as “preferences inconsistent with 
basic flourishing that a person developed under conditions nonconductive to basic flourishing that we expect 
her to change under conditions conducive to basic flourishing” (p.17). See Khader’s Adaptive Preferences 
and Women’s Empowerment (2011). 
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projects have not yet been executed. If the year ends and that same individual has not yet 
seen his project be executed, such feelings of agency may drastically change. In other 
words, a self-described agent in the PB decision-context in t, may not be one in t+1 if 
certain conditions, such as project-execution, are absent. With these points in mind, let’s 
now move to discussing the instrument and selected variables. 
 
3.2.4 Instrument & Indicators 
For the design of the questionnaire, I examined the literature to identify questions 
associated with and appropriate for the theme of this study. This study used two versions 
of the questionnaire—one for SDE and STI and a modified one for SDO and LVG to adjust 
for the absence of PB there (Annexes 3a and 3b). These questionnaires compile 
information about respondents’ perceptions of agency and some well-being measures at 
the individual and collective levels, political and ideological views, community integration, 
awareness of and experience in PB, and socio-demographic information.  
Alkire (2005) presents a detailed account of different survey-based measures of 
agency (and empowerment), based on peoples’ self-evaluation. Although I included some 
of such survey questions for the general accounts of agency, the dependent variables of 
interest for this study are subjective measures of agency exclusively within a domain of 
municipal budget planning. Because of this context specificity, I had to come up with my 
own questions, which are discussed next. 
 
 
Agency Measures  
It is possible that a person might be an agent in respect to household decisions, and 
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a non-agent in respect to PB decision-making. Alkire (2005) explains that “agency might 
be more accurately evaluated with respect to different functionings rather than globally. 
Agency is often exercised with respect to distinct dimensions and indeed it is precisely the 
dimension-specific agency levels that may be of interest” (p. 226). Because of this 
consideration, in addition to an agency question framed for life in general,60 the survey also 
contains questions specific to the PB context at the individual and collective levels. Once 
the questions are translated from Spanish (the original language of the questionnaire) back 
to English, they read as follows: In a scale from 1 to 5, how much do you think that you as 
a citizen are contributing to making a difference in the way that the local government 
manages and uses its resources? One means that you are making no difference, and five it 
means that you are making a profound difference. The collective version reads: Now think 
60 The instrument also gathered a measure of perceived agency/empowerment. Such question was placed at 
the very beginning of the questionnaire and concerns a general level regarding power over/control over 
personal decisions. It tells us the extent to which individual believes he or she is in control over daily 
activities. This question serves as an approximation of intrapersonal agency/empowerment, addressing the 
confidence and worth respondents feel they possess about acting for themselves (Zimmerman, 1995).  The 
question has been asked with respect to both individual and collective levels. I used a modified version of a 
question that Graham and Chattopadhyay (2009) already employed, which in turn derives from one asked in 
the World Values Survey. In part, the modifications responded to Spanish translation logistics. The 
individual-level question, once translated back to English, reads as follows: “Think about the freedom you 
have to make decisions about things that affect your life. Please indicate in a ladder from 1 to 10 how much 
control you think you have to make decisions. The first step in this ladder means that you have no control to 
make decisions, and the tenth step means that you have total control.” The collective-level question reads as 
follows: Please think now about your life in this community. Please indicate in this same ladder, how much 
control do you think the members of this community, in a collective manner, have in the decision-making of 
things that affect your life as a community. One in this ladder means that the community has no control in 
making decisions, and ten that it has total control.” Although I do not use this measure as the dependent 
variable of interest in the analysis, it does allow me to have an idea of my sample’s perception patterns with 
respect to agency. This finding is important when interpreting results, because it may highlight adaptive 
preferences, that is, the way people adjust their expectations and aspirations to fit contextual constraints and 
opportunities. The questionnaire also includes a question that, although it will not be used in the quantitative 
analysis, serves as a closer approximation to actual, rather than perceived agency; Have you done anything 
lately to help with the betterment of the community of which you feel pride? This question approximates to 
what Zimmerman calls behavioral empowerment, which reflects an individual’s participatory skills and 
activities of participation. However, given the direction in which this research question sets, my interest is to 
know whether participation makes people (more complete) agents, as I am testing the hypothesis that 
participation in PB (or option to participate) is linked to increases in agency.  
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about your community. In this same scale, how much do you think that the community 
collectively is contributing to making a difference in the way the local government manages 
and uses its resources? One means that the community makes no difference, and five means 
that the community is making a profound difference. Note that this question does not 
specifically asks about PB since residents of non-PB cities—by default—do not participate 
in PB, and that in the PB cities, not everybody participates. However, for simplicity 
purposes, and since the idea is to evaluate how having access to and/or participating in PB 
is associated with people’s reported scores, in the rest of this analysis I refer to these two 
measures as individual and collective PB agency, respectively, and they represent the two 
main outcome variables.61 These two questions approximate a type of agency that takes 
place in a particular context. That is, they reflect the participant’s critical understanding of 
the forces that shape the environment (the causal mechanisms), knowledge of resources 
and methods to produce social change, and the decision-making and problem-solving skills 
to do so (Zimmerman, Israel, Schulz & Checkoway, 1992).  
 
PB-related Measures 
The main survey question related to the PB process is the one determining 
participation in the assemblies. For the PB municipalities the survey asks those who knew 
of their community assemblies whether or not they participated in them. Participation is 
then a dummy that takes the value of 1 for individuals who participated and 0 for 
61 Note that for the question at the community level the unit of analysis is still the individual, but the question 
asks respondents to assess the level of empowerment they perceive at the community level for the domain of 
interest (i.e., life in general or PB). 
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individuals who did not (including those who were unaware of the assemblies). This is the 
key independent variable for Q1a and Q1b. 
The instrument included a question asking respondents whether they had heard 
about PB before. This variable is important for the second research question of spillover 
effects as it allows me to tease out the existence or lack thereof of an awareness/availability 
effect. I refer to this variable as awareness: it takes the value of 1 for individuals who knew 
of PB and zero otherwise. A stronger version of awareness is available for respondents 
from PB cities, and the instrument captures it by the question, previously mentioned, of 
whether people knew of their community’s assembly. Answers to this question also take 
the value of 1 for individuals who knew of their respective PB assembly, and zero 
otherwise. I refer to this variable as awareness of assembly. Control variables are 
introduced in the sub-section that follows.  
 
3.2.5 Description of Data 
For a full account of all measures gathered, see Annex 3, which contains the 
metadata, that is, information on all variables collected with the questionnaires, and their 
main statistics. The following is a summary of this data, especially as related to this study’s 
research questions.  
The average age of respondents is 42, 63% live together with a partner or are 
married, 62% are heads of households, 59% are educated (associates degree or more), 23% 
have difficulty meeting basic needs, 92% are employed, and 58% believe their health is 
“good”. In regards to matters related to PB, 90% of the respondents are not clear about the 
decision-making process regarding the municipality’s budget. Furthermore, only 46% are 
even aware of the existence of the PB process. From those who were aware of PB in the 
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PB cities, only 39% in SDE and 51% in STI are aware of their communities’ specific 
assemblies. However, these latter percentages should be interpreted carefully, since part of 
the surveys targeted participants who by definition were “aware.” That is, the percentage 
of people truly aware, either of PB in general, or of the assemblies, is likely to be 
significantly smaller in the real population.  
Although subjective measures of agency are discussed next, it is worth noting that 
38% of the sample claimed to have done something for the community of which they are 
proud. Depending on the context, this claim (and pride) could be an indication of real (or 
behavioral) agency rather than merely perceived agency.62 The highest percentage of this 
sort of “agentful” behavior was found in LVG (55%), which might explain why people 
from this city reported such high levels of all indicators of subjective agency.63  
Figures 2 and 3 show the percentages of respondents in each group—that is, 
participants from a PB municipality, non-participants in a PB municipality, and non-
participants in a non-PB municipality—that have either a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 individual or 
collective PB agency score. In each figure, the three columns to the left correspond to SDE 
62 It is interesting to note the close connection between actual and perceived agency within the context of PB 
and community development: In PB city SDE, 64% of the 92 respondents who reported actual agency also 
reported an individual PB agency score of 4 or 5. In that same city, only 15% of the 157 who did not report 
actual agency also reported an individual PB agency score of 4 or 5. In non-PB city SDO, 51% of the 39 
respondents who reported actual agency also reported an individual PB agency score of 4 or 5. In that same 
city, 44% of the 206 who did not report actual agency also reported an individual PB agency score of 4 or 5. 
In PB city STI, 48% of the 117 respondents who reported actual agency, also reported an individual PB 
agency score of 4 or 5. In that same city, only 34% of the 149 respondents who reported no actual agency 
also reported an individual PB agency score of 4 or 5. Finally, in the non-PB city LVG, 70% of the 141 
respondents who reported actual agency also reported an individual PB agency score of 4 or 5. In that same 
city, a surprising 63% of the 117 respondents who reported no actual agency also reported an individual PB 
agency score of 4 or 5. With the exception of LVG, in the other three cities it becomes evident that people 
who reported high levels of agency within the municipal budget context, are more likely to have also reported 
having contributed to making a change in their communities with some action they feel proud of.  
63 People in LVG may have a channel other than PB for exercising their agency that need to be studied in the 
future. LVG results open up the idea that PB is one way but not the only way (or even the best way) to 
exercise and experience agency. Also, given that LVG the smallest of the four cities, the results are not 
surprising, in the sense that people feel more empowered in smaller communities. 
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and SDO, and the ones to the right to STI and LVG. Recall that for simplicity, I refer to 
PB agency as the variable that measures whether respondents feel they are making a 
difference in the way that the local government manages and uses its resources, regardless 
of whether the person actually participates in PB or not. And I do so, because individual 
and collective PB agency are the outcome variables with which I evaluate whether 
participation in or access to PB are linked to differences in such agency scores.  
 
Figure 2. Individual PB Agency Score by Group 
 
 
Figure 3. Collective PB Agency by Group  
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Avg Individual Gral Agency 
(1-10) 
8.99 9.16 8.95 7.97 8.22 7.87 8.64 5.80 0.21 0.35 0.52** 0.35 2.17*** 2.42*** 
Avg Collective Gral Agency 
(1-10) 
5.59 6.65 5.31 5.94 6.98 5.54 6.53 3.95 1.34*** -0.94 0.12 1.44*** 1.99*** 3.03*** 
Avg Individual PB Agency 
(1-5) 
2.72 4.60 2.23 2.88 3.70 2.55 3.16 3.80 2.37*** -0.45*** 1.43*** 1.16*** -0.91*** -0.09 
Avg Collective PB Agency 
(1-5) 
3.09 4.31 2.77 3.07 3.69 2.82 3.81 2.53 1.53*** -0.57*** 1.78*** 0.88*** -0.74*** -0.11 
Avg Economic Ladder (1-
10)1 4.64 5.04 4.54 3.07 3.69 2.82 6.41 3.82 0.51** 1.78*** -1.37*** 0.63** 1.21*** 1.64*** 
Avg Age 41.8 47.7 40.3 44.7 49.8 42.4 40.9 40.2 7.4*** 0.92 6.78*** 7.32*** 4.5*** 9.6*** 
Percentage Unemployed  15.7 10.0 17.2 7.0 6.2 7.7 6.6 2.7 7 -9.17*** 0.03 -1.5 4.3** 3.5 
Percentage Educated2 31.0 32.7 30.6 45.8 43.9 47.1 71.7 41.4 2 40.62*** -38.97 -3.2 4.5 2.5 
Percentage Married/Co-
living  60.5 67.3 58.7 74.0 81.7 70.9 64.9 51.6 8.6 4.42 2.41 10.8* 22.4*** 30.1*** 
Percentage Participating in 
CSOs 64.0 88.4 57.8 70.8 97.5 58.4 76.7 65.8 30.8*** 12.6*** 11.8* 39.1*** 5.0 31.8*** 
Avg Perception of Corruption 
(1-10)3 4.9 3.0 5.4 6.3 5.2 6.3 4.7 6.4 -2.4*** -0.17 -1.8*** -1.1*** -0.5* -1.3*** 
Avg Trust in Mayor (1-3)4 2.2 2.6 2.1 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.6 0.5*** -0.4*** 0.8*** 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.4*** 
Avg Trust in Neighbors (1-3)5 2.4 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.6 0.3*** -0.3*** 0.6*** 0.2*** -0.2*** -0.02 
Avg Wallet Return (1-10)6 2.7 4.2 2.1 3.3 3.1 3.3 5.3 2.6 1.9*** 2.6*** -1.1*** -0.3 0.7*** 0.5* 
ttest of differences in means significant ***1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Notes: 1) “Economic Ladder” is a variable that derives from people being asked to place themselves in a 
10-step ladder where the first step they would be the poorest and in the tenth step they would be the richest. It is a subjective wealth measure; the question does not identify 
a reference group. 2) “Educated” is defined as people who have obtained education beyond high school. 4) “Trust in Mayor” is defined in a 1-3 scale measured as (1) no 
trust, (2) some trust and (3) a lot of trust. 5) “Trust in Neighbors” has been defined in a 1-3 scale measured as (1) no trust, (2) some trust and (3) a lot of trust. 6) “Wallet” 
return refers to a question, derived from the World Gallup Survey question in which people estimate how many people would return their wallet if it got lost; in the present 
case the group of reference is restricted to fellow residents of the municipality. Helliwell and Wang (2010) used this question previously when they evaluated the links 
between trust and well-being.  
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Table 7 above shows the mean values of some of the key variables discussed, as 
well as the differences in these values (and their significance) across groups.64  
With respect to perceptions of PB agency, from the table and figures above it is 
interesting to highlight several patterns:  
(a) Intra-PB city comparisons: On average individuals from PB municipalities who 
participate in the assemblies report statistically significant higher levels of both measures 
of PB agency (individual and collective) than non-participants in their municipalities.65  
(b) Distribution of scores in PB cities (SDE and STI): Figure 2 shows that in both 
PB cities a higher proportion of participants vis-à-vis non-participants report a high 
individual/collective PB agency score (4 or 5) rather than a mid or low one (1, 2 or 3). 66  
(c) Inter-city comparisons: Columns 10 and 13 on Table 6 show that, on average, 
individuals residing in PB municipalities (regardless of participation) report lower levels 
64 These are some general trends for PB participants in SDE in comparison with SDE’s non-participants: On 
average, in SDE PB participants are older, more likely to be unemployed, educated, married or co-living. 
Moreover, SDE participants in CSOs, have a lower perception of corruption in the local government, have 
more trust in the mayor or neighbors, and believe that more people are willing to return a lost wallet (a proxy 
for social trust). However, the differences in unemployment, education, and marital status are not statistically 
significant.  
These are some general trends for PB participants in STI in comparison with STI’s non-participants: On 
average, in STI PB participants are older, more likely to be employed, uneducated, married, participants in 
CSOs, have a lower perception of corruption, more trust in the mayor or neighbors, and believe that less 
people are willing to return a lost wallet. However, the differences in unemployment, education, and return 
of wallet are not statistically significant. 
65 Column 9 shows that for SDE, PB participants report an average individual PB agency of 4.60, that is 2.37 
points higher than that of non-participants. SDE participants’ average collective PB agency score is 2.23, and 
1.53 points higher, than non-participants’ scores. Column 12 shows that participants in STI report an average 
individual PB agency score of 3.70, which is 1.16 points significantly higher than that of non-participants. In 
STI, the participants’ average collective PB agency score is 2.55, and 0.88 points higher than that of non-
participants. 
66 In SDE 88% of participants and 63% in STI report a high individual PB agency score. In turn, most non-
participants from either PB city report mid or low levels of individual PB agency – 82% of non-participants 
in SDE and 68% in STI. In regards to collective agency, in SDE, 85% of the participants, and 63% in STI, 
report a score 4 or 5. In contrast, most non-participants from either PB city declare a mid or low collective 
PB agency score—72% in SDE and 68% in STI. 
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of individual and collective PB agency than those in non-PB municipalities. However, it 
must be noted that these results are based on unweighted averages.67 In the case of SDE, 
when only participants are considered vis-à-vis all SDE inhabitants, the average score for 
either PB agency measure of participants is indeed significantly higher than that of SDO 
residents. For the other pair of cities, when only STI participants in PB, rather than all STI 
residents, are considered, they still report individual PB agency scores lower than those of 
LVG residents (but such lower scores are not statistically different than that of LVG).   
These results are suggestive of the worth of conducting an exercise to evaluate the 
impact of PB in a comparison group setting, and with appropriate controls. Moreover, 
although the differences in means of both measures between STI participants and LVG 
residents is not statistically significant, it is worth noting that potential reasons for the STI’s 
modest level of agency are explored in Chapter 5 and might respond to fundamental 
problems in the PB structure and process in this city.  
(d) Distribution of scores in non-PB cities (SDO and LVG): In SDO, individual PB 
agency scores are divided almost evenly, since high (4 or 5) or  mid/low scores (1, 2 or 3) 
are each chosen by half of the sample. In the case of collective agency, 88% of SDO 
respondents selected a mid/low score. On the other hand, the percentage of LVG 
respondents who have a 4-5 individual or collective PB agency scores is 67% in both 
instances.68  
One of the stories that the data might be telling is that the mere existence of PB 
67 Specifically, the average individual PB agency score of all respondents in SDE is 2.72, which is 0.45 points 
lower than in SDO, and in STI is 2.88, which is 0.91 points lower than in LVG. The average collective PB 
agency score of SDE residents is 3.09 and 0.57 points lower than in SDO, and in STI is 3.07 and 0.74 points 
lower than in LVG. 
68 Given these high PB agency scores, investigating which channels for exercising agency LVG residents 
have will be an important future research task.  
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does not guarantee a sense of empowered or agentful participation, at least not in equal 
ways across cases (note how LVG shows a pretty high sense of agentful participation 
without PB). A higher proportion of participants in SDE report high levels of agency than 
participants in STI; this may hint that, all else constant, there are important differences in 
the nature of the PB process in the two municipalities. The reasons why this may be the 
case are explored in detail later, but my observations of the assemblies lead me to conclude 
that STI’s PB process suffers from more structural problems than does SDE’s. And these 
structural features may impede people from being able to translate participation into high 
feelings of agency. These differences in the patterns of reported agency scores among 
respondents in both pairs of municipalities support my decision to treat SDE/SDO and 
STI/LVG each as an individual case study rather than combining data from both PB cities 
(SDE+STI) and comparing them to the non-PB cities (SDO+LVG).  
 
3.3 Agency and Participation in PB 
 
3.3.1 Empirical Methods 
The objective with Q1a and Q1b—which, respectively, concern individual and 
group agency—is to assess whether PB participation is associated with more agency. 
Although preferably I would test for causality, citizens self-select to participate in PB, and 
they do so on the basis of observable and unobservable characteristics that may in fact 
influence agency and perception of agency. Unfortunately, while I have been able to 
account for observable features, such as age or gender, I have not been able to account for 
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unobservable characteristics.69 That is, the independent variable of participation might 
potentially be a choice variable correlated with unobservable factors that have been 
relegated to the error term. In other words, participation may be endogenous if the decision 
to attend a PB meeting is correlated with unobservables that affect perceptions of agency. 
To this end, there are many personality characteristics that could affect participation 
decisions and/or agency. For example, how grumpy, depressed, lonely, lazy, absent-
minded, or angry the individual is may help explain why a person does not participate in 
PB. Another example is that it may be that an agency-loving person participates in a PB 
precisely to get the thrill of running his or her own life or playing a key role in community 
affairs. A risk of only acknowledging, yet not being able to account for such unobservable 
covariates, is that of attributing incorrectly the treatment effect to PB, when other factors 
could be actually causing the relationship.  
Under certain conditions, some scholars support the claiming of causality only on 
the basis of selection on observables. Dehejia and Wahba (1999), in a study that estimated 
the treatment impact of a labor-training program on post-intervention earnings, claim that  
there may be covariates, for which the propensity score method cannot 
account. However, rather than giving up, or relying on assumptions about 
the unobserved variables, there is substantial reward in exploring first the 
information contained in the variables that are observed… [as doing so] 
offer(s) both a diagnostic on the quality of the comparison group and a 
means to estimate the treatment impact. (p. 1062)  
69 Please note that this study is based on survey data. That is, the unobservables problem comes up because 
the surveys cannot capture personality traits. It is likely, that with different type of observations (e.g., through 
a more ethnographic style of investigation and spending significant time with them), it could be possible to 
interpret the minds of the studied units. I would never know fur sure what are their motivations to participate 
or not; in fact, they could deceive me for social desirability purposes.  
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Moreover, Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005), establish that selection on observables 
is equivalent to selection on unobservables as long as the set of observables selected is 
chosen randomly from a full set of variables that explain the outcome of interest, and the 
number of both, observables and unobservables, is large enough so that none of the 
covariates dominate the relationship.70 Regardless of Dejehia and Whaba and Altonji et 
al.’s point and practice, since I cannot confirm these statements rigorously in this study, I 
choose to be conservative and leave causality assertions for future research.  
Albeit not being able to isolate the PB effect, since I do have data on non-PB cities, 
I will use quasi-experimental methods to conduct a rigorous associational analysis. If the 
causality exercise were possible, it would be necessary to identify a counterfactual in order 
to establish causality by empirically testing to what extent participation, and nothing else, 
contributes to differences in reported agency values.  
α = (agency | PB =1) – (agency | PB =0) 
This formula establishes that the causal impact (α) of participation in PB (PB) on 
the outcome of individual/collective PB agency (agency) is the difference between the 
outcome (agency) with participation (i.e., when PB=1) and the same outcome (agency) 
without participation (i.e., when PB=0). Gertler, Martínez, Premand, Rawlings and 
Vermeersch (2011) explain that in an all-things possible world, one would be able to 
observe each unit of analysis under both situations at a given point in time. But given that 
70 I assume that some of the unobservables traits are indirectly captured in some observed measures. For 
example, different motivations to participate in PB may be captured by membership in CSOs.  Also, given 
the number of personality traits that could affect participation or agency, it could be expected that no single 
trait dominates. Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that the selection on unobservables is not zero, as the OLS 
or logit models assume, and therefore the estimates presented later may be upper-bound.   
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observing an individual simultaneously in two different states is not possible, and knowing 
that at each point in time an individual is either a participant or not, a valid counterfactual 
(agency | PB=0) becomes necessary to be able to tease out the likely effect of participation. 
In other words, this counterfactual represents what the agency outcome would have been 
in the absence of participation. The analysis that follows takes on this design, and presents 
a comparison group; but again, given that this counterfactual is built only from observable 
factors, it is not valid for establishing causality. 
Taking only observable factors into account for the comparison group design, I use 
a combination of propensity score matching (PSM) with difference-in-differences to show 
to what extent the differences in outcomes (levels of reported agency) are associated with 
being a participant in PB. 71  In a quasi-experimental language, for Q1a and Q1b the 
treatment is participation in PB (a yes/no question in the survey in reference to the 
community assembly of Fall 2012). The treatment (participation) groups contain 52 
observations from participants in SDE and 82 in STI, my two PB cities. The respective 
controls are the complete populations of SDO (248 observations) and LVG (265 
observations), my two non-PB cities.  
The propensity score is defined as “the probability of assignment to treatment, 
conditional on covariates” (Dehejia & Whaba, 1999, p. 1053). This method focuses on the 
comparibility of the PB and non-PB municipalities respondents in terms of variables (the 
71 Although I can only use them for finding significant correlations, this combination of causal inference 
techniques has been used before. For example, Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) evaluated the impact of 
an employment program by using matching estimators of differences in differences and replicate their results 
with random information. van de Walle and Mu (2008) combined PSM and differences in differences to 
evaluate the impact of rural road improvements on local markets at the commune level in Vietnam. Applied 
to the PB context, the World Bank has used PSM to evaluate the impact on the budgetary assignments and 
final fiscal positions of PB and non-PB municipalities in Peru. Different from this latter case, I do not match 
municipal observations, but instead those of individual respondents. 
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covariates) that should not be influenced by participation in PB, but that theory suggests 
they impact participation and/or the outcome. With data matching, it is possible to assign 
to each treated observation (defined as a participant in a PB municipality) one observation 
from the control group (defined as all respondents in a non-PB municipality) that is as close 
as possible when it comes to the observable variables that could potentially produce the 
bias between the treated and the control groups. Similarly, it is possible to match each non-
treated unit in the PB city with a similar individual in the non-PB city across the same 
covariates. For better inference, the idea is to make the treatment and control groups as 
identical as possible based on time-invariant characteristics.  
With such objective in mind, at the municipal level, the site selection has been made 
in a way that pairs of municipalities are as close as possible along some characteristics that 
are and likely to be relatively stable over time.  Therefore, the life conditions (social, 
economic and political) under which individuals in both municipalities lived before PB 
were also likely to be similar. At the individual level, which is the one that matters for 
estimating the propensity score, the observable factors to be taken into consideration for 
the matching are measureable, relatively stable and exogenous to PB. These factors include 
age, gender, employment, marital status, education, subjective income, participation in 
CSOs, trust in fellow municipality inhabitants, perceptions of corruption, and role in 
household.72 Nonetheless, as stated before, participation in PB, being voluntary in nature, 
may still be driven by unobservable personality traits, which are in turn probably related to 
72 Choosing the right covariates/observables prevents the propensity score model from losing efficiency due 
to the inclusion of irrelevant covariates. 
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the agency question and cannot be adjusted for by only using PSM.73 For example, a high-
energy “can do” person may choose a local PB to exercise her abundant agency rather than 
gaining enhanced agency from the PB experience. Regardless, the matching technique does 
assist me in generating a data structure suitable for a difference-in-differences approach, 
albeit without resolving the latent selection bias problem. Table 8 summarizes the quasi-
experimental design. The matched observation in the non-PB municipality for each group 
(participants and non-participants) will be used as  pseudo pre-treatment observations for 
the original units in the PB cities, which are considered as post-treatment. For example, 
individual a in STI is matched with individual b in LVG, and b is considered as a before 
PB.  
 
Table 8. Data Design 




of the treated)  
Matched individuals to participants 
(pseudo pre-treatment  
of the treated) 
Non-participants 
(post-treatment  
of the controls) 
Matched individuals to non-
participants 
(pseudo pre-treatment  
of the controls) 
 
 Once the data is organized in such form, difference-in-differences are then 
calculated, which allows me to cancel out the effect of selection bias related to the 
observables by taking the difference in outcomes of matched participants versus matched 
73 These unobservable characteristics of individuals are not expected to interact in any particular systematic 
fashion with aggregate level ones (at the level of the municipality). 
 85 
                                                 
non-participants across the two types of municipalities (or across the real and pseudo 
times).74  
Besides the selection on observables versus unobservables problem, the approach 
has other limitations, one of which is not being able to account for the dosage or amount 
of the “treatment,” since participation/exposure is only a binary variable. It could be 
expected that different degrees, quality, or length of involvement in PB would influence 
agency measures differently; but this study does not account for such variations.  
 
3.3.2 Initial Evidence 
Before testing association with the quasi-experimental design, it is useful to explore 
the data in its simplest form. As an initial step in examining the empirical relationship 
between participation and PB agency scores, three kinds of regressions have been 
conducted:  (a) logistic (with a dichotomous dependent variable of high or mid/low PB 
agency),75 (b) ordered logistic (with the 5 point PB agency scale variable as the dependent 
74 Heinrich, Maffiolo and Vázquez (2010) explain that even if participating units are in many ways different 
from those in the comparison group, insofar as what makes them different influence agency equally across 
the two localities, this specification then takes away bias produced by such differences between participants 
and non-participants. 
75 The logistic regression model has the following structure: There are k independent observations agency1, 
… agencyk, and the i-th observation can be treated as a realization of a random variable Agencyi. This variable 
takes the value of 1 when the reported PB agency score is either 4 or 5 (a high score), and zero when it is 1, 
2 or 3 (mid or low). Assuming that Agency1 has a binomial distribution  
Agencyi ~ B (ni, π1), 
where ni is the binomial denominator and π1 the probability, with ni=1 for all i. 
The logit of the underlying probabi lity π1 is a linear function of the independent variables 
logit (π1) = x’iβ, 
where xi is a vector of covariates and β is a vector of regression coefficients, each of which represents the 
change in the logit of the probability associated with a unit change in the j-th dependent variable, ceteris 
paribus. 
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variable), 76  and (c) ordinary least squares (with the 5 point PB agency scale as the 
dependent variable, but assumed as continuos).77 These models have been run to grasp the 
potential for a statistical difference among the scores reported by the different groups and 
the magnitude of such difference. The following covariates have been selected as 
determinants of PB agency based on previous findings and context specificity: 
respondents’ age, self-reported health, perceived relative wealth, social trust78 measured 
(as noted above) as expectations of getting back a lost wallet, age, education, gender, 
participation in other CSOs, and perceptions of corruption in the local government 79 
(Bekkers, 2005; Easterlin, 1995, 2003; Graham 2009, 2011; Helliwell & Putnam, 2004; 
76 The ordered logistic regression model has the following structure: Taking the cumulative probability Cij as 
the probability that the ith individual is in the jth or higher category: 
Cij = Pr (agencyi ≤ j) = Σ Pr (agencyi =k) 
This cumulative probabilitycan be then turned into a cumulative logit 
logit (Cij) = log (Cij / (1- Cij)) 
The ordered logit then models the cumulative logit as a linear funtion of a set of predictors 
logit (Cij) = αj – βxi 
where each αj represents the logit of the odds of being equal to or less than category j for the baseline group. 
Such intercepts increase over j and are called cutpoints. The β represents how one uit increase in the x of 
interest increases the log-odds of beng higher than category j; the increase is assumed to affect the log-odds 
the same way regardless of the cutpoint being considered. 
77 The ordinary least square regression model has the following structure: there are n observations {agencyi, 
xi}, and each observation includes a scalar response agencyi and a vector of regressors xi. The outcome 
variable is a function of the regressors, so that 
yi = α + x’i β + εi, 
where α is the constant, β is a vector of regression coefficients, and εi are unobserved random variables 
(errors) which represent the difference between the observed agency scores and the predicted values. 
78 Helliwell and Putnam (2004) explain that social trust—“the belief that others around you can be trusted” 
—is a significant part of social capital, and the expectation (and the previous evidence) is that individuals 
who believe themselves to be living among others who they can trust on, are more likely to report higher 
levels of perceptions of well-being. 
79 While it could be argued that PB influences perceptions of corruption, I am not overly worried by this, as 
from the groups of non-participants in the PB city who were aware of the assemblies and chose not to go, 
only 3 individuals in SDE said that it was because of disappointments with the process (which could be linked 
to perceptions of corruption caused by PB), and none in STI.   
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Helliwell & Wang, 2010).  
Tables 9 and 10 present the models for SDE (PB) and SDO (non-PB) for individual 
and collective PB agency, respectively. Tables 11 and 12 do the same for the pair of STI 
(PB) and LVG (non-PB). 
Consistent with the histograms shown earlier, the tables below show that the 
coefficient for participation is positive and statistically significant across specifications and 
for both outcomes—individual and collective PB agency. That is, PB participants (who 
happen to reside in SDE) do report higher levels of PB agency than non-participants, ceteris 
paribus. Interestengly, the city parameter (SDE) has different signs in the individual and 
collective agency models. In the case of individual agency, the negative coefficient 
suggests that living in SDE is associated with lower perceptions of agency. However, when 
participation is considered, the larger size of participation's positive parameter when 
combined with the city parameter, corroborate the previously told story that while 
participants are reporting higher levels of PB agency, non-participants in SDE report lower 
levels of agency than non-participants in SDO, holding all else constant. In the case of 
collective agency, for which the city parameter is positive, the data then suggests that living 
in SDE is related to higher perceptions of collective agency, regardless of participation. 
This result, which I return to later, may be an indication of spillover effects from 
participants to non-participants in that same municipality. 
Although younger and married individuals are likely to report lower scores of 
individual agency, participants in other CSOs, heads of household, and people who placed 
themselves high in the economic ladder report higher levels of individual PB agency. 
Additionally, people who believe their fellow residents are trustworthy also report higher 
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individual agency. People who believe that corruption is high feel less PB agency, but it is 
important to note that there might be an endogenity issue in this relationship: less agentful 
individuals might already feel that corruption is high. No significant correlation was found 
with gender or employment. In the case of collective PB agency, all previous relationships 
prevail, with the exception that employment becomes statistically significant in such 
models; its possitive sign implies that employed individuals report higher levels of 
collective PB agency. 
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Table 9. Determinants of Individual PB Agency (SDE vs SDO) 
Independent 
Variables 
Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Ologit 1 Ologit 2 Ologit 3 OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 
(high/mid-low agency) (1-5 ordinal agency) (1-5 continuous agency) 
Constant 
-0.0735 2.8403* 2.1998    2.3700*** 4.168*** 3.5979*** 
(0.1279) (1.4835) (1.6381)    (0.1514) (0.6818) (0.7712) 
Participation 
(1=yes) 
3.5471*** 3.4877*** 3.6486*** 4.2573*** 3.7066*** 3.6840*** -0.9371*** 1.6592*** 1.6124*** 
(0.4715) (0.5856) (0.6331) (0.3859) (0.4117) (0.4352) (0.1217) (0.1669) (0.1781) 
SDE (1=yes) 
-1.4367*** -0.7137** -0.4164 -1.4462*** -0.1532*** -0.1364*** 3.1633*** -0.4213*** -0.3080** 
(0.2242) (0.3131) (0.3554) (0.1859) (0.0483) (0.0517) (0.0741) (0.1334) (0.1498) 
Male (1=yes) 
 0.2084 0.1237  0.2270 0.1894  0.0583 0.0414 
 (0.2545) (0.2653)  (0.1736) (0.2501)  (0.0965) (0.0969) 
Age 
 -0.2149*** -0.2499***  -0.1532 -0.1364***  -0.0807*** -0.0729** 
 (0.0670) (0.0752)  (0.0483) (0.0517)  (0.0302) (0.0315) 
Age2 
 0.0028*** 0.0032***  0.0020*** 0.0019***  0.0011*** 0.0010*** 




 0.7050** 0.7582**  0.2004 0.2719  0.2507** 0.2776** 
 (0.3244) (0.3423)  (0.2117) (0.2211)  (0.1229) (0.1259) 
Corruption  
 -0.3423*** -0.3607***  -0.1946*** -0.2141***  0.1223*** -0.1302*** 
 (0.0567) (0.0596)  (0.0334) (0.0346)  (0.0189) (0.01957) 
Wallet 
 0.3078*** 0.2781***  0.2790*** 0.2430***  0.1376*** 0.1243*** 




  0.4270   0.3031*   0.1870* 
  (0.2743)   (0.1848)   (0.1016) 
Employed 
(1=yes) 
  0.5207   0.4934   0.2243 
  (0.5121)   (0.3231)   (0.1878) 
Economic 
Ladder  
  0.1572*   0.1286*   0.048 
  (0.0957)   (0.0723)   (0.0430) 
Married 
(1=yes) 
  -0.2261   -0.4895**   -0.2555** 
  (0.2992)   (0.2024)   (0.1124) 
n 496 475 455 496 475 455 496 475 455 
Pseudo/Adj 
R^2 0.1558 0.3773 0.3895 0.1080 0.1990 0.2036 0.2596 0.4750 0.4828 
Standard errors in parenthesis. For OLS, robust standard errors. 
*** Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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Table 10. Determinants of Collective PB Agency (SDE vs SDO) 
Independent 
Variables 
Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Ologit 1 Ologit 2 Ologit 3 OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 









2.5265*** 2.9306*** 2.7087*** 









2.8460*** 2.0446*** 2.1541*** 1.5338*** 1.0323*** 1.0277*** 









0.2919* 1.1983*** 1.4981*** 0.2473** 0.5947*** 0.7196*** 

















-0.1154 -0.0610 -0.1229** -0.0280*** -0.0551** 





0.0016* 0.0008*** 0.0015*** 0.0004 0.0007** 





0.2050 0.4394** 0.3771* 0.2215* 0.1783 





-0.2146*** -0.2302*** -0.2296*** -0.1089*** -0.1060*** 





0.1285** 0.1680*** 0.1521*** 0.0832*** 0.0717*** 









(0.2733) (0.1822) (0.0921) 
Employed 
 
1.0760** 0.8777*** 0.4353*** 
(0.5475) (0.3111) (0.1504) 
Econ Ladder 
 
0.1248 0.0951 0.0497 
(0.1006) (0.0675) (0.0344) 
Married 
 
0.5029* 0.3504** 0.1822* 
(0.3106) (0.1954) (0.0981) 
n 496 475 455 496 475 455 496 475 455 
Pseudo/Adj R2 0.1884 0.2730 0.2965 0.0707 0.1500 0.1650 0.1975 0.3602 0.3881 
Standard errors in parenthesis. For OLS, robust standard errors. 
*** Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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In the case of STI and LVG, Tables 11 and 12 show that participation is also 
statistically significant, presenting a positive association with both outcome variables. The 
city variable (STI) is negative and significant, suggesting that people in the control 
municipality of LVG, on average and with all else constant, report higher levels of PB 
agency than STI residents. Moreover, given that the absolute value of the city coefficient 
is almost always larger than that of participation, for this pair of municipalities the data 
suggests that LVG residents feel on average more agency, all else constant. This result both 
alerts us that there may be some agency deficiencies in STI’s PB process and reminds us 
that there are ways other than PB in which citizens can exercise and experience agency 
within the municipal budget planning context. 
Male, older, employed individuals, as well as participants in other CSOs and people 
who placed themselves low in the economic ladder report higher levels of individual PB 
agency. Additionally, people who believe that corruption is high feel less agency. No 
significant correlation was found with being the head of the household, marital status, or 
social trust. In the case of collective agency all previous relationships prevail, with the 
exception that being married and not being the head of the household become statistically 
significant and associated with higher feelings of agency, although not robustly, since such 
correlations only appear in one of all nine specifications.  
It must also be noted that STI/LVG models are not as powerful as those for 
SDE/SDO, and again, I argue that this is likely the case—at least, partly—because of the 
subpar organizational and democratic characteristics of the PB process in STI, making it 
less conducive to  participation being translated into stronger feelings of agency. 
Nonetheless, given that the analysis without counterfactuals is pointing to a statistical 
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difference between participants and non-participants, let us then explore how such 
relationship holds (either getting stronger or weaker) when analyzed using a quasi-
experimental design.  
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Table 11. Determinants of Individual PB Agency (STI vs LVG) 
Independent 
Variables 
Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Ologit 1 Ologit 2 Ologit 3 OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 
(high/low agency) (1-5 ordinal agency) (1-5 continuous agency) 
Constant 0.6989*** -1.7302* -1.4051    3.7954*** 2.7734*** 3.1357*** 
 (0.1319) (0.9612) (1.1967)    (0.1066) (0.6383) (0.7095) 
Participation 1.2893*** 0.8950*** 1.0228*** 1.1111*** 0.8093*** 1.0155*** 1.1578*** 0.8928*** 0.9941*** 
 (0.2790) (0.3198) (0.3405) (0.2268) (0.2637) (0.2793) (0.1743) (0.2098) (0.2173) 
STI -1.4577*** -1.3840*** -1.1756*** -1.6381*** -1.5403*** -1.3731*** -1.2494** -1.1011*** -0.9725*** 
 (0.2057) (0.2315) (0.2590) (0.1877) (0.2038) (0.2265) (0.1494) (0.1622) (0.1828) 
Gender  0.6129*** 0.5557**  0.5926*** 0.4737**  0. 5079*** 0.3967** 
  (0.2131) (0.2324)  (0.1838) (0.1967)  (0.1546) (0.1598) 
Age  0.1130*** 0.0756  0.0612* 0.0210  0.0386 0.0093 
  (0.0005) (0.0486)  (0.0360) (0.0400)  (0.0274) (0.0303) 
Age2  -0.0012*** -0.0008  -0.0006 -0.0002  -0.0004 -0.0001 
  (0.0005) (0.0005)  (0.0004) (0.0004)  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Participation 
Other Org 
 0.3294 0.4081*  0.1881 0.1852  0.2003 0.1883 
 (0.2208) (0.2416)  (0.1921) (0.2048)  (0.1512) (0.1559) 
Corruption  -0.0778** -0.0758**  -0.0499* -0.0464  -0.0460* -0.0438* 
  (0.0331) (0.0352)  (0.0291) (0.0308)  (0.0240) (0.0253) 
Wallet  -0.0329 0.0102  0.0032 0.0340  0.0019 0.0266 
  (0.0405) (0.0434)  (0.0342) (0.0362)  (0.0271) (0.0282) 
Head of 
Household 
  -0.2287   -0.0583   -0.0849 
  (0.2262)   (0.1910)   (0.1521) 
Employed   1.2272*   0.9219**   0.7621*** 
   (0.7003)   (0.4576)   (0.2745) 
Econ Ladder   -0.2440***   -0.1971***   -0.1337*** 
   (0.0607)   (0.0517)   (0.0398) 
Married   0.2805   0.1564   0.1419 
   (0.2421)   (0.2070)   (0.1630) 
n 525 491 448 525 491 448 525 491 448 
Pseudo/Adj R2 0.1884 0.1243 0.1504 0.0545 0.0715 0.0814 0.1224 0.1670 0.1877 
Standard errors in parenthesis. For OLS, robust standard errors. 
*** Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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Table 12. Determinants of Collective PB Agency (STI vs LVG) 
Independent 
Variables 
Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Ologit 1 Ologit 2 Ologit 3 OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 
(high/low agency) (1-5 ordinal agency) (1-5 continuous agency) 
Constant 0.7278*** -1.4080 -1.9453    3.8084*** 3.0412*** 3.0611*** 
 (0.1321) (0.9349) (1.1845)    (0.1050) (0.6288) (0.7134) 
Participation 1.3167*** 1.0008*** 1.1102*** 0.8386*** 0.5925** 0.7405*** 0.8779*** 0.6603*** 0.7320*** 
 (0.2782) (0.3159) (0.3343) (0.2192) (0.2507) (0.2650) (0.1563) (0.1800) (0.1872) 
STI -1.4945*** -1.5600*** -1.3923*** -1.4758*** -1.5488*** -1.4361*** -0.9912*** -0.9918*** -0.8800*** 
 (0.2056) (0.2315) (0.2574) (0.2192) (0.2033) (0.2261) (0.1403) (0.1489) (0.1657) 
Gender  0.2563*** 0.1891  0.3420** 0.2104  0. 2417* 0.1324 
  (0.2123) (0.2288)  (0.1777) (0.1898)  (0.1411) (0.1447) 
Age  0.0888** 0.0605  0.0412 -0.0014  0.0239 -0.0091 
  (0.0420) (0.0473)  (0.0355) (0.0394)  (0.0271) (0.0284) 
Age2  -0.0008* -0.0006  -0.0003 0.0001  -0.0002 0.0002 
  (0.0005) (0.0005)  (0.0004) (0.0004)  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Participation 
Other Org 
 0.1710 0.1754  0.1250 0.0728  0.1157 0.0826 
 (0.2175) (0.2345)  (0.1878) (0.1983)  (0.1466) (0.0231) 
Corruption  -0.0409 -0.0464  -0.0407 -0.0448  -0.0324 -0.0355 
  (0.0324) (0.0344)  (0.0280) (0.0295)  (0.0226) (0.0231) 
Wallet  0.0382 0.0691  0.0561* 0.0842**  0.0479 0.0685 
  (0.0402) (0.0431)  (0.0333) (0.0351)  (0.0249) (0.0246) 
Head of 
Household 
  -0.0064**   0.1047   0.0484 
  (0.2196)   (0.1866)   (0.1451) 
Employed   1.6210**   1.2469***   1.0176*** 
   (0.7045)   (0.4578)   (0.3453) 
Econ Ladder   -0.1435**   -0.1418***   -0.0950** 
   (0.0578)   (0.0491)   (0.0383) 
Married   0.1893*   0.2205   0.1386 
   (0.2356)   (0.2003)   (0.1530) 
n 529 491 451 529 494 451 529 494 451 
Pseudo/Adj R2 0.0822 0.1243 0.1218 0.0421 0.0565 0.0659 0.0894 0.1188 0.1438 
Standard errors in parenthesis. For OLS, robust standard errors. 
*** Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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3.3.3 Characterizing the Participation Model 
After this initial evidence, let us explore more deeply the relationship between 
participation and subjective agency (individual and collective PB agency). My first step is 
to estimate the propensity score, which I then use to match individuals across PB and non-
PB municipalities. To do so, it is necessary to choose a set X of conditioning variables that 
should not be influenced by PB. The participation model predicts the probability of 
participation in PB. It is characterized by variables that likely determine not only 
participation, but also agency. Because, as we have noted, it is possible that unmeasured 
factors affect participation decisions, we must relax the assumption of conditional 
independence (selection into participation is based only on observable characteristics) 
required to be present in PSM models.  
There is no list of clearly relevant variables that will allow me to come up with the 
least biased estimate based on the accuracy of the matched control group. But, after 
considering different factors, I have chosen as covariates most of the same control variables 
used in the preliminary models shown earlier. The differences are that: (a) instead of using 
the wallet question as the social trust variable, I have now incorporated a measure of trust 
in neighbors and trust in the mayor, both of which takes ascending values of trust from 1 
to 3; (b) I have also included health, education and an interaction term for education and 
gender; and (c) I considered adding indicators of employment, being the head of household, 
and marital status, but I concluded they were irrelevant as they added no power to the 
models. It is important to note that although this participation model has included trust and 
perception variables, very similar results were obtained when they were excluded (which 
may be an indication that results may not be all endogenous to pre-existing individual 
traits/attitudes). Table 13 below shows the results for the participation logit models for Q1, 
 
from which the propensity score was predicted for each pair of municipalities (i.e., 
SDE/SDO & STI/LVG). 
 
𝑒𝑒 (𝑥𝑥) ≡ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 1 | 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥) 
𝑋𝑋 ⊥ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 | 𝑒𝑒 (𝑋𝑋) 
(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1 , 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎0)  ⊥ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 |  𝑋𝑋 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 0 < 𝑒𝑒(𝑋𝑋) < 1 
⇒ (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎0) ⊥ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃|𝑒𝑒(𝑋𝑋) 
 
where PB is the treatment indicator of participation in PB, agency is the outcome, and X a 
set of observed characteristics of each individual.  
 
Table 13. Participation Model 















































N 239 231 
Pseudo R2 .1922 .2609 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*** Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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Looking at the standard errors (in parenthesis) from SDE’s participation model, it 
can be seen that participation in PB is related to age (the older the individual, the higher 
the probability of participating), perceptions of corruption (the higher the perception of 
corruption in the government, the lower the probability of participating), trust in neighbors 
and the mayor (the more trust, the higher the probability of participation), participation in 
other CSOs (members of other CSO are more likely than non-members to participate) and 
the interaction of education and gender (educated men are less likely to participate). 
Gender, perceptions of wealth, 80 education, or health are not significant in explaining 
participation in PB. In the case of STI, participation in PB is positively and significantly 
correlated with age, being male, trusting neighbors and the mayor, perception of wealth, 
being a member or participant in other CSOs, and being healthy. 
 
3.3.4 Assessing the Association of Participation and PB Agency  
Using Stata’s psmatch2 plug-in developed by Leuven & Sianesi (2003), four 
matching exercises were conducted using the nearest neighbor algorithm, without 
replacement. Because the treatment group was oversampled when compared to its 
80 Although ideally I would have controlled for objective income, the problem is that self-reported income 
data tends to suffer from tremendous measurement error. Moreover, after looking at the data meticulously, I 
have strong suspicions that many respondents reported their personal income, rather than the household 
income, as the survey asked. Furthermore, 8% of the income observations are missing. Because of this, I 
have decided to use the economic ladder question to account for a measure of wealth. Although there is less 
incentive to misreport in this exercise than in the income question, using the economic ladder question also 
has it limitations. Graham and Chattopadhyay (2008) find that “happier, wealthier, and educated people are 
likely to place themselves higher on the ladder…These findings reflect more optimistic people ranking 
themselves higher. Yet they also reflect realistic assessments related to income and status.” (p. 9). In sum, on 
the one hand, is the finding that happier and more optimistic respondents will put themselves high up the 
wealth ladder. On the other hand, some would argue that people with more agency also would likely put 
themselves higher in the ladder, but a counter argument would suggest that people with more agency are 
more realistic about factors constraining their agency.. With these two competing ideas, it is not clear if using 
the economic ladder question would bias the result in a particular direction.  
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frequency in a random population, Heinrich et al. (2010) explain that matching should be 
done on the log-odds ratio log (P (Xi) / 1-P (Xi)), instead of directly on the estimated 
propensity score.81 Doing so assures that results are invariant to the sampling method. 
In the first (SDE/SDO) case, the input was to match participants in the PB 
municipality, SDE, with similar individuals in the non-PB city, SDO (across the chosen 
observables captured in the participation model). Fifty observations were used and matched 
with the log odds ratio of the propensity score. In the second (STI/LVG) case, the same 
was done for participants in STI, who were matched with similar individuals in the non-
PB city, LVG. Sixty-three observations were used and matched with the log odds ratio of 
the propensity score. These pairs became the treatment units—SDE/STI figures serving as 
the post-treatment measure for the treated, and SDO/LVG as the pseudo pre-treatment for 
SDE/STI participants. In the third case, the input was to match non-participants in SDE 
with similar individuals in SDO. As a result, 187 observations of non-participants were 
matched with similar individuals in SDO. Finally, the same was done for non-participants 
in STI, who were matched with similar individuals in LVG. In this case, 166 observations 
for individual agency and 167 for collective agency of non-participants were matched with 
similar individuals in LVG. These pairs became the control units.  Once again, SDE/STI 
figures served as the post-treatment measures for the control group, and SDO/LVG as the 
81  “With choice-based sampling [where the treated are oversampled relative to their frequency in the 
population] the number of treated and comparison cases does not reflect the likelihood that an individual with 
given characteristics participates in the program in the full universe, but rather is determined by various 
factors outside the control—and knowledge—of the researcher. Matching on the log odds of the propensity 
score has the advantage that it “spreads out” the density of scores at very low or very high propensity scores. 
Use of the log odds also allows for a consistent bandwidth to be used. In addition, since the logit is used to 
predict propensity score, the log odds are a linear combination of the independent variables, and a constant 
radius is expected to translate into the same metric at different propensity score levels” (Heinrich et al., 2010, 
p. 26). 
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pseudo pre-treatment. Annex 5 presents the outputs of the matching exercises, both for 
individual and collective PB agency.82 
To assess the association of participation with PB agency, and assuming that the 
differences between treatment and control groups are the smallest possible over real and 
pseudo time (which is believable given the way in which municipalities were selected), it 
is necessary to introduce some post-matching notation.  
Let us define agencyit as the mean of the outcome in group i at the time t. i=0 for 
the control group (SDE non-participants and their matches) and i=1 for the treatment group 
(SDE participants and their matches). Define t=0 as the pre-treatment period (values of 
matched observations) and t=1 to be the post-treatment period (values of SDE’s 
observations; note that only the treatment group gets the treatment—participation). The 
assumption under a quasi-experiment with no unobservable and endogeneity issues would 
be that any difference in the change in means of agency between treatment and control 
units is the result of participation in PB. However, more cautiously, I will take such 
estimator as a stronger evidence of correlation (vis-à-vis the preliminary findings), rather 
than established causation. I estimate the estimator (agency11-agency10) – (agency01 – 
agency00), which is the change in agency for the treatment group minus the change in 
agency for the control group. One can then run the model: 
 
 
82 While performing these matching exercises, given that PSM is a data hungry technique and given that the 
size of this dataset is modest, a given individual from a non-PB city could be matched both, with a participant 
and non-participant from the PB city. 
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Δagencyi = β0 + β1 Xi + εi; 
 where Δagencyi = agencyi1 - agencyi0  and Xi is a dichotomous variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the individual is in the treatment group and 0 in the control group. 
 
Table 14. Empirical Association between Participation and PB Agency  
  Average difference in agency between participants 
and their matches – average difference in agency 
between non-participants and their matches 
Individual PB Agency 
SDE (237 obs; Adj R2=.2047) 
1.9649*** 
(.2501) 
Individual PB Agency 
STI (229 obs; Adj R2=.0612) 
1.2564*** 
(.3153) 
Collective PB Agency 
SDE (237 obs; Adj R2=.1051) 
1.1354*** 
(0.2118) 
Collective PB Agency 
STI (230 obs; Adj R2=.0495) 
1.0149*** 
(.2822) 
*** Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
 
It must be pointed out that the dependent variables are ordinal in nature. Hence, the 
outcome of interest has categories in a meaningful order, but for which a score of 2 in 
agency does not mean double the agency than a score of 1. However, due to the similarity 
in the coefficients yielded by OLS and ordered logit models, the former are here presented 
for easier interpretation (ordered logit outputs are shown in Annex 6).83 In all cases, the 
effect of participation is positive and significant; but again, I take this as evidence of a 
significant relationship between both variables. The association with individual PB agency 
is larger than with collective PB agency. Moreover, the coefficient for individual PB 
agency is larger in magnitude in the city of SDE vis-à-vis STI, but the coefficient for 
collective PB agency is greater in STI vis-à-vis SDE. Nonetheless, comparison across both 
83 Although ignoring that agency is ordinal and treating it as a nominal variable causes a loss of efficiency, 
the estimates are still unbiased. 
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cases are not appropriate, since there are many structural differences in the way the PB 
process has been carried out in each city.  
As Table 14 shows, the main results are: (a) PB participants in SDE, on average, 
report individual and collective PB agency scores 2 and 1.3 points higher, respectively, 
than do non-participants in SDE; and (b) PB participants in STI on average report 
individual and collective PB agency scores 1.3 and 1 points higher, respectively, than do 
non-participants in STI. 
 
3.4 Agency and Awareness of PB 
 
3.4.1 Context 
I have already considered the correlation between participation and agency. I now 
examine the possible association between having some sort of knowledge about PB, rather 
than directly participating, and once again having feelings of agency (within the 
PB/municipal budgeting context). Doing so allows me to obtain suggestive evidence (for 
future causal evaluation) of whether the potential sphere of influence of PB may go beyond 
those who attend the assemblies.  
The specific question (Q2) tested in this section asks whether non-participants who 
live in a PB municipality and are aware of PB are more likely to report higher levels of 
collective agency vis-à-vis unaware individuals in that municipality, or residents of non-
PB municipalities. In testing this claim, the independent variable of interest is whether an 
individual is aware or not of PB defined as having heard about the process before the 
interview. This is the variable previously introduced as awareness. The idea under 
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examination is whether or not people who are aware of PB in a PB municipality, although 
not themselves participants in PB, feel—albeit, indirectly—like agents through a social 
network externality. What of possible awareness of PB in a non-PB municipality? 
Interestingly, it could be argued that people who are aware of something perceived as good 
(e.g., PB) but they cannot enjoy, feel more frustrated and disempowered than those who 
simply have no awareness of its existence. Or, on the contrary, it could be argued that 
residents of non-PB cities who are aware of PB in another cities may report enhanced 
agency (at least agency freedom, if not agency achievement) believing that what residents 
of PB cities can do, they can also do. Because of the indirect road to agency explored in 
this section, which comes through the action of one’s social networks, rather than direct 
personal action, collective, rather than individual agency, becomes the outcome of interest.  
 In this case, the non-PB municipality is considered purely on its own terms, rather 
than as a pseudo PB city (as it was employed in the quasi-experimental setting). To test 
this claim a straightforward regression analysis without a comparison group design is 
informative, given that no problems of selection bias are suspected in this case: First, I 
assume that people do not choose to live in one municipality or the other based on the local 
government’s decision to conduct PB or not.  Second, I assume that whether an individual 
in SDE becomes informed or not about PB does not directly depend on either internal traits 
related either to motivation to participate or the propensity to enjoy agency, for the local 
government uses mass advertising strategies, such as radio spots and street signs, that more 
or less reach all individuals alike. On the contrary, in STI, most of the information about 
PB is transmitted through neighborhood councils; and, hence, it is less likely that an 
individual becomes informed about the process of PB unless he/she is already involved in 
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such matters.  Although the calendar of assemblies is indeed published in the website of 
STI’s local government, it is suspected that for an individual to decide to look for the 
schedule on the website, he/she is already aware. Thus, because of the potential of 
obtaining biased estimators for the STI/LVG’s case, for Q2 only SDE and SDO are 
included in the analysis. 
To better control for the potential problem (even in SDE) that those who are aware 
of PB may know of the process precisely because they have a motivation to find out about 
the process and its respective assemblies, I have dropped from the sample two groups of 
respondents who could have been placed into the “suspect” category of agency-motivated 
individuals: (a) participants, and (b) non-participants who skipped their community 
assemblies because of a reported “lack of time”. It may be the case that respondents 
informed about the community assemblies when asked why they did not go responded—
due to a social desirability effect—because “I had no time”, rather than along the lines of 
“I was not interested.” However, for the present at least, there is no way to control for such 
measurement error; and in any case, such measurement error is being omitted since that 
data is being dropped and, hence, is irrelevant for the rest of the analysis. In sum, for SDE 
the only respondents who are being considered are those who have heard of PB, but have 
not participated, and have declared a reason different than a “lack of time” to justify their 
lack of participation. From the non-PB municipality of SDO all respondents are being 
considered, and for them it is also known whether an individual there has or has not heard 
about PB (i.e., is aware or not aware). Once these filters are applied, the number of eligible 
observations in SDE is 182 and the number of observations in SDO remains the same at 
265. 
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Figure 4 shows the percentage of respondents divided by awareness and 
municipality that reported each score of collective agency. The graphic evidence suggests 
that the percentage of aware individuals in SDE reporting high levels of PB agency (score 
of 4 or 5) is double  (31%) than that of unaware individuals in the same locality (16%). In 
SDO, there is not much difference in these percentages, as individuals reporting high scores 
represent around 12% of either aware or unaware individuals in that city. As hinted earlier, 
there are different potential explanations behind these results for SDO: (a) it may be the 
case that being aware of something that is not available may not empower you (on the 
contrary, it might make the individual feel frustrated for a lack of access to it, if he values 
it as good, as nearly all the sample did); (b) being aware of PB enhances your agency, since 
you know that you have the freedom and/or ability to do it; or (c)  people in the non-PB 
cities feel that they were different in some way than residents of the PB cities (we are 
always stuck in the mud, with more-corrupt officials or more-selfish citizens than others). 
This conundrum is worth investigating further in the future. 
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3.4.2 The Model and Results 
Let us specify the model: 
agencycoli = β1 + β2 awarenessi + β3 pbcityi + β4 awareness*pbcityi + β5 Xi + εi; 
where agencycoli is the collective PB agency score for unit i, awareness is a dichotomous 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual has heard of PB and 0 otherwise, pbcity 
is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual is from SDE and 0 if 
the individual is from SDO, awareness*pbcity is an interaction term between the latter two 
variables, and Xi is a vector of controls. Table 15 below presents the main results for 
SDE/SDO. 
Figure 5 shows how the PB non-participant from SDE, but who is aware of PB 
reports higher feelings of agency than the PB-aware individual in SDO, who would not 
have access to the process. Although these differences in levels do not account for control 
variables, it speaks of the possibility of a spillover effect. The figure below also shows 
what could be considered as a municipality effect—the SDE individual reports higher level 
of collective PB agency regardless of his/her awareness condition. Another interesting 
pattern is that aware individuals, regardless of their place of residence, report higher levels 
of PB collective agency. This is interesting, as it tends to rebut the argument that an 
individual who is aware of PB in SDO is frustrated due to the lack of access to it. But, 
when we turn to the regression results (Table 15), there is not enough support for the 
indirect link to agency argued, as the coefficients of interest are not statistically significant. 
This finding goes in line with Crocker’s idea that for one being an agent one must 
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contribute—or have the freedom to contribute—to the realization of the goals.84  
 







Table 15. PB Awareness and Collective PB Agency (SDE vs SDO) 
  OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) 
Constant 2.2696*** .8079* .6437 
 (.0953) (.4590) (.4741) 
Awareness 0.4843*** .0185 .0601 
 (.1309) (.1411) (.1417) 
PBcity .0577 .3351* .3751** 
 (.1676) (.1760) (.1746) 
Awareness*PBcity .0997 .0035 -.0266 
 (.2111) (.2082) (.2071) 
Gender  -0.1012 .1333 
  (.1001) (.2968) 
Age  .0034 .0025 
  (.0045) (.0045) 
84 In the interest of framing future research, it is interesting to note that a person may live in a non-PB city 
and be aware that other cities have a PB (which gives them more agency and control over their city). Although 
this person does not have agency freedom right now with respect to PB in her city (for it does not exist), she 
does have agency freedom to “agitate, educate, and organize” (B. R. Ambedkar in Dreze and Sen 2013) to 
bring about PB in her city. There are different sorts of freedom to contribute to the realization of one’s goals 














                                                 
Economic Ladder  .0993*** .0946*** 
  (.0352) (.0350) 
Participation/Membership in CSO .2316** .2895** 
  (0.1183) (.1184) 
Educated  -.1885* -.4376*** 
  (.1127) (.1424) 
Employed  .4491*** .7009*** 
  (.1625) (.2120) 
Health  -.0080 -.0204 
  (.0921) (.0912) 
Corruption  -.0870*** -.0844*** 
  (.0188) (.0187) 
Trust in Neighbors  .2280** .2444*** 
  (.0988) (.0979) 
Trust in Mayor  .2578*** .2726*** 
  (.0875) (.0869) 
Educated*Gender   .5785*** 
   (.2014) 
Employed*Gender   -.6203** 
      (.3150) 
N 424 388 388 
Adj R2 .0606 .2429 .2594 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*** Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
 
For sensitivity purposes, let us now turn to the stronger measure of awareness—
awareness of community assembly. This measure is generated from the specific question 
in the PB city instrument that asked residents if they were informed of the scheduling of 
their respective community assemblies. I call it a stronger measure since it implies not only 
having ever heard about PB, but specifically knowing that the discussions and voting were 
scheduled.  Hence, it is interesting to compare collective PB agency scores of non-
participants in SDE who were aware of the scheduled assemblies vis-à-vis those also in 
SDE who were not but had a general idea of the city’s PB. Note that this model does not 
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involve the SDO residents at all. 
The models on Table 16 (below) do provide support for the argument of possible 
spillover effects, which, I believe is this dissertation’s most interesting empirical finding. 
The coefficients for awareness of scheduled community assembly are positive and 
statistically significant across specifications, suggesting that people who were aware of the 
assemblies but did not participate do feel more like agents vis-à-vis other residents of the 
municipality that may or may not have heard about PB before, but for certain did not know 
of assemblies scheduled events.  The third model shows that on average, individuals aware 
of the scheduled community assemblies report a collective agency score that is, on average, 
0.81 points higher than the unaware, all else constant. This result speaks of the existence 
of strong social networks and a vibrant civil society that may be effectively and 
satisfactorily working through channels of representation. Moreover, it also touches upon 
the importance of knowledge of the opportunities available for political decision-making, 
which citizens can translate into feelings of agency freedom. 
 
Table 16. PB Awareness of Community Assemblies and Collective Agency (SDE) 
  OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) 
Constant 2.5374*** 1.1154** 1.1273 
 (.0915) (.4768) (.7735) 
Awareness of CA 1.0876*** .8723*** .8083*** 
 (.2165) (.2052) (.2179) 
Gender  -.3002** -.0823 
  (.1522) (.4203) 
Age  -.0013 -0.0024 
  (.0064) (-.0074) 
Economic Ladder   0.0298 
   (.0671) 
Participation/Membership in CSO .0811 .2056 
  (.1582) (.1709) 
Educated   -.6871*** 
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   (.2407) 
Employed   .5366* 
   (.2845) 
Health   -.1122 
   (.1355) 
Corruption  -.0546** -.0564** 
  (.0274) (.0286) 
Trust in Neighbors  .3417*** .3331*** 
  (.1244) (.1284) 
Trust in Mayor  .4947*** .4462*** 
  (.1450) (.1540) 
Educated*Gender   .8714** 
   (.3524) 
Employed*Gender   -.5862 
      (.4489) 
n 179 174 164 
Adj R2 0.1198 0.3224 0.3335 
Standard errors in parenthesis 






3.5 Conclusions & Implications 
From the perspective of the agency-oriented capability approach that I introduced 
in Chapter 2, citizen participation in PB assemblies, as an exercise of direct democracy in 
which people have an opportunity to influence decision-making and make a difference, is 
theorized to have an impact on people’s feelings of agency. Although I have been unable 
to test for such causal link due to data limitations, I have performed an associational 
evaluation of the link between participation in this local level affair that PB is, and 
individual and collective reports of agency. Specifically, this chapter showed that 
participation in PB assemblies is positively associated with higher levels of perceived 
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agency in the PB context. Participating in SDE is associated with an average increase in 
the reported individual and collective agency scores of 1.97 and 1.14, respectively, when 
compared to non-participants, ceteris paribus. Participating in STI is associated with an 
average increase in the reported individual and collective agency scores of 1.26 and 1.01, 
respectively, when compared to non-participants. Note, however, I surmise that the 
relationship between both measures of interest is not as strong and powerful in the case of 
STI as in the case of SDE because of the problems with the way in which the process is 
carried out in the former city—problems that affect the association of participation and 
perception of agency.  
It is appropriate, given the normative interest behind this research, to highlight the 
normative implications of these varying results. Although PB is clearly associated with 
higher levels of agency freedom and achievement, the mere offering of PB is not enough 
to achieve full realization of the normative ideal, for we observe significant differences 
between STI’s and SDE’s results. I argue that to produce agents in this context, power 
sharing designs like PB must be fully democratic and “work well.” The conditions for this 
notion of “working well” are discussed in the following chapter. 
The other key and more novel finding presented in the preceding pages is the 
evidence of a significant correlation between collective agency scores and being aware of 
PB but not participating in the assemblies. I found that the non-participants who are aware 
of the assemblies in SDE report a collective agency score that is 0.83, on average, higher 
than that of unaware non-participants in the same city, which can be argued is suggestive 
of the existence of a spillover effect.  
Once again, this result of an awareness externality also has normative implications: 
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knowledge and trust in representatives matter. From the capability approach lens this 
means that in a PB municipality, someone who is aware of PB, and of her freedom to 
participate in it, will feel like an agent (indirectly) even if she does not participate, because 
she knows she has the freedom to participate and possibly, because she also knows that 
others may be already faithfully representing her interests. A person in a non-PB 
municipality may be aware of the PB in other cities, but the lack of freedom to participate 
in her own PB takes away the capability of experiencing agency freedom, let alone agency 
achievement. Equally important is the case that a resident in a non-PB city can become an 
(indirect) agent by hearing about PB in another city for she sees how residents in that city 
exercise their power to participate in PB—and, depending on the willingness of the mayor 
and other citizens to conduct PB after citizens’ demands for the process, this resident may 
be empowered to do the same in her city. Due to a lack of PB in her city, this person does 
not have agency freedom for now, but she does have potential—or a different kind of—
agency freedom (unless she lives in city dominated by a non-responsive mayor or tyrant). 
Future research should focus on exploring the enabling conditions for this indirect link to 
agency. 
Finally, I do believe that there is promising work to be done in the future to move 
beyond correlations to causal relationships between participation in or awareness of PB 
and subjective measures of agency. I hope to have provided sufficient reason to inspire 
such future research.  
Thus far, I have shown the existence of an associational link between participation 
in and awareness of PB and measures of agency. Differences in results between STI and 
SDE might be driven by intrinsic differences accross the localities, but also may be an 
 112 
indication of how the characteristics of each PB can produce varying outcomes. As a result, 
in the next chapters I move on to studying in more detail possible structures, patterns and 
enabling conditions within PB assemblies that likely have diverse outcomes in the 
realization of our normative ideals of interest. The analysis that follows allows me to tease 
out possible determinants in the success or failure of a PB, when viewed as a driver of 







Chapter 4. Participatory Budgeting in the Dominican Republic:  
A Qualitative and Normative Methodological Framework 
 
Exploring different normative features of PB within the DR context, and focusing 
on PB’s second stage of public consultations, in this chapter I introduce a methodological 
framework with which I will later attempt to move beyond mere correlations to possible 
causation. I do so by identifying and describing enabling conditions that explain how 
participation in PB can drive outcomes such as feelings of agency. Without arguing 
normatively or ethically that the conditions of the PB process are intrinsically good or that 
the many intended consequences of PB are intrinsically or instrumentally good, I offer a 
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hypothesis that if certain conditions are met, then, the intended results are likely to occur. 
More specifically, using two case studies, applying the methodology of “process tracing,”85 
and basing the analysis on the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2, I present the 
complex hypothesis: if the following conditions of the PB process take place—assemblies 
are fair, effective, inclusive, deliberative, and civil society actors have at least minimal 
initial functionality86—the following PB’s intended (and alleged) consequences are likely 
to occur: participants of winning communities feel like agents of their own change, are able 
to increase their cooperative group functioning, become witnesses to more and better local 
democracy, as well as protagonists of authentic development.  
I argue that these outcomes are achieved to different degrees depending on the 
presence and robustness of such enabling conditions. I test the previous hypothesis in 
Chapter 5.As a claim to be tested in future research, I also propose that if certain conditions 
prevail during the third (execution) stage of PB (not observed in this study), then 
individuals are likely to reinforce the previous outcomes or make them more durable. 
Moreover, with observations from the third stage, well-being results can be analyzed, 
which would be relevant for teasing out whether participation is leading not only to higher 
feelings of agency, but also of empowerment.  
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 presents the research context; 4.2, 
my qualitative methodology and 4.3 the conceptualizations of the variables and conditions. 
 
85 In sum, this methodology differs from the quantitative one used in Chapter 3 in that it uses observational 
and interview data, rather than survey data, and in that its objective is not only to look at the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables, but to also understand the different mechanisms that 
plausibly connect the two sets of variables. 
86 I go into more detail about what I mean by these conditions in Section 4.3. 
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4.1 Research Context  
 
4.1.1 Theoretical Background 
As adumbrated in Chapter 2, the research context for this chapter stems from 
capability approach and its normative principles that exercising agency is a good thing and 
includes active deliberation, decision-making, and the implementation of processes in 
which individuals and collectivities make differences in the world with respect to greater 
individual and communal well-being. The contrast is with contexts in which an individual’s 
or group’s decisions are made and actions performed by what Robert Dahl calls 
“guardians”: 87  scientists (for example, economists), technocrats (for example, 
development experts), bureaucrats, or politicians. In PB, individuals have great access to 
political life and democratically forge political consensus through dialogue. Their 
consequent decisions have various positive impacts, such as: (a) enhanced individual well-
being and agency achievements; (b) better (more inclusive, deeper) democracy, in which 
citizens can act together to shape public policy; and (c) enhanced communal well-being 
and agency. 
The main idea examined is that in PB—insofar as assemblies are fair, inclusive, 
deliberative, and groups have a certain cooperative and strategic functioning and capacity 
for effective change—participants are likely to feel they are PB agents, experience 
strengthened group functioning, witness more and better democracy, and become 
protagonists of authentic development.88  
87 See Chapter 7 of Robert Dahl’s On Democracy, 2010.  
88 It is pertinent to point out, as it will be discussed in more details later, that there are likely other impacts of 
PB—beyond those of empowerment, agency, group functioning, authentic development and more and better 
democracy. However, in this study I restrict my attention to the ones just listed.  
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4.1.2 Data 
The data used for the qualitative analysis that follows consists of direct observations 
of public assemblies, interviews, and archival data (written documents). I use the survey 
and quantitative data from Chapter 3 when pertinent and in a complementary manner. 
Table 17 below summarizes the information gathered from the field over three research 
trips: Fall 2012 (trip 1), Winter 2013 (trip 2), and Spring 2013 (trip 3). 
Observing the public consultations of SDE and STI, the two PB municipalities, was 
the primary research activity in which I engaged.89 I observed two kinds of processes, one 
kind at the community level and other at the block level, where diverse communities 
competed to insert their projects in the municipality PB of 2013—in which some 
communities win, and some communities lose. As I mentioned previously, and as I will 
analyze later, these two types of meetings had very different dynamics, and although both 
were democratic, the kinds of democracy displayed in the assemblies differed significantly. 
At the same time, the block-level consultations also varied considerably among themselves 
depending on factors such as number and years of experience of attendees, location, and 
the character of the facilitator, all of which I will explain and analyze subsequently.    
 
Table 17. Research Data 
Quantity Type of data 
Research 
Trip No. 
10 Observations of community assemblies in SDE 1 
17 Observations of block assemblies (6 in SDE and 11 in STI) 1 
56 Interviews of ordinary citizens, local leaders, reporters, local 
governments staff, SDE’s vice-mayor, STI’s mayor, staff from local 
1,2,3 
89 I prepared for this research activity by following guidelines about qualitative evaluation, research, and 
reporting that scholars such as Cloutier et al., (1987), Platon (1990), and Wholey et al., (1994), have 
developed. 
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NGOs, FEDOMU and The World Bank 
50+ Documents 1,2,3 
532 My surveys in PB municipalities of SDE and STI (used for analysis in 
Chapter 3) 
2,3 
507 My surveys in non-PB municipalities of SDO and LVG (used for 
analysis in Chapter 3) 
2,3 
 
Due to the simultaneity in date/time of some of the meetings, I was not able to 
physically attend all meetings and a research assistant recorded some meetings. (I also 
video-recorded most of the assemblies that I attended) Annex 7 presents a table that 
summarizes the details of the meetings observed, assigning an alphabetic or numeric code 
to each assembly, which I use in the next chapter when referring to specific events.  
In general, attending the public consultations allowed me to observe and later 
describe several characteristics of the PB participants and processes: (a) diversity in 
participants’ observable characteristics, such as gender or my perception of their age; (b) 
power asymmetries; 90  (c) general level of participation and interest/distribution of 
interventions; (d) the procedure by which decisions were made (e.g., consensus versus 
majority vote); (e) how much and/or what kind of deliberation takes place; (f) indications 
of whether deliberation occurred in an environment of trust, where honest and open 
dialogue took place; (g) the way in which disagreements were handled; (h) how much 
consideration was given to different points of view and values; (i) appropriateness of the 
physical setting for the meeting and the amount of time assigned to deliberations; (j) the 
likelihood of participants changing their views during deliberation, making trivial or deep 
compromises, finding common ground, taking on board some of the views of those with 
90 The idea was to observe how inclusive the process was. Did everybody have a reasonably equal chance to 
voice his or her opinions? Or, rather, did a single individual or a group dominate the proceedings? 
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whom they disagree, or offering proposals that others could accept; (k) the kind of 
leadership displayed in the sessions; and (m) level of respect among deliberators, leaders 
and facilitators.91  
As specified earlier in Table 17, I supplemented my direct observations by 
interviewing local leaders, municipal authorities and/or employees, and ordinary citizens. 
Of the latter group, some were participants in the PB meetings while many others were just 
inhabitants of the communities under study. The interviews gave me a broader 
understanding of the situation in each municipality and enabled me to collect information 
about certain aspects that my direct observation of the public assemblies could not reveal. 
In addition, interviews enabled me to gather information about varying community 
dynamics, such as negotiation strategies, that occurred before the meetings. 
As part of the qualitative portion of this study, these interviews were not structured. 
Although I did have a set core of questions that I always was careful to ask, I did not follow 
a script expecting concise or direct answers. Instead, these interviews were more relaxed 
and conversational, which ultimately allowed me to better connect with the respondents 
and, thereby, obtain a deeper understanding of their views and interests. Annex 8 presents 
a list of topics/questions frequently employed in the interviews and specifies those that 
were more relevant for each type of municipality—PB or non-PB. None of the interviewees 
requested anonymity. Should any further researchers have an interest in the content of these 
interviews (most of which were either audio or video-recorded), they are available and can 
be accessed for any additional information.  
91 As evidenced by this long list, this is a big agenda; ethnographic methods and longer stays in the cities 
could enhance the depth and breadth of my research.  
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 The archival data includes FEDOMU PB reports from chosen municipalities, 
reports from follow-up committees, booklets, PB methodology guides, books, legislatures, 
DVDs, financial statements, newspaper articles, Power Point presentations used in 
conferences, Office of National Statistics Province profiles, and others. 
 
4.2 Methods: Process Tracing 
Baiocchi et al. (2011) use the method of analysis called “process tracing” to 
document and evaluate “the entire participatory input chain, from the first articulation of a 
demand to the actual budgetary allocation” (p. 65). Inspired by their approach, I also use 
this methodology for a detailed analysis of the PB processes observed. The process to be 
traced is participation in PB (independent variable), as a potential means to more agency, 
increased cooperative group functioning, more and better democracy (dependent 
variables), and so forth.  
Before describing my methodology in detail, it is important to point out the 
similarities and differences between this approach and that of Baiocchi et al. Although I 
use their PB and non-PB pairing structure for the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 
3, they used the pairing approach for a qualitative evaluation. In this and the next chapters’ 
qualitative assessment, I use their same process tracing, but only focusing on data from PB 
cities, because data from the non-PB cities is still limited. The main reason why I was 
restricted in investigating citizen mechanisms in the non-PB municipalities is that they do 
not have these formal forums, and hence, it was very hard in the time I had available to 
determine with whom to meet, where to meet them, and the timing of any informal 
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meeting.92  
So, what is process tracing? Collier (2011) defines process tracing as “an analytic 
tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence—
often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (p. 823).93 
Although the diagnosis pieces are often called causal process observations, due to the 
complexity of the causal mechanisms94 embedded in this social and political phenomena 
of PB, I will refer to them as evidence of the presence /absence of enabling conditions.95  
Collier argues that two of the many effective uses of process tracing are (a) 
identifying novel political and social phenomena and systematically describing them, and 
(b) gaining insight into causal mechanisms96 as a way to add leverage to quantitative 
analysis, especially to small-N design, as employed in this study. Thus, process tracing 
becomes an appropriate tool of analysis to complement the findings of Chapter 3. It allows 
me to identify enabling conditions that link participation in PB with outcomes normatively 
92  In the last section of Chapter 6—“The Way Forward”—, I suggest that more ethnographic-type 
investigation in the non-PB cities could provide substantial information about the way in which residents of 
non-PB cities interact among each others, with leaders, with the local government and about the means they 
find available to come up with solutions for their community or block needs. 
93 According to Collier (2011), while process tracing sometimes relies on quantitative data for description, it 
is fundamentally a key tool of qualitative analysis; moreover, he posits that even though it is often used as a 
qualitative tool, it is only rarely applied adequately or rigorously.  
94 Just as was the case with the quantitative methodologies employed in the previous chapter, with process 
tracing it is also impossible to ascertain conclusively whether a given mechanism is the only cause of an 
outcome; rather, it only indicates whether it has contributed to it or not. 
95 As Bennett (2010) states, performing a process tracing analysis “is also analogous to a doctor trying to 
diagnose an illness by taking in the details of a patient’s case history and symptoms and applying diagnostic 
tests that can, for example, distinguish between a viral and a bacterial infection” (para 5). 
96 Beach (2012) defines causal mechanisms as factors that are individually necessary parts of a mechanism, 
composed of entities that engage in activities producers of change or transmitter of causal forces. For George 
and Bennett (2005), causal mechanisms are “ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological 
processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to 
transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities” (p. 137).  J. L. Mackie (1965) defines causes as INUS 
conditions: “Insufficient but Necessary parts of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient” for 
their effects.  
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favored by the capability approach but based on evidence gathered from the field. I do this 
by making within-case inferences about the presence (or lack thereof) of enabling 
conditions founded in the PB processes of SDE and STI.  
Beach and Brun Pedersen (2013) distinguish three versions of process tracing: 
explaining-outcome, theory-building, and theory-testing.97 I will be using the latter, which 
is schematized in Figure 6 below. For the application of theory-testing PT, I follow what 
George and Bennett (2005) called analytic explanation: “an analytical causal explanation 
couched in explicit theoretical forms” (p. 211), which, as specified earlier, is derived from 
the capability approach. The causal processes reflect the complexity of the several 
conditions embedded in the PB systems of SDE and STI, which, as it will be shown, 
manifest themselves in significantly different ways in each locality.98 The analysis of these 
conditions entails looking at the different activities and entities that play an intervening 
role throughout the stages observed during the 2013 PB cycle. That is, the inductive logical 
process under analysis is that there is one X (participation) assumed likely to cause different 
outcomes Ys, given the presence of certain conditions (to be discussed next). 
97 Beach and Brun Perdersen (2013) explain the differences between the three versions of process tracing by 
detailing the purposes of each. The purpose of theory-testing process tracing is to tease out if a causal 
mechanism is present and whether it functions as the theory suggests. The purposes of theory-building 
process tracing is to find out what is the causal mechanism between X and Y. The purpose of explaining 
outcome process tracing is to establish what mechanismic explanation accounts for a given outcome (Beach 
& Brun Perdersen, 2013).  
98 Since process tracing does not allow for cross-case inferences, the cases of both PB municipalities will be 
assessed independently; however, in Chapter 5 I derive policy implications from comparative analyses of 
both cases. 
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Figure 6. Theory-Testing Process Tracing - The PB Case 
 
To use process tracing effectively and to be able to unfold the PB cycle, it is first 
necessary to describe and understand the plausible relationships between participation in 
PB and the probable outcomes in the present context. As a starting point, a timeline is 
presented (Figure 7) with the objective of summarizing and reminding the reader of the 
different stages of the PB process as described in Chapter 2. Subsequently, a modified 
version of a “logic” model/theory of change helps to depict the potentially causal 
relationships. This logic model can be viewed from the points of view of both the local 
governments (based on their stated intentions and legislature), and the individuals and their 
communities. Because the units of analysis in this study are ordinary citizens who 
participate in PB, I present the logic model from the community’s point of view in Table 





Figure 7. Timeline of PB 
 
Since process tracing it is not only theorizing about X and Y, but also theorizing 
about the possible causal mechanisms linking them, theoretical concepts for all of the parts 
between X and Y must also be introduced before applying PB. Beach and Brun Pedersen 
(2013) explain that by doing so, it becomes possible to seize the theorized process by which 
causal forces manifest through a causal mechanism to produce a certain result. But, once 
again, given that PBs are complex social phenomena,, instead of claiming to have identified 
“causal mechanisms” through process tracing analysis, conservatively, what I do is identify 
and evaluate conditions that enable the possible relationship between participation and the 
normative outcomes theorized. The logic model below shows how different types of 
outcomes relate to each other and what I understand should ultimately happen at each stage 
as a result of the initiatives and strategies that takes place. Table 18 also shows how some 
outcomes are independent and how others occur simultaneously as a result of one particular 
event. The following presentation of concepts captures these relationships formally. I argue 
This image cannot currently be displayed.
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that as is common to social phenomena, the outcomes of interest are the result not of one 
enabling conditions, but of multiple conditions acting simultaneously and/or sequentially. 
Furthermore, when analyzing these set-theoretical relationships, only the presence or 
absence of the conditions will be investigated. Hence, I only define the positive variation 








Table 18. Logic Model from Community’s Point of View using SDE and STI’s PB Experiences for 2013 












community level (in 
SDE these meetings 
include the local 
government 
participation and are 
part of the official 
PB process; in STI, 
these meetings occur 
without involvement 
of the government 
and are not officially 
part of the PB cycle) 
(a) Community 
agreement 
(identification of main 




(b) Increased awareness 
of pressing issue in the 
community and 
motivation to take action 
by supporting a project 
in the PB assemblies that 
would provide its 
solution 
Action plan (specific projects to be 
requested) to present in the PB 
assembly and neighborhood 
partnerships established 
Identified 
needs based on 
action plan  
Participation in the 
PB block assembly 
to formally voice 
such need and 
democratically 
437 projects proposed 
(SDE) 
 
Unknown number of 
projects proposed (STI) 
(a) Communities are empowered 
due to their capability of raising 
issues of high priority and bringing 
desired change; (b) Individuals and 
communities exercise agency in 
99  An example of this is that I posit that one of the conditions that enables the relationship between 
participation in PB and agency is that participation is of the deliberative kind. The most contrasting pole of 
this condition, following Crocker’s modes of participation, would be nominal participation. For process 
tracing, however, it is sufficient to conceptualize deliberation, and anything but deliberation as the opposite 
pole (any mode of participation that is thinner than deliberation). 
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submit it to the 
government’s 
consideration with a 
vote 
 realizing their well-being goals; (c) 
Communities improve their group 
functioning due to an increased 
ability to articulate a shared 
purpose and jointly implement 
actions towards goals100; (d) More 
and better democracy is attained; 









Active follow-up in 
the execution and 
maintenance of 
projects by elected 
delegates  
Approved projects done 
in agreed-upon time and 
according to the 
characteristics 
established  





4.3 Conceptualizations: Variables and Enabling Conditions 
Before concepts are introduced, it is necessary to define the context.101 The PB 
processes of SDE and STI are a case of PBs in the DR, and the population of cases refer to 
democratic institutions that enable open-ended democratic participation as a tool for 
decision-making regarding issues that are valued by and that affect the subjects who 
participate. With this context in mind, and since most concepts have been addressed in 
depth in the literature review of Chapter 2, I will proceed briefly to define and/or explain 
each of the variables and conditions. 
 
4.3.1 Main Independent Variable 
100 Such goals represent a shared definition of a specific problem or condition that ought to be addressed by 
the municipal government. 
101 “Context can be defined as the relevant aspects of a setting where the initial conditions contribute to 
produce an outcome of a defined scope and meaning through the operation of a causal mechanism” (Falleti 
& Lynch, as cited in Beach and Brun Perdesen, 2013, location 1038 of Kindle e-version). 
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Participation in PB: This variable represents whether an individual who lives in 
SDE or STI, and who is aware of PB, has chosen to participate in PB assemblies or not. 
This variable makes no distinction in the type/mode of participation within the PB process.  
 
4.3.2 Outcome Variables 
As explained earlier, the literature presents a wide array of definitions of 
empowerment and agency, and different views on the relationship between these two 
concepts.102 The objective of this study is not to contribute directly to the conceptual 
debate, but instead to choose what I see as one of the many adequate 
definitions/relationships and utilize these concepts to analyze the measures of interest. For 
my purpose, I assume great similarity if not synonymy between empowerment and agency. 
Agency: “individuals and communities are agents to the extent that they scrutinize 
reasons for various courses of action, decide for themselves, and have an impact in the 
world” (Crocker, 2012, p.48). A person would perceive him/herself as an agent in the 
domain of municipal budget planning, as long as he/she examines reasons for selecting one 
proposal over others in PB assemblies, decides for him/herself, and is able to influence the 
results of PB.  
Increased Cooperative Group Functioning: this variable refers to social 
mobilization that enables (a) people collectively to demand change and (b) groups to 
increase their ability to articulate and embrace a shared purpose and to engage in 
collaborative, respectful, and strategic relationships with other groups. 
 Local (Municipal) Democracy: local democracy (in this context) is attained insofar 
102 For example, recall that Drydyk sees agency as a component of empowerment, whereas Alkire sees 
empowerment as a subset of agency. 
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as spaces for open public participation and deliberation are offered to the citizens as a way 
for the local government to obtain citizen input for policy-making purposes. 
Alkire and Ibrahim (2007) have argued that empowerment and good governance 
are mutually reinforcing (I here extend this reasoning to empowerment’s component of 
agency). Good governance can come about from the open channel of participation that PB 
theoretically is—a process, democratic by definition, that is fair, transparent, fosters 
information flows, and provides a forum for an active civil society to become agents of 
change. I argue that deliberation is one important facet of good governance that matters 
particularly for agency, both at the individual and community levels. 
Authentic Development: social development, I assume, is authentic change as long 
as groups at whatever level become subjects who deliberate, decide, and act in the world 
with respect to their goals, means, and decision processes, rather than being either victims 
of chance or objects of other people’s decisions (Crocker, 2008). Such authentic 
development becomes good development in so far as self-determined change also 
promotes, protects, and restores well-being and agency for all affected. 
Ibrahim and Alkire (2007) argue that local participation (the main independent 
variable in this study) is theorized to exert a significant impact on national and even global 
development outcomes. However, this development outcome is most likely when there is 
agency. I argue that, because of this relationship, authentic and good development is a 
dependent variable of second degree, being attainable only after the first-degree outcome 
of agency has been reached. 
 
4.3.3 Enabling Conditions  
The following paragraphs define and describe the main and enabling conditions 
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that I propose in fact play a role in citizen participation having the outcomes just listed.103 
Fairness of the PB Process: this condition refers to assemblies occurring without 
foul play from either the municipal government team or a manipulative leader/elite group 
introducing power asymmetries that disrupt the transparency, impartiality and objectivity 
of the assemblies and their results. It requires a “level playing field,” an open and 
potentially equal sharing of PB knowledge among participants. For example, the 
government and experienced local leaders should make sure that every participant, new or 
old, is equally aware of the rules of the game and equally free to propose, criticize, question, 
and vote. As a necessary condition for all outcomes, the implication is that the fairer the 
PB process, the more likely it is that all outcomes become attainable. 
Inclusiveness of the PB Process: this condition refers to assemblies being attended 
by a wide and diverse audience. It links to Crocker’s breadth dimension, which establishes 
that an inclusive democracy is one in which there is wide participation from various groups 
and individuals, especially those previously and unfairly excluded. Fairness has to do not 
only with the procedure followed, but also with who can take part in the procedure. It must 
be noted that when outcomes like PB agency are analyzed from an individual’s point of 
view, inclusiveness becomes, in a sense, irrelevant because the concept matters for 
103 Although for the purposes of this study I employ capability approach and deliberative democracy norms, 
this list of conditions is derived from Przeworski’s (2010) work and has been adapted to the context under 
study. Even someone with a minimalist/aggregationist view of democracy, like him, sees that is it important 
to use moral norms to evaluate democratic process. He argues that a system of collective decision-making 
that does a good job in reflecting and aggregating individual and heterogeneous preferences must satisfy four 
criteria: (a) equality all participants must be able to influence collective decisions equally); (b) participation: 
participants must be able to influence effectively collective decisions; (c) representation: elected officials 
must implement collective decisions; and (d) liberty: the law should ensure that no event interferes with this 
process. 
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collectivities. 104  However, when analyzed from the community’s point of view, 
inclusiveness becomes a necessary communal condition for the members of communities 
to feel they are PB agents. Thus, as a condition contributing to all outcomes, the more 
inclusive the PB meetings are, the more likely that the outcomes are attained.  
Effective Change (Capacity and Actuality): this condition refers to (a) individuals 
who through participation either already have or acquire a real capacity to produce a certain 
type of outcome (a project selected and won through PB for a participant’s community or 
another one which she may be supporting, which need not be her own), and (b) participants 
truly bringing about desired change and making a difference in their own communities or 
in one they have chosen to support (which entails the government’s actual execution of the 
citizen-chosen project). These two aspects need to be separated since you can have (a) – 
the capacity / citizen freedom to effect change) without (b) – realized / citizen achievement 
of that change. 
Let us define these aspects further: (a) capacity of effective change aligns with 
Crocker’s democratic dimension of control, that is, the extent to which individuals can 
influence decisions and make a difference. I also tie this capacity to the dimension of range, 
that is, the kinds of questions about which citizens have a say on. I argue that as long as 
capacity of effective change prevails in every PB cycle it is more likely that the outcomes 
of interest can be attained. However, when comparing an individual or group that has 
actually won a PB project, with an individual or group that exercised their capacity but 
failed to win a project (since not all can win), I argue that an outcome like agency 
104 Of course, exclusion matters to an individual when that person believes he or she has been unfairly 
discriminated against (on the basis or morally irrelevant considerations such a gender or education.) 
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achievement does not necessarily fade away fully, but is certainly diminished. (It becomes 
what I designate as partial agency).105 My hypothesis is that if year after year an individual 
or group consistently fails to have its reasons and proposals selected for implementation in 
the PB process, then it is not likely that the final outcome will be agency enhancing. Actual 
effective change (b) is observed during the third stage of PB, which corresponds to project 
execution; the implication is that if actual effective change is achieved by the project being 
in fact executed, then more well-being and authentic development is brought to the 
recipient community.  
In sum, part (a) implies that the more able individuals are—or become through the 
process—to effect change, the more likely the outcomes become attainable, and the more 
change is likely to be brought about in the world.106 Part (b) implies that only if participants 
are able to be successful in producing actual change, is full agency (and other normative 
goals, as in Drydyk’s notion of empowerment) likely to be attained. Given the inter-
temporal characteristic of this mechanism and the lack of longitudinal data, the analysis of 
this condition is currently inconclusive and calls for future research. 
Effective Deliberation in the PB Process: this condition refers to deliberation being 
the prevalent mode of participation in PB assemblies. This condition captures Crocker’s 
depth dimension, and the “thickest” of his seven modes of participation. The implication 
105 The concept of partial PB agency I am proposing alludes to an individual who has participated in the PB 
process, has not won a project, but thinks that the process is just and democratic and therefore keeps hope 
alive and expects for the group project eventually to “win” and be implemented in a future PB cycle. I further 
develop this concept on Chapter 5.   
106 Although with the condition of capacity to effect change I am referring to the idea of having agency 
freedom, there is an important related aspect of citizens’ political functioning through PB that is worth 
considering in future research. The ability to effect change is likely conditioned on certain capacities or skills 
(in addition to agency freedom) that contribute to citizens being able to deliberate, decide, and act. See David 
Crocker’s “Sen and Deliberative Democracy,” in Alexander Kaufman, ed., Capabilities Equality: Basic 
Issues and Problems, 2006, pp. 155-97. 
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is that the more deliberative participation is (as opposed to any of the thinner modes), the 
more likely the outcomes of agency, local democracy, and group functioning become.  
Prior Cooperative Group Functioning: this condition refers to supportive patterns 
of associations among participating units (civil society actors)—benign patterns that at 
least minimally characterize the group by the time PB assemblies are convened. 107 
Specifically, prior cooperative group functioning refers to how groups function in regards 
to mutual and strategic cooperation, respect, trust, and the sharing of the same values and 
purposes. A group can become more cooperative and solidary in and through the PB 
process—just as citizens can become more complete agents through the process. 
Nonetheless, if groups start with citizens who hate each other and refuse to work together 
or respect each other—or if citizens start as hopelessly passive or incurably damaged 
individuals—the alleged good consequences of PB are highly unlikely. In sum, this part of 
the enabling condition implies that the more the actors and groups function in the ways just 
mentioned, and the fewer groups try to block, undermine, “game,” co-opt, or capture PB, 
the more likely group functioning will increase with participation, and the more likely it is 
that PB’s outcome will result in more agency, better democracy and authentic 
development. Confronting and at least partially overcoming power asymmetries, as 
adumbrated in the condition of fairness above, is also relevant to healthy group functioning.  
It is important to note that I have set different degrees of cooperative group 
functioning both as an outcome (increased cooperative group functioning) and as an 
enabling condition (prior cooperative group functioning). Although Goertz (2006) 
107 In this regard, Baiocchi et al. (2010) argue that “the actual impact of institutional reform is conditioned 
by the nature of preexisting civil society, a point established by studies in which PB practices are either 
facilitated by or come into conflict with existing civic practices” (p. 14). 
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cautions scholars to eliminate potential causes of a phenomenon from the concept itself, so 
as to avoid self-fulfilling prophecies, there is no way around this risk here. I must to some 
extent “hardwire” the condition into the outcome, for without some antecedent or initial 
cooperation the PB process cannot proceed, let alone have the desired outcomes.  
The following example, comparing the outcome of agency with that of increased 
functioning during the PB process, helps me make my point.  Take an individual who just 
moved to SDE, a PB city, around time t (time of PB assembly) from SDO, a non-PB city, 
where she used to live (in t-1). This individual seizes her new opportunity to participate in 
PB and becomes an agent in t from being pretty much a non-agent in t-1. Now consider a 
group of individuals who have always been in SDE but lack what I have called cooperative 
group functioning, that is mutual relations based on cooperation, respect, trust and the 
sharing of the same values and goals. In this depressing situation, group functioning cannot 
just magically emerge at t. Social relationships of this kind are too complex to be nurtured 
within minutes or hours preceding an assembly. A relevant analogy: a kid does not learn 
to run (the outcome) before learning to walk (the initial condition). Hence, once again, I 
propose prior cooperative group functioning as the condition, and increased cooperative 
group functioning, as the outcome.  
The conditions I now have presented are individually insufficient to fully explain 
how PB is likely to deliver all the hypothesized and normatively desirable outcomes. But, 
each is necessary parts of a whole causal structure, which is likely to issue in the desired 
outcome. 108  Table 19 below depicts all relationships, summarizing the interactions 
108 Together these conditions, although sufficient, are not necessary to explain or generate the normative 
consequences for they might come about due to alternative sorts of democratic practices (which may account 
for LVG’s relative high agency scores). 
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between the independent and dependent variables, and the enabling conditions. This chart 
serves for registering the expected process predictions. 
It is difficult to assign a weight to each of the enabling conditions as a way to 
theorize which one is more important in leading up to the outcomes, for it is likely that 
each participating unit puts a different weight on each condition. For instance, a participant 
might be bothered by a lack of deliberation if he thought that more discussion was needed 
for arriving at the decision as to which project to support. On the other hand, another 
participant may not care about deliberation, be satisfied with a majority vote rule, but be 




Table 19. Plausible Causal Relationships in PB 
 The Enabling Conditions (Units and Activities) 
Context Participation in PB is likely to lead to more agency, more and better group 




Participation in PB  
Enabling 
Condition 1  
If assemblies are fair 
Citizens, through government, establish and openly share the rules of the 
game for free and equal members and monitor the transparency of the 
process, and local leaders facilitate the process without resorting to 
manipulation or coercion  
And 
Enabling 
Condition 2  
If assemblies are inclusive 
Residents from assembly’s geographic area participate widely without 
restrictions such as gender, age, socio-economic status, ideology. 




Condition 3  
If assemblies nurture a credible capacity for effective change  
Participants develop or acquire a real capacity to produce desired change 
and actually bring about the desired change as a result of “winning” a project 
and the government provides a credible platform for participants to be 
capable of influencing policy-making and delivers the project in a timely 





Condition 4  
If assemblies are deliberative 
Participants engage in deliberations (formally during the assemblies, and/or 
informally before the assemblies), local leaders do not eclipse deliberations 
but facilitate the hearing and critical give and take of all voices and the 
making of decisions in an orderly way 
And 
Enabling 
Condition 5  
If there exists prior cooperative group functioning 
Participants in t-1 build on their antecedent mutuality and shared purpose 
and decide on plan of action towards the PB process 




a) Participants feel more like agents  
b) Participants increase their group cooperative functioning  





    d)   More authentic and better development is attained  
 
Thus far, I have introduced the PT methodology, described the different stages and 
characteristics of PB as carried out in the DR, and defined the independent (enabling 
conditions) and complex (normative) dependent variables to be examined. Following the 
steps of the PT approach, in the next chapter I continue with a detailed and analytical 
narrative and a critical examination of the events observed, and subsequently, a 
presentation of the diagnostic evidence that will serve as the foundation for descriptive 
inferences (Collier, 2011). Such identified evidence conforms to the presented enabling 
conditions and/or the desired and expected outcomes. In the following steps, as patterns 
recur across individuals, communities, and municipalities, my aim is to interconnect 

















Chapter 5. Participatory Budgeting in the Dominican Republic: Results 
and Implications  
 In the previous chapter I introduced the hypothesis that if assemblies are fair, 
effective, inclusive, and deliberative, and civil society actors have at least minimal 
cooperative functionality, the following intended (and alleged) consequences of PB are 
likely to occur: participants of winning communities feel like agents of their own change, 
they are able to increase their cooperative group functioning, become witnesses to greater 
and better local democracy, as well as protagonists of authentic development.  In this 
chapter, instead of arguing what is likely to happen (given the enabling conditions), I now 
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observe and analyze to what extent the two PB cities under analysis have in fact fulfilled 
the antecedent enabling conditions.  
Based on the application of the methodological framework presented in Chapter 4, 
I find that the presence of the PB conditions varies drastically across assemblies, therefore 
affecting the attainment of outcomes on a case-by-case basis. The most frequent and likely 
causes of process disruption that impede the realization of the desired consequences were 
elite manipulation, uneven representation, proneness to corruption, misguided cooperation, 
uneven knowledge, limited deliberation, and limited capacity to effect change.  
A novel result of my research is that even if a PB fulfills all ideal conditions, given 
that not all communities can win in PB, it is possible that the participants will fail to bring 
about desired change and after repeated cycles of losing in PB will fail to feel that they are 
agents of change. However, I argue that this group cannot and should not be equated to 
non-agents (i.e., individuals who choose not to participate in PB or who wish to participate 
but have no access to it). Rather, these individuals, I argue, find themselves in a transitional 
state that I call partial PB agency. Exerting effort and having partial success is the exercise 
of at least partial agency. Moreover, as adumbrated above, an interesting finding is that 
most of the deliberation occurs informally and outside of the official PB assemblies, This 
result confirms Wampler’s (2007)  findings for the Brazilian case. 
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 describes the PB process 
in detail based on my observations. Section 5.2 presents the results and policy implications. 
 
5.1 Process Description 
I now proceed to narrate and critically examine more than 25 specific observations 
 136 
of PB assemblies for the 2013 cycle. 
 
5.1.1 Community Assemblies in SDE 
In SDE, a PB municipality, a municipal government facilitator leads and supervises 
assemblies. These meetings were divided among SDE’s three urban planning zones 
(circunscripciones): 99 community assemblies took place in zone one, 85 in zone two, and 
253 in zone three, for a total of 437 community assemblies. All assemblies were held during 
the period between October 1 and October 28, 2012, taking place from Monday to 
Thursday during afternoon hours. I was able to observe ten of these community 
assemblies.109  
All community assemblies that I observed in SDE were conducted in a causal 
environment. Their length ranged from thirty minutes to an hour, and they took place in all 
sorts of locations, such as the middle of a street closed to vehicular traffic, a sidewalk, the 
driveway of house, and a church. The format for these meetings was basically the same. 
First, the facilitator from the municipal government meets the president of the 
neighborhood council or community organization at the agreed location. The local leader, 
accompanied by his/her fellow group members, either waits for the facilitator or else the 
leader invites neighbors over after the facilitator arrives. Meetings rarely start at the agreed 
upon time, due to the facilitator being late or the long time that it takes the president of the 
group to gather everybody.  This informality, customary in Dominican life, did not seem 
109 I was not able to observe more assemblies due to the simultaneity of the events and an overlap with other 
research activities. Although ten assemblies may seem like a non-representative sample, comments from 
facilitators Daniel Merán and Lucía Bello about other community assemblies, which they had directed, lead 




                                                 
to bother any of the attendants (a different scenario occurred with SDE’s substantially 
delayed block assemblies, as I will explain later). In fact, “hanging out” and waiting 
provided an agreeable kind of social interaction.  
After greeting the community members and giving someone the opportunity to say 
a prayer before the meeting starts, the facilitator explains the purpose of the assembly—to 
officially record in writing (a certificate) the three main needs of the community, which 
would be decided after discussion and by vote. The facilitator hangs a wall sign presenting 
the menu of eligible projects, so that the participants might be reminded that only projects 
from this list can be selected. Subsequently, time is allocated for participants to speak out. 
In the majority of cases, the president of the neighborhood council or organization speaks 
first, making the case for one or more of such needs. Afterwards, brief deliberation ensues.  
Almost always, as a result of previous talks that led to a consensus, the president’s fellow 
neighbors are in agreement, and such public discussions are characterized by an easy and 
affable tone that displays group cohesion.  
To complete the trio of selected projects,110 more deliberation continues as other 
group members take turns to present other needs that also merit the municipal 
government’s attention. Once the favored projects and the reasons for supporting such 
projects are made public, the voting follows. This voting occurs in different ways: In some 
communities, there is such a high degree of agreement (even unanimity) regarding the three 
projects to be included in the document (and their order of priority) that after announcing 
the selection a simple count of hands is sufficient to conclude that the majority—if not 
110 It is important to point out that since former participants know that only the first project (the one of highest 
priority) is defended in the block assemblies, as only one project per community can be accepted at the block 
assembly, the amount of importance given to the selection of projects two and three is considerably smaller.  
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everyone—agrees with the proposal, In other cases, the vote count is done by reading each 
item from the menu list and asking people to vote for their three preferences by raising 
their hands.111  
After the voting brings closure, the facilitator asks the crowd to nominate four 
delegates who will be in charge of attending the block meeting the following Saturday or 
Sunday, in accordance to the official schedule. The facilitator reminds the group members 
that there is a gender quota that ought to be respected, and, hence, two male and two female 
delegates should be elected. The common scenario is one where the president of the 
neighborhood council or organization is nominated, and then more names are publicly 
suggested for the selection of three other delegates. Typically, these individuals are local 
leaders or individuals highly involved in community affairs, and they have been chosen as 
delegates in previous PB cycles. Before finalizing the selection of delegates, the facilitator 
clarifies that no substitute delegate can attend the block assembly, so whoever is selected 
should make sure of his/her availability to participate in the block meeting, otherwise the 
community’s chances to secure a project would be severely hurt. The facilitator then 
collects the names, national identification numbers, and contact information of the 
delegates, and writes their names on the certificate, which also states the three selected 
projects. The newly elected delegates sign the certificate, the facilitator gives the president 
of the group a copy, and the facilitator takes the original agreement with him to the 
municipal government offices. The meeting ends with the facilitator thanks the people for 
111 From my observation, this voting style sometimes led to counting issues, as some individuals would raise 
their hands more than three times, without being asked not to do so by the facilitator (this happened, for 
example, in assembly K, where I noticed individuals favoring more than three projects); however, I never 
got the impression that this resulted in the selection of something different than what the majority already 
supported.     
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their participation, stresses the importance of their participation in the block meeting to win 
a project, informs them of the location and timing of their corresponding block assembly, 
and (typically) wishes them good luck.  
 
5.1.2 Block Assemblies in SDE 
I was able to attend six out of the eighteen block assemblies held in SDE during my 
period of research. Each block assembly occurred during the Saturday or Sunday after the 
respective community assemblies. A regular block assembly begins when the municipal 
government facilitator112 and a team averaging four assistants enter the chosen location. 
Some facilitators ask delegates to remain outside until they are ready to start the meeting, 
while others do all organizational tasks with the delegates inside the premises. The 
facilitators who keep delegates outside, let them in by calling them one by one and 
verifying everyone’s national identification documents. Once inside, a large sheet of paper 
is hung on the wall, and an assistant writes with a marker the highest priority project for 
each community, as stated on the certificates. (Below I explain why only one project—
rather than three—is listed for each community). For easier voting, each project on the wall 
sheet is accompanied by a number and the name of the community/organization to which 
it belongs. While the wall sheet is being prepared, some facilitators ask their assistants to 
organize chairs in lines of four, so that the delegates representing each community can be 
easily identified; other facilitators permit the delegates to arrange their chairs and sit as 
they please. 
112 In most cases, the local government employees who serve as facilitators of community-level assemblies 
work as assistants for the facilitator of block-level assemblies.  
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Once the facilitator is ready to start the meeting, a delegate volunteers a prayer. 
Then the facilitators (with more or less clarity and organizational skill) explain the process 
that is about to unfold. First, each delegate receives a blank card in which his/her vote will 
be cast. Second, delegates are given 30 minutes for deliberation and negotiation, so that 
they can make agreements with fellow communities regarding which projects to support 
besides their own. Third, the voting process starts and each delegate fills out his/her voting 
card by writing down the reference numbers of five projects. Fourth, an assistant collects 
all the cards and gives them to the facilitator, who then counts them out loud to verify that 
the number of cards matches the number of delegates present. Fifth, the facilitator reads 
the results to the audience, and two assistants help him record the votes on the wall sheet. 
Finally, the five communities with the highest number of votes earn or “win” projects that 
are included in the 2013 PB budget. The delegates from each winning community receive 
a certificate stating the results, and they become the follow-up committee (unless a change 
is requested later).  
In the days following the block assembly, the municipality’s engineering 
department visits the sites of the projects to produce feasibility studies, accompanied by 
one or more of the follow-up committee members. If the project is deemed not viable for 
the PB (for example, if it will be more expensive than the budgeted amount), then the 
project that received the second-most votes in the community assembly (but which was not 
under consideration in the block assembly) is evaluated. If this second project passes the 
feasibility test, then this alternate project becomes the one to be executed. It is precisely 
for this reason that more than one project is selected at the community assemblies.  
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5.1.3 Block Assemblies in STI 
Although in SDE a municipal government facilitator leads the community 
assemblies, in STI, the second of our PB municipalities studied, these meetings are private, 
without the involvement of any municipal figure, and it is left to the community groups to 
decide whether or not to conduct them. I observed none of these private community 
meetings. STI’s municipal government conducted 29 block—in contrast to community—
assemblies (September 17-27, 2012), from which I collected observations from eleven. 
STI’s block assemblies differ from those of SDE in a number of ways. First, instead of 
block assemblies requiring the presence of delegates from community assemblies, the 
meetings are open to the public. They are forums of direct or face-to-face democracy rather 
than representative democracy. Second, different facilitators use different organizational 
strategies when leading the meetings. Some check identification documents, register the 
data of attendees, and only ask assistants to hand out voting cards for the number of people 
registered.  Others hand out cards more carelessly, even giving them to a local leader to 
distribute among his or her fellow community members. Third, gender quotas for the 
selection of delegates, although always suggested, are not binding as they are in SDE. 
Fourth, each group is asked to vote for one instead of five projects. Fifth, only one winner, 
based on majority vote, is selected even though communities that end up in second and 
third place are announced in the event that the municipality becomes able to execute more 
than one project for the block. (Such would be determined at the municipal assembly, 
which takes place in December). Sixth, attending members vote by written ballot to elect 
delegates—from both winning and losing communities—to be part of the municipal 
assemblies, and the latter are selected for the experience such service will provide. Each 
attendee only votes for one individual (from his or her own community or group). Like the 
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SDE meeting, the STI assembly concludes rather formally and even solemnly: prior to the 
facilitator’s official dismissal, delegates provide their national identification documents 
and contact information, sign the certificate, and obtain a copy. In STI, many facilitators 
add a nice touch by telling the participants “You have been empowered.” 
 
5.2 Diagnostic Evidence (Results) and Implications 
Once observations have been put in narrative context and assessed for accuracy, the 
next step is to examine the evidence with respect to the presence or absence of the enabling 
conditions relevant for this study. I do this new task by using case-specific contextual 
knowledge. Instead of presenting exclusively positive evidence regarding the presence of 
the enabling conditions, my main—although not exclusive—strategy is to look for both 
confirming and disconfirming evidence of the enabling conditions. The logic behind this 
approach is that for PT only the presence or absence of the condition matters (rather than 
variations of it). After each examination, I also summarize the main normative and policy 
implications of the presented evidence. To facilitate the reading of this portion of the study, 
Annex 7 shows the codes used for each assembly—a letter A-Q for assemblies in SDE and 
a number 1-11 for assemblies in STI—which I use when making references to specific 
events within each assembly. What, then, do we find or fail to find with respect to the SDE 
and STI PB assemblies? 
 
5.2.1 Fairness: Assessing the Evidence 
With respect to the issue of a fair procedure, in both STI and SDE I observed some 
non-equitable voting/representation, leader manipulation and disruptive presence of 
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outsiders, as well as the voting process’s vulnerability to being corrupted. These factors 
reduce the fairness of the PB process, hence weakening the likelihood of the beneficial 
impacts.  
(a) Non-equitable Voting and Representation 
The potential fairness of PB was most compromised by non-equitable 
representation in the assemblies and consequently communities and groups having non-
equitable chances of having a project selected. This issue appears both in STI and SDE, 
but in different ways.  
I start out with STI.  Given STI’s model of block assemblies open to the public, 
rather than being attended by the same quota of delegates from each community, the 
number of participants per community depends on the location of the assembly and, hence, 
unfairly favors the host community. Gregoria Díaz,113 a leader from STI’s Comité de 
Desarrollo Comunitario Nordeste, explained that the community that wins a PB project is 
the one able to bring more people to the assembly site.114 Such an arrangement does not 
lead to equal representation and is likely to discourage effective collective action and 
cooperation among communities. This issue was common to each of the assemblies 
observed in STI, and a source of disappointment for losing communities in assemblies such 
as 3, 7 and 9. Juan Castillo, from Fundación Solidaridad, claims that assembly 10 was only 
one example of a community illicitly bringing people from other localities to represent 
them in order to get more votes.115  
113 Interview on 10/30/12. 
114 Wampler (2007) finds something similar in Brazil, where the rules of PB seem to favor with a greater 
level of PB funds those groups that are able to mobilize the greatest number of supporters.  
115 Regardless of the veracity of the claim, the risk remains, so the point is valid. 
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Narciso Almonte,116 a local leader from the Centro de Formación y Acción Social 
Agraria, based in Gurabo (STI), highlighted one of the unjust implications of non-equitable 
representation. Almonte argued that the community with the greatest need is not 
necessarily the one with the capability of moving the largest number of people to the 
assembly site. Angelita Villamán, 117  another local leader from STI’s southern zone, 
claimed that many people do not get involved in PB because it is difficult to mobilize them, 
and even more difficult when meetings are held in a distant locality, which forces 
participants to incur transportation costs.118 Leivan Díaz, a municipal government staff 
member, explained that to solve this problem, the local government started rotating 
assembly sites in 2012. Hence, different communities now can benefit from the location 
selection each year. 
As a result of the non-equitable representation arrangement just described, the 
following scenario could take place: a STI community can win a PB project with 18 votes 
in a small/poorly-attended block assembly, whereas, in a highly-attended assembly a 
community can lose with 120 votes due to another community winning with 130. Some 
participants see as a drawback that the project that is executed is that for which a 
community is able to bring more people per block assembly, without considering the sizes 
of other block assemblies in the rest of the municipality or at least in each unit of zonal 
planning. Whether the community with 18 votes is in greater need of the project than the 
116 Interview on 10/23/12. 
117 Interview on 10/30/12. 
118 With a similar argument, local leader Rhadamés Gómez (interviewed on 10/29/2012), now selected for 
the 2014 follow-up committee of municipal control, claimed that “the municipal government of STI has no 
control over the invitation to organizations to PB assemblies and there is no participation that covers the 
whole territory equitably; instead, projects are won based on who can take more people”.  
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community with 120 may not be easy to determine and, in any case, would vary from case 
to case, just as would the number of people that would actually benefit from the project. 
Nevertheless, this sort of inequitable representation does warrant a complaint of 
representative or procedural unfairness on the part of those who do not manage to secure a 
PB project.  
Several questions are pertinent: Is it fairer that big communities have a greater 
chance of winning PB projects? What if the community with 120 votes is actually smaller, 
but with a higher civic sense that translates into more involvement in the execution, 
maintenance, and sustainability of the project itself? In either case, which parameter should 
be used to judge which one of the two proposals is of higher need? Would a process 
entailing more deliberation (and consideration of community size and distance from the 
meeting location) help overcome many of these problems? In due course, I answer.  
However, there remains much room for improvement in institutional and procedural design 
to approximate more fully level playing fields. 
Another issue with respect to representation is that of geographical over-
representation in the sense that—a community may have more democratic clout because 
several organizations represent the same or overlapping interests. This problem is not 
exclusive to STI, as I also observed it in SDE. STI local leader Radhamés Gómez explains 
that in cases like this, organizations should elect a speaker, instead of having members from 
many groups introducing what turns out to be redundant proposals to the same assembly. 
Equally problematic is that dominance by the same interests creates “self exclusion,” for 
some organizations do not participate at all because they judge the model to be unfair:  their 
odds of winning a project, they believe, are minimal when competition is not one against 
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one, but one against many.  
A similar problem is seen in SDE with its block assemblies. All blocks throughout 
SDE’s three zones get an equal number of projects (5), but not all blocks have an equal 
number of communities/groups, population size, or income level. For example, block 
assembly E, which represents a relatively wealthy community, is composed of only 18 
communities and had 5 projects selected (27.7% chance of winning). In contrast, assembly 
J, a poor block, involved 34 communities but selected only 5 projects (14.7% chance of 
winning). From a justice-oriented point of view, this distribution could be considered unfair 
based on the grounds that it is usually the poorer blocks that have more needs, more people 
underserved, and more groups registered.  
 
 
(b) Local Leader Manipulation and Disruptive Presence of Outsiders 
When addressing participatory development in India, Menjor Singh (2008) 
establishes that participation depends a lot on leadership, and the best leadership must come 
out of local communities—“persons having vision, tolerance and all qualities of sincerity, 
honesty, transparency and accountability. Above all, they should be fine human beings. 
Such right leadership will help build confidence of the villagers as also their accountability 
for promotion of their common interests and objectives” (p.72). In the presence of 
patronage networks, local leaders may serve as “agents of political mobilization for those 
above them in the party hierarchy and as brokers for the demands and needs of their 
constituents below them” (Selee, 2006, p. 105). However, in the present case, the evidence 
suggests that some leaders misuse their public office and manipulate crowds for personal 
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gain, hence reducing fairness. This manipulation usually takes the form of leaders 
coercively pushing their fellow group members to vote for a particular project. Drydyk 
would call this a “democratic dysfunctionality” in the community. Through clientelism, 
local elites use personal networks to get favorable treatment from the state or to use the 
state to advance their personal interests. 119  Assembly 6 (STI), for instance, provided 
extensive evidence of the existence of such power asymmetries. There, Ariel Acosta, a 
local leader from one of the participating communities, loudly, repeatedly, and openly 
asked his peers to vote for a clubhouse to be named after him. It was clear that many of his 
fellow neighbors worked against the selection of this project, but they remained silent when 
he confronted them, passively going along with his decision (perhaps lacking in valor to 
do otherwise). Acosta even proceeded to write up the votes for some of his people, 
especially for those who appeared more vulnerable to his influence, such as the elderly and 
those who seemed to have limited writing skills. Whether previous community 
deliberations had driven participants towards that project or not is unknown to me,120 but 
it is clear that at the time of the block assembly consensus did not yet exist (even if votes 
would suggest that it did).  
More serious than these isolated events, is the underlying problem with local 
leadership in STI, namely, its lack of independence from the local government. Almonte 
explained that in STI there are four federations of neighborhood councils, which comprise 
119 Clientelistic politics is not exclusive to the Dominican municipal governments. For example, when 
analyzing municipal political institutions in Mexico, Selee (2006) finds that “citizen participation in 
municipal affairs, though frequent, was mediated through clientelistic channels and permitted little citizen 
engagement in deliberation about public affairs. In fact, the entire political system was predicated on a series 
of patronage networks that mediated between citizens and their elected authorities” (p. 105). 
120 After the assembly ended, I wish I had been able to interview members from this community, but such 
was not possible given my limited time in the area. 
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all councils in the municipality. Leaders from these federations are on the government 
payroll. The problem is that given their ties to the government and the conflicts of interest, 
it is unlikely that their community associations allow for an objective and effective job of 
counterbalancing and holding the government accountable.121  
Yet another power asymmetry became apparent in assembly I (SDE). Municipal 
councilor Edita Sandoval’s involvement (an outsider122 for the assembly’s purposes) upset 
many losing organizations. Participants who failed to win projects declared that councilor 
Sandoval’s community won because of her position of power that allowed her to acquire 
votes from everybody who either had a hard time telling her that they would not support 
her or wanted to gain favors by being on her good side. This event also highlights the 
121 Baiocchi et al. (2010) highlight different scenarios across the municipalities they study in regards to 
degrees of civil society independence. On the one hand, they find that in municipalities like Sapucaia and 
Timoteo civil society was too attached to the government—presidents of community councils, with strong 
political connections with mayors, largely controlled the respective PBs. In the more successful and effective 
case of Joao Monlevade, on the contrary, there was a strong and autonomous civil society. As a result, the 
PB stimulated broad and deep civic participation. This “separation or power” illustrates one of Crocker’s 
democratic dimensions.  
122Although not considered in relation to any of the key causal mechanisms presented in this model, outsiders 
can hurt the PB process in several ways. First, consider the consultation phase of a PB. When I interviewed 
her, local leader Gregoria Díaz made clear that political leaders also become “pseudo” or “faux” community 
leaders with the dominant—if not, sole—objective of obtaining personal benefits and pursuing their political 
agendas. Similarly, local leader Radhamés Gómez said that some community leaders are linked to political 
parties and see community organizations as platforms from which they can develop a political campaign for 
partisan or personal gain. I suspect that theses sorts of leaders tarnish the transparency of the PB process. 
One instance occurred in assembly H (SDE), during which a public attorney took the meeting as an 
opportunity to work on his public image by delivering a speech completely unrelated to PB. The other was 
in assembly 9 (STI), where a councilor spoke for about twenty minutes at the end of the meeting, telling 
“losing” communities to “empower” themselves by going to the offices of the municipal government to 
demand the change they need. He also stressed to the “winning” communities how urgent it was to put 
pressure on the government, because otherwise the government would not execute the project. Although such 
an opinion may prove to be helpful for the follow-up committees, it is embedded in a political discourse (in 
this case from the opposition), and may diminish enthusiasm and trust in the process even before things 
actually go wrong. According to Díaz’ accounts, the problem with the involvement of leaders like these two, 
is that they tend to use their power to get their communities first in line in the PB projects execution schedule. 
Note, however, that my observations correspond to the consultation stage and have not been confirmed to be 
a problem during the execution phase. Hence I refrain from labeling this as diagnostic evidence in order to 
avoid introducing measurement error to this process tracing analysis. I should also note a topic for further 
research—whether communal outsiders may sometimes play a democratically positive role in the DR PB 
process. Informative to this future analysis is Crocker’s (1991) "Insiders and Outsiders in International 
Development Ethics," Ethics and International Affairs 5: 149-73.  
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underlying problem of not disallowing participation in PB by municipal councilors (or 
other local government employees). Their presence is likely to be accepted due to the 
facilitator’s fear of losing the councilor’s goodwill, since the latter holds an influential 
position in the municipal government. It is politically prudent for the facilitator to avoid 
publicly humiliating the councilor by requesting him/her to leave the premises. 
Let us step back and reflect on the significance of the evidence we have presented. 
Drydyk (2005), as we saw in Chapter 2, has a concern relevant to DR and its PBs: 
“participation schemes are inevitably dominated by socially and economically more 
powerful groups within communities, who thereby seize the greater share of benefits” (p. 
262). “Inevitably” seems too strong, and Drydyk himself would argue that PBs and 
participation in them are still valuable if and when ways can be found to mitigate the danger 
of elite capture. However, democrats must be constantly vigilant of the ways in which an 
elite may use the rhetoric of PB to camouflage elite control of local decision- making.  
This point also links with Henry Richardson’s enabling condition of procedural 
fairness: “the process of democratic debate and decision must itself be structured so as to 
allow each person a fair chance to participate and to counteract to a degree that potential 
influence of disparities in economic and political power” (Richardson, 2002, cited in 
Crocker, 2008, p. 318). Even when valued options are available, citizen agency is 
compromised by the interference of authoritarian leaders or the shortcomings of democratic 
leaders. That is, the existence of a non-equitable distribution of power123 diminishes what 
123 Using the case of Kerala, India, Mandira Kala (2009), makes a point relevant to the evidence just 
presented. She explains that “power dynamics between elite and marginal groups…in the deliberative setting 
of the gram sabha are likely to affect the outcomes of deliberation, the extent to which participating citizens 
can steer decisions on redistribution of development resources and also which of the two groups interest are 
advanced in the outcomes of the deliberation. If such inequalities are a starting point for participation and 
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Crocker calls democracy’s moral equality dimension, explaining that “we have reason to 
value democracy as inherently good because it assumes that all adult members of the group 
are equal with respect to their worth or dignity, and this worth is related, among other 
things, to their agency” (2008, p. 302). The fact that there are manipulative leaders making 
decisions for the group means that agency is being sacrificed, as citizens or group members 
are not effectively in charge of their own lives. A democratic leader would not be an elite 
guardian imposing expert views and telling participants what to vote for. Rather, a 
democratic leader facilitates the forging by group members of a consensus that at least a 
majority could accept: “[Such a leader] empower(s) the agency of others as free and equal 
group members” (Crocker, 2012, p. 55), and empowers them to also be leaders themselves 
when appropriate.  
(c) Vulnerability of the PB Process to Corruption 
In some SDE assemblies and in all STI assemblies, I found evidence that PB voting 
itself is susceptible to corruption. One of such cases has to do with the handing out of 
voting cards. In most assemblies, the municipal team handed out the cards without much 
care and at different times (some participants got them at the beginning of the assembly, 
while other latecomers would get them later in the process), therefore decreasing 
transparency. Another questionable practice in this regard, and seen in both cities, was that 
of giving the president of a neighborhood council the voting cards to distribute and collect, 
rather than giving such responsibility to someone from the municipal government team. 
This caused losing communities to question whether a neighborhood association president 
deliberation, it is argued that deliberative politics cannot be an instrument for justice, democracy or 
redistribution” (pp. 26-7).  
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had violated the assembly’s procedural fairness.  
The exceptions are those SDE’s assemblies that Edward (last name unknown) led. 
In these assemblies voting went on without a hitch thanks to Edwards’s public articulation 
and monitoring of very transparent voting guidelines. Delegates from each community sat 
in lines of four, and each participant, one by one (and line by line) received a voting card. 
In the same organized way, an assistant collected the votes, which were then counted out 
loud to verify that they matched the number of delegates present (which the assistant 
publicly announced at the beginning of the meeting). 124  Another exception were 
assemblies that that facilitator Angela Tavarez’ led in STI. In assembly 9, Tavarez was able 
to keep both order and transparency. However, assembly 9 was rather small, easy to handle, 
and in a middle-income neighborhood. She did not have the same results in assembly 10, 
which was a large assembly in an extremely poor neighborhood where people’s 
misbehavior pushed the local government to redo the assembly.125  
(d) Uneven Knowledge 
Finally, the fact that many participants lack full knowledge of PB affects different 
aspects and stages of PB and injects unfairness into the process. As a “school of 
democracy,” which a PB aspires to be, it is expected that a learning curve exists. 126 
124 Some participants suggested, during interviews, that when the number of cards is counted to verify if it 
matches the number of delegates, a delegate (randomly chosen) should verify such count, rather than asking 
a municipal team member to do so. 
125 Participants conduct in this assembly was, to say the least, problematic. In fact, I had to leave the premises 
before the process ended because some participants turned violent, and I was also afraid someone might steal 
my camera or smart phone. Yes, democracy can be messy! 
126  Wampler (2007) suggests that “as a [PB] program is consolidated, it is expected that the average 
participants’ political knowledge will expand” (p.62). This increased knowledge helps lessen the risk that the 
most well informed activists become the ones who try to lead and dominate the PB discussions. According 
to Wampler, this non-egalitarian result is more likely to occur during the first years of any PB program—a 
time when most participants find themselves at the beginning of the learning curve. 
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Nonetheless, observations suggest that at times, lack of information affects new 
participants who are unaware of the way in which voting sections could be strategized to 
achieve success. Although the facilitator could make such details explicit before 
deliberations, negotiations and the voting process start, this does not always happen. As a 
result, some participants seemed upset to see communities making strategic alliances, 
thinking that it was an inappropriate move, without knowing that strategizing in such 
manner is a justifiable practice. As Crocker recognizes, bargaining exercises agency and 
may supplement deliberation. Bargaining and alliance formation may also reflect 
solidarity, cooperative group functioning, and long-term vision. 
Another sort of asymmetric information concerns the responsibilities of the follow-
up committee. A handful of delegates expressed their frustration during the execution stage 
of the projects, because of the often-slow rate of responses from the municipal government 
to their questions and demands. The issue is that the follow-up committee may not be aware 
of the kind of pressures they legitimately can put on the government, nor the mechanisms 
that they can use, as established by the law.  This lack of knowledge benefits the 
government that is lucky to avoid legitimate pressures from the “politicking” groups. 
Based on the previous analysis of the evidence, I reluctantly conclude the enabling 
condition of fairness, when viewed in all its aspects, is at best uneven and partial.  
 
5.2.2 Inclusiveness: Assessing the Evidence  
To what extent, if any, were the assemblies inclusive? There are several different 
aspects of this enabling condition to consider. One is that participation in the assemblies 
observed seemed to be inclusive in terms of gender and age. Unfortunately, although I was 
easily able to distinguish men from women, I had no hard data to confirm my casual 
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perceptions, for no record exists with respect to the exact age of participants.127 Although 
participation seemed to be balanced in these two regards, on a closer look STI did present 
an exclusion problem when selecting delegates. In fact gender quotas were not always 
observed, for there was a selection bias in favor of male representatives. Although this 
imbalance may just be a reflection of the customary prominence of male community 
leaders, it does raise the question of whether women are not trusted to handle public affairs. 
Survey data helped to clarify this question. 128 (Note, however, that the survey respondents 
were not necessarily participants in the same assemblies that I evaluated.) Nonetheless, this 
result, without being direct evidence, may shine light on the predominant cultural view in 
STI (and SDE) towards women in public life. From the group of SDE respondents who 
were participants in PB, 75%, 19.2% and 5.8% thought that women should have more, 
equal, and less participation in public life, respectively, vis-à-vis men. When this variable 
is analyzed for participants in STI, then the percentages are 85.54%, 8.43% and 6%, 
respectively, for more, equal and less participation of women vis-à-vis men. These numbers 
suggest that the bias favoring male delegates in STI is not a reflection of machismo in 
Dominican society.129  
127 Although surveys were not necessarily conducted using the same pool of individuals who attended the 
meetings that I observed, such data suggest that the average age of participants in SDE was 52 years with a 
standard deviation of 11.8, and in STI the average age was 49.75 with a standard deviation of 11.3. 
128 Question 3.4 reads: How much participation do you think women should have in public life, as opposed 
to men: More participation than men, equal participation than men, less participation than men, or no 
participation? 
129  It must be noted, however, that it is possible that these survey responses merely reflect what the 
respondents believe the researchers want to hear, namely, fairly egalitarian views, when in fact machismo is 
the operative norm. This possible scenario of distorted communication resonates with Robert Chalmers’ 
notion of “inadvertent ventriloquism.” For more on such notion and its dangers see Chalmers’ “All Power 
Deceives,” IDS Bulletin, 25, 2 (1994), cited in Crocker (2008), 347-48. 
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Let us now turn to a different aspect of inclusiveness. The DR is beset by 
widespread and deep poverty, a reality that affects many people within SDE and STI. 
However, most of the people whom I observed in the assemblies do not belong to the 
poorest of the poor. (Exceptions that prove the rule were participants from assembly 10 in 
STI and assembly K in SDE who, generally, were indeed very poor.) The fact that 
invitations to participate are extended to all communities in the municipalities is intended 
to insure that the process is inclusive. Regardless of the economic condition of a 
community, if located within the territory of the municipality, such community should have 
an assembly assigned and, hence, an “equal” chance—when compared to more affluent 
communities—to win a project. This expectation especially holds if a poor community has 
a neighborhood council or other type of civil association. Nonetheless, it must be pointed 
out that while I have no evidence of any intention to make PB exclusive in either of the 
municipalities, some poor residents inadvertently and structurally probably were left out of 
the process. For example, in STI, and as it was discussed earlier, due to the structure of its 
block assemblies, residents of non-host communities, if poor, might have had a hard time 
paying for transportation to get to the location site.130 The pertinent question is whether the 
government’s decision to site an assembly might in fact be responding to some kind of 
favoritism. Without evidence of favoritism, there are no grounds for claiming intentional 
exclusivity. This question is on my agenda for future research.  
Owing to my unavoidably subjective observation, the potential of measurement 
error is high regarding exclusion by economic or social status. Hence, it is relevant to 
130 Based on their reporting, this seems to be what happened for residents of Respaldo Manhattan when 
participating in assembly 9 in STI. 
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examine once again the information obtained from the surveys. Answers to two questions, 
which I introduced in Chapter 3, are helpful for understanding two concepts/characteristics.  
First, “Do participants in PB perceive themselves to be at the bottom of the economic 
ladder;” and, second, “Is the PB process perceived as exclusionary?”131 Just as with the 
statistics concerning women in public life, these poverty figures should be considered only 
as indirect diagnostic or suggestive evidence. In regards to relative wealth, participants 
from both SDE and STI, on average, perceived themselves wealthier than non-participants 
(deriving this result from the economic ladder variable introduced in Chapter 3). 132 
Because of the differences in the SDE and STI block assemblies, participants’ (and non-
participants’) perceptions of whether or not the process is inclusive are worth looking at 
separately for each municipality. In SDE, 86.54% of participants and 97.52% of non-
participants said that PB was exclusive, rather than inclusive, and these two figures are 
statistically different. In STI, it was only 29.63% of participants and 62.43% of non-
participants who found PB to be exclusive.  
From this data, the first observation is rather obvious and expected: participants 
saw the process as more inclusive than those who did not participate. But interesting 
implications can be further derived from these figures. One such implication is that 
regardless of the practical issues embedded in the open-ended structure of the assemblies 
in STI, that same feature—which is absent in SDE—might be contributing to the relatively 
131 Moreover, note that although the survey did include an income question, there were many missing 
responses, and hence, it is not justified in making strong inferences with respect to whether or not the PB 
excluded the (most) poor.  
132 Recall the question that teases out relative economic status: “Imagine a ladder with 10 steps, in which the 
poorest people are standing in the first step and the richest in the tenth step. Where would you place yourself 
in this ladder?” For all respondents in SDE and STI, the mean was 4.85. The mean for non-participants was 
4.69, and the mean for participants was 5.31, and the latter figure is statistically different at the 1% than the 
former. 
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positive perceptions of inclusion in STI. That is, because everybody can take part in the 
final voting, instead of only delegates, feelings of inclusion in the decision-making process 
are high in STI.  
On the other hand, SDE’s case is more worrisome, as perceptions of exclusion are 
very high even for those who participate. I argue that this may happen due to SDE’s 
structure of equal representation in block assemblies. The issue is that while such 
arrangement seems reasonably fair in terms of an equal number of voters per 
community/group, it is also the case that only those elected as delegates—an 
selective/exclusive group and not everyone in the assembly—are involved in the final 
decision-making process, as it is the case in STI. Although delegates in SDE are 
democratically chosen representatives in community assemblies precisely to vote in the 
block assembly, this arrangement might make non-delegates feel excluded from the later 
and decisive decision-making process (recall that community assemblies only serve as a 
step to formalize the preferences of communities, but at this stage the three selected 
projects are not yet part of PB). For those who do not participate as delegates but happen 
to know which group of four delegates attended the block assembly—and knowing that 
being a delegate correlates highly with leadership (and economic) status—, it is fairly easy 
to make the assumption that only those from a higher social or economic group participate.   
Another implication is that given the 24.4% of respondents in SDE who claimed 
not to know about the PB process, it is fair to expect that if there were more awareness 
about the first open-ended assembly and the logic behind the selection of delegates for 
restricted assemblies, the process could be regarded as less exclusive—given my initial 
assumption that people feel excluded due to their belief that final decisions are made only 
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by a few persons (four individuals in each community). Moreover, people may only feel 
like agents as long as they are active players in directly deciding on and bringing about 
desired change; thus, even participants of community assemblies might not feel as agents 
because they do not take part in the final selection or implementation of PB projects. And, 
evidence exists that the community members may not have a strong bond with their 
leaders—in spite of the fact such leaders are supposed to represent them.  
In sum, the preceding arguments raise the issues of: (a) whether representation 
always runs the risk of reducing the agency of the represented; and (b) whether efforts have 
to be made to reduce this democratic deficit through ongoing relationships between 
delegates and those represented. The problem, however, is that PB is by definition a hybrid 
approach to democracy, one which combines features of participatory and representative 
democracy. I support the view that after looking at the advantages and disadvantages in 
context; no other arrangement can work better at the communal level than that of electing 
representatives to make decisions at the block level. In order to secure fairness and 
inclusiveness with open-ended block assemblies, as those in STI, logistics would be too 
complicated because not all communities can host assemblies, and because population 
sizes vary among communities within a block. As long as the selection of such delegates 
is done without coercion and democratically, and insofar as communities have leaders 
whom they admire and trust and have opportunities to influence, then such selection of 
representatives should not undermine inclusiveness.  
Based solely on my observations of the assemblies, PB does reasonably well in 
passing the test of Crocker’s breadth dimension. However, given the survey results that 
reflect an unfavorable degree of inclusiveness at SDE’s PB, and of a conservative estimate 
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of the same variable in STI, no claims with respect to inclusiveness can be made with full 
confidence. For now, I conclude that inclusiveness is only partially realized.   
  
5.2.3 Deliberative Democracy: Assessing the Evidence 
The official assemblies that I observed showed little, if any, evidence of a purely 
deliberative democracy approach to the transformation of preferences. Instead, for the most 
part, a mere aggregation of written votes determines which are the winning groups and 
projects. Even though for strictly PT purposes this is all that would need to be known in 
order to conclude that the deliberative causal mechanism is nonexistent, doing so would 
lead to a spurious conclusion. Context is key here, and, thus, I move on to discuss some 
interesting—often neglected—patterns of democratic activity.  
Let us examine more closely than we have so far occasions for democratic 
deliberation. In all SDE’s community assemblies I observed a high degree of uniformity in 
the stated preferences of the community members. It could be argued that such 
homogeneity, if authentic and not coerced, would decrease the need for much, if any, 
deliberation. It seems as if the community assemblies were little more than an exercise of 
majority rule that aggregated—without the give and take of deliberation—private 
preferences. This aggregative process might be supplemented if and when a facilitator 
sensed that there was some disagreement and opened up discussion. However, such would 
be a narrow view of the entire process for real deliberation did occur, but did so largely 
prior to the PB assembly. From local leaders I learned that community organizations would 
meet days and even weeks prior to the community assembly in order to deliberate and 
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decide on the projects that they planned to support in the formal meeting.133 By the time 
the government facilitator came to lead the community public consultation, little 
deliberation was needed because through informal deliberation group members have 
forged an agreement concerning their high priority needs.  During these previous group 
assemblies, most of which happen at an informal setting in someone’s home, more 
deliberation—as well as negotiation and bargaining—actually may have taken place.134  
Unfortunately, these meetings were impossible for me to observe given the timing, 
structure and policy-oriented (non-ethnographic) nature of my research. By the time I 
started my field research and met with local leaders, such internal group sessions had 
already occurred. Note, as well, that it was these leaders, whom I met during the community 
assemblies (after possible internal deliberations), who would have provided information 
on—and an invitation to—such internal meetings times and places.  
Clear evidence exists with respect to deliberative participation in SDE’s block 
assemblies but, once again, this deliberation is informal and occurs prior to SDE’s official 
PB assembly. My first encounter with this happened in assembly E, where participants 
from some communities (though not all) met for about an hour before the assembly to 
engage in plenty of deliberation and negotiation. During this time, each community 
presented the case for their proposed project to fellow participants with the intention to 
gain their sympathy and, consequently, their vote. The most common scenario is an 
exercise of reciprocity, in which community a supports community b and vice versa. 
133 Miguel Arias, local leader from Punta Torrecillo, Los Mameyes (Interview on 10/3/12,), Doña Rojita (last 
name unknown), local leader from Barrio Felicidad II, Los Mina (Interview on 10/10/12) and local leader 
Alison Mateo, El Brisal, Bello Campo  (Interview on 10/06/12). 
134 This finding is similar to that of Wampler (2007), who claims for the Brazilian case that “[PB participants] 
hold their own pre-and post-community meetings to analyze the current political environment, map out 
strategies and solidify their intra-CSO alliances” (p.71).  
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Highlighting another scenario, local leader Alison Mateo135 explained how communities 
that have no pressing needs are still willing to participate and provide their vote to a fellow 
group in need. I also observed in assembly E the transformation of a view about communal 
needs from a narrower community view to a block point of view. In other words, when 
communities have similar needs in adjacent places, they can deliberate and reach the 
decision of combining projects and votes, presenting them as a unified proposal based on 
respectful cooperation.136 This informal agreement is converted into an official decision 
minutes later during the actual assembly. When these agreements are decided before the 
formal PB assembly, the thirty minutes allocated by the facilitator for 
deliberation/negotiation, are instead used for confirming that the antecedent agreements 
still hold, and to write up the votes. Assemblies E, I, and P all had successful cases of such 
joint efforts.  
From the totality of this evidence with respect to conditions prior to or during the 
PB processes, it is useful to make the following positive and, hitherto, unnoticed points. 
First, deliberation can and perhaps sometimes should take place in informal venues prior 
to official, formal deliberation. Although such informality might contribute to frankness 
and openness, there is also the danger that some members who should be involved would 
be excluded. Richardson does distinguish four phases of one deliberative process;137 the 
third phase is “coming to an informal agreement” and the fourth phase is “converting the 
135 Interview on 10/06/2012. 
136 Similar outcomes following deliberation have been found elsewhere. In his (2012)’s essay “Participatory 
Budgeting: Core Principles and Key Impacts” Wampler explains how his empirical research and that of 
others show how participants in PB are “often willing to delay their short-term needs to support the interests 
of other communities that have more pressing needs” (Wampler 2007; Baiocchi 2005; Marquetti et al 2008). 
(p.3, citations in original).  
137 Omitted in the text are phases 1—formulating proposals—and 2—arguing the proposals’ merits. 
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informal agreement into an official decision” (Richardson, 2002, cited in Crocker, 2008, 
325-27). Different from Richardson’s model, which assumes that these phases take place 
in the same venue, in one PB context they occur in different venues and are separated in 
time; nonetheless, something like Richardson’s two phases still holds. A second point is 
that these informal deliberations might not be only about which project to support (and 
why) but also about strategic thinking and planning about how to win. The balance between 
strategy and deliberation is not always clear-cut and, in any case, in the real world decisions 
are not just the result of an “exchange of reasons and decision based on reasons most can 
accept.” Such a situation would be unfortunate, democratically speaking, if subgroup self-
interest dominated and there was little give and take of proposals and mutual compromise. 
An example helps me illustrate this scenario. 
In SDE’s assembly Q, I observed one incident in which a group’s narrow self-
interest prevailed over the block’s democratically motivated collective action. In such 
assembly there appeared to be a well-intentioned negotiation and bargaining if not 
deliberative participation of the various communities. However, on closer inspection it was 
clear that one group engaged in unseemly strategic (purely self-interested) and not 
communicative (fair) action. After making informal agreements with more communities 
than the group could actually support with their votes, said group used one side of their 
ballots to show four organizations how they had placed their project number as one of their 
five votes (their own plus those four), and then used the same tactic with another group of 
four other communities (this time using the other side of the ballot). The maverick group’s 
design was that all eight communities would reciprocate and also vote for it. This group’s 
members, clearly lacking minimal civic integrity, later deleted what was written on one 
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side of the voting card, so that their votes were actually admissible, but injustice had 
occurred: The greedy group succeeded in gaining double support and winning a project 
through a rigged majority vote. 
It is pertinent to discuss the negative impact that a excessively self-interested and 
unfair action, just like the one described above, can have in relation to the goals set forth 
in Crocker’s ideal of deliberation.  On the one hand, the publicity principle of deliberation 
and collective agreements—which entails a transparent process in which each unit involved 
knows exactly what is being agreed or disagreed—is violated when a party to the process 
is falsely led to believe that their project is being supported by a certain community (in 
seeming fair exchange for supporting that community’s own project). On the other hand, 
the principles of accountability and reciprocity also fail to be realized. Accountability is 
lacking in the sense that a democratic process does not legitimate the decision since the 
“decision” was just foul play perpetrated by a group organization operating in opposition 
to democratic norms and governmental authority.  And reciprocity is absent in the sense 
that all justifications given to the misled groups for them to support the cheating group’s 
project are based on a manipulative lie. It is reasonable to assume that the agreement would 
not have been mutually acceptable, had all the information being public. 
 
5.2.4 Effective Change (Capacity and Actuality): Assessing the Evidence  
Recall, from our earlier discussion of this condition, that effective change has two 
aspects: (a) an individual’s capacity and freedom to effect change and (b) the actual 
realization of such change. When studying the participatory institutions of Kerala, Kala 
(2009) remarks: 
Applying the capability approach to the evaluation of the campaign in 
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Kerala requires an assessment of what intrinsically matters for the well-
beings and agency of participating citizens. This implies that the campaign 
and its local deliberative body of gram sabha should present effective 
opportunities for citizens to undertake actions and redistribute valued 
resources that enhance their multidimensional capabilities and agency. (p. 
42)  
Following this guideline, it is pertinent then to discuss that although evidence shows 
that deliberative democracy in our two PB communities does not fully realize the PB 
(deliberative democracy) ideal, the process of majority voting that takes place in each 
assembly does display participants’ capacity for and some achievement of effective 
change. Such process shows at least some transfer of authority from government officials 
to ordinary citizens. While many residents of these two cities who are aware of PB, 
therefore having the freedom for effective change, choose not to seize that opportunity, 
within certain limits participants do show that they can influence decision-making. In 
Crocker’s terms, people have at least some control.138  It must be noted, however, that the 
degree of control for those participants who win projects is higher than that for those who 
participate in the shaping of the budget, but lose in PB. The fact that all block assemblies 
conclude with the selection of a number of projects to be taken before the municipal 
assembly for final approval show that participants have some freedom for and achievement 
of effective change. For the 2013 PB SDE approved 90 projects, and STI approved 31.  
In the present case, I hypothesize that if the capability to effect change has been 
realized in solely voting and deciding but not in “winning,” then individuals or subgroups 
who “lose” through several PB cycles find their subjective agency fading away. 
138  One crucial implication for control is that the opportunity to bring about actual change and the 
achievement of such change should not be narrowly equated with the capability to vote, the act of voting, or 
with the mere approval of the projects. 
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Participants may tolerate not winning in PB at the beginning of the learning curve—the 
first years of participation. But repeated failure to get one’s proposal accepted or even 
embodied in the final decision may have a negative impact on one’s feeling of being an 
agent. This idea is what sustains my concept of partial PB agency.  
A partial agent is an individual who has participated in the PB process, has not won 
a project, but thinks that the process is just and democratic and therefore keeps hope alive 
and expects for the group project eventually to “win” and be implemented in a future PB 
cycle.139 In other words, partial PB agency exists when a person is not an agent at time t, 
since she—regardless of having agency freedom—has not succeeded in achieving her 
ultimate goal and making a difference for her community, but has undergone the 
deliberation and decision-making process, consequently building expectations of 
becoming an PB agent in t+1 should the PB process continues and should she choose to 
participate again.140  
What about the range of options, defined as the scope of the options open to 
democratic choice? As we have seen, democratic range concerns the number and variety 
of options open for democratic choice. In the two PB cases under consideration, the number 
of projects from which a community can choose is very limited and under the control of 
139 Wampler (2007) claims that it is likely that individuals who fail at having their proposals approved in PB 
will eventually stop participating, since they see no use of devoting their time to a process that does not 
enable them to achieve their goals. 
140  Two further clarifications regarding PB agency are worth making: (1) A partial PB agent does not fully 
lose his agency freedom, as valued goals can yet be achieved in a future PB cycle, but his agency achievement 
is null for the present time, unless the individual or community realizes their goal through means of 
empowerment other than PB, in which case agency achievement remains. However, since such realization 
would not be the result of PB, then it is community agency rather than PB agency that is exercised. (2) Recall 
that, at least in STI, losing communities still chose delegates to oversee the rest of the PB process, regardless  
not having had a project selected. This procedure can be seen as a way for “losers” to continue to participate 
in more or less deliberative ways and, hence, compensate for the partial agency of deciding on a project that 
fails to be realized.  
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government officials. The government presents a menu to communities and typically 
permits no additions or exceptions. When admitted, exceptions are not to amplify 
democratic choice but rather respond to the municipal government’s desire to avoid 
conflict with peculiar sectors (at least in STI). One example of an exception is that the 
standard menu does not include building temples or chapels for churches, but if a 
community asks for a temple or chapel under PB, then the government typically 
complies.141 This specific case derives from the Dominican reality that the Catholic Church 
is deeply involved in politics.  No mayor or highly ranked politician can afford to have the 
Church for an adversary. I would argue, however, that allowing for the discretionary 
approval of projects outside the standard menu—although it increases options—decreases 
the fairness of the municipality-wide process and opens the procedure to bias and 
corruption. Influential sectors or actors get their way, whereas the less powerful are told 
that “only that which is in the menu can be accepted.”  
One of the issues of an adequate democratic range of options is whether basic 
community necessities, such as streets, should even be part of the PB menu. To be on the 
menu implies that at this juncture the communities are being given the right to decide 
issues. But, what if a necessity should not be up for democratic choice—not when they are 
so essential that the government (theoretically) has the obligation to take care of them 
regardless of any input from the community. Although I favor ample citizen control, the 
range (menu) restrictions pose the danger that PB becomes nothing more than a political 
exercise that municipal governments conduct to claim that “the people have spoken”, when 
141 A local government official (name concealed) explained how in such cases, the funding for churches 
comes from general capital investment funds and not from PB funds. 
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all that “the people” have end up doing is vote for things that the government had already 
planned for anyway and merely wants a halo of populist support. This risk of PB becoming 
politicized (giving participants a false sense of control) should not be taken as a reduction 
in the intrinsic value of PB or citizen participation/deliberation in general. Given the 
limited resources of municipal governments, which make it impossible for them to cover 
all needs—including those that are their mandated responsibilities—it is valuable and 
important to allow ordinary citizens to provide an input on how to proceed with the 
allocation of such limited resources, even if their options are a restricted set of less than 
basic needs. With this power in the hands of the people, there is a possibility that citizens 
will choose wrongly or be forced to choose something that may not be what they most 
desire, given the menu exclusions. However, such danger is preferred over that of an 
unaccountable government (beyond citizen control) choosing wrongly and misusing public 
resources. And even if some basic necessities are left off the menu, it may be that a robust 
PB can have a role in weighing in on how important these “necessities” are in relation to 
other apparent necessities. Moreover, citizen agency also can be exercised in bringing to 
power government officials with what the majority of citizens consider to be better 
priorities.  
Let us now turn to the second part of this plausible causal mechanism—the enabling 
condition of attaining desirable actual change. The realization of this part of the 
mechanism is attached to the third stage of PB, that of project execution. As indicated 
earlier, I was not able to observe project success or failure during my research trips.142 
142 Given that this study is cross-sectional and not longitudinal, only making observations from September 
2012 to May 2013, the conclusions for this part of the effective change condition are only tentative. Future 
analysis over the medium- and long-terms is pending. 
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Thus, it must be emphasized that given the timing of data collection, and the time in which 
this causal mechanism plays its role in the process, this condition is not observable in this 
study. Hence, I present only claims based on expectations, rather than factual evidence.  
The approval of PB projects prompts the government to respond—in some way or 
other—to the demands of the communities, but evidence suggests “slippage”. Electronic 
communications from PB contact persons from SDE and STI municipal governments 
indicated that 85% and 44%, respectively, of the PB projects for 2013 had been completed 
by February of 2014. These numbers cast doubt on the governments’ ability to meet the 
deadline of completing 100% of the projects by the end of the first trimester of 2014, 
especially in STI. Nevertheless, interview data based on previous PB cycles suggest that 
typical government behavior does not deliver many PB projects in a timely manner, if at 
all. With such unreliable rate of project execution, actual change becomes not only 
contingent on winning a project in an assembly but also on having the government execute 
it at the agreed-upon time and according to the agreed-upon characteristics. Because this 
third PB stage occurs later in time, actual change does not affect the initial reported 
perceptions of agency, for instance, derived directly from participation (stage 2); instead, 
what it does is measure the degree to which such outcome would vary should it be achieved 
in or after stage 3. If the impact of the group’s decision is delayed or fails to materialize, 
participants may feel they are, at the end of the day, not in control and hence are not full 
agents. Since project success may not occur, if at all, until well after “winning,” perceptions 
of agency may need to be reviewed at a significantly later time.  
To further illustrate the previous point, let us consider an example. A community 
wins a project and its members feel like agents. If the project is, indeed, executed later, the 
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group would have succeeded in bringing about change and strengthening those—now 
justified—earlier feelings of agency, becoming more complete protagonists of authentic 
development. If, on the contrary, the government fails to implement the project, actual 
change does occur (or occurs only with respect to deliberation and choice of the project). 
After a time the initial feeling of agency might weaken or completely evaporate and be 
replaced with a feeling of powerlessness. When the government does not deliver on the 
projects approved, PB assemblies turn into a merely non-empowering consultative body. 
However, if the governmental delay was not unreasonable and/or the community found 
ways to pressure the government to act, agency feelings might not fully erode, especially 
in the Dominican context where citizens are used to expect to governmental delays and 
inefficiencies.143  
This governmental delay or failure to implement PB projects at least partially 
violates Gutmann and Thompson’s view that deliberative democracy’s decision should be 
binding on governments rather than merely optional or advisory. As Crocker (2012) 
remarks, “in a deliberative democracy, what happens before (and after) balloting is equally 
or more important” than balloting itself (p. 53). While it could be argued that deliberative 
democracy takes place even if citizens are involved only in policy-making and not in policy 
executing or implementing, more and better citizen agency and democracy is reached only 
if the chosen and desired change is attained. That is, not only does it matter that preferences 
are deliberatively transformed and decisions are made, but also that the content of the 
decisions is implemented in the world. And through pressuring the government to honor 
143 An interesting further research topic would be to study the DR threshold for reasonable governmental 
delays as well as channels through which citizens might pressure the government to make good on its 
commitments. 
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its commitment, citizens may be involved indirectly in implementation as well.144  
In conclusion, although participants do have capacity to effect change and exercise 
control in stage 2 of the PB process, this control is limited to choice from a small range of 
options because governmental officials define the menu and restrict the options available 
for citizen choice. Moreover, due to the unreasonable delay or failure in project 
implementation, citizen agency achievement is at best partial and a fuller assessment awaits 
future evidence.  
 
5.2.5 Prior Cooperative Group Functioning: Assessing the Evidence  
Recall that prior cooperative group functioning refers to how groups function in 
regards to mutual and strategic cooperation, respect, trust and the sharing of the same or 
overlapping values and purposes. Moreover, I have claimed that some such communal 
relations help enable PB participation and agency. Evidence for group functioning, without 
a doubt, varies from community to community. In general, there seems to be more desirable 
group functioning in SDE than in STI. Such good functioning is partly due to the way in 
which block assemblies are conducted. With equal representation in SDE, it is easier for 
groups of delegates of neighboring communities to make strategic alliances, deliberate, and 
negotiate votes prior to the block assembly. But, in STI, the process does not provide the 
right incentives for fostering mutual respect and concern, because voting alliances give no 
guarantees if adequate numbers of group members do not attend the block assembly. A 
group can invest time and energy in deliberations and negotiations prior to the block 
144 An important breakthrough in institutionalizing the binding character of deliberative decisions occurs 
when the binding character of a representative deliberative body’s decision is contingent on the decisions 
being ratified through a democratic referendum. See Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse, eds., Designing 
Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly, 2008. 
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assembly and as a result come up with a voting strategy that both groups mutually support. 
However, if one of the groups fails to bring community residents / group members in 
sufficient numbers to the block assembly, then a majority of votes may be impossible to 
secure. In STI, conducting open assemblies—rather than assemblies in which each group 
is equally represented—is what tends to decrease the success of alliances and collective 
action. In SDE, the strategizing of votes can be planned with better statistical prospects, 
since communities know that there are a fixed number of competing votes that they can 
expect, which they can factor in when negotiating amongst each other. 
The best examples of successful group functioning that I observed correspond to 
the SDE assemblies J and P. In these assemblies communities effectively formed alliances 
for the achievement of their goals. Satisfaction was evident: members from different 
communities shared laughs, hugs and handshakes after the assemblies ended (as opposed 
to the yelling of phrases of frustration and disappointment that I saw in less successful 
cases). Assemblies J and P evidenced the existence of what Crocker (2012), following 
Josiah Ober, calls “inclusive social networks,” where knowledge is aggregated, shared and 
codified by collaboration among various groups—in contrast to situations where groups 
are always at odds with each other or where elite guardians take charge. In these cases 
groups and alliances of groups attended the assemblies with more or less shared visions 
and strategies, which had been defined prior to the assembly. The PB meeting, for them, 
was nothing more than an exercise for making official the agreements they had already 
worked on collaboratively (and that were part of a long-term reciprocal relationship among 
allied groups). A typical sentiment was: “this year we support community a, next year we 
will support community b, and we will expect their support in turn.” These observations 
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echo Abers (1998) finding that PB fosters an increase in associational activities. The 
evidence also shows that where a sort of prior cooperative group functioning exists, 
participation in PB (and the experience that results from it) may increase cooperative group 
functioning in the future, as groups see the benefits of cooperation. 
Not all group relationships, however, were so positive. Some communities ended 
up feeling betrayed, deceived, and disillusioned after their block assemblies because other 
communities promised support and failed to deliver the votes.  For instance, in the same 
assembly P, Viñas del Mar voted only for itself as retribution for what it considered another 
group’s dishonest negotiations in the previous year.  The delegates from Viñas del Mar 
chose not to use its three extra votes to support another community, in spite of knowing 
that doing so would result in its receiving no support from others and, hence, certainly 
losing. Perhaps, their self-defeating action could be viewed as a protest deigned to restore 
integrity to the process. One must wonder, however, whether the rest of the community 
they represent would not have scorned this irrational and anti-democratic act. 
STI seems to have had even worse intra-community and inter-communal divisions 
and conflicts. According to Gregoria Díaz, communities in STI are not clear regarding the 
needs of neighboring communities, nor of the needs that they share with other 
communities. Instead, in STI, inter-community relations seem to be contentious rather than 
collaborative. It seems clear, however, that in order to achieve successful joint action 
among neighboring groups, dissension needs to be overcome at the neighborhood council 
level. Díaz posits that at least in her community, some of those who do not get their way 
in the community assemblies prior to the official block assemblies often choose to not go 
to the block assemblies to support their communities. As a consequence, this reduces the 
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community’s numerical participation and, hence, hurts the community’s chances of 
winning through majority vote. Díaz claims that this is what happened to her group during 
the assemblies of the 2013 PB.  
Explaining and, perhaps, attempting to justify the absence of prior cooperative 
group functioning, Radhamés Gómez claimed that the likely reason why CSOs and 
neighborhood councils do not tend to create strategic alliances145 among themselves is due 
to the co-existence of two very different sorts of community members. On the one hand, 
are those community leaders whose real interests are less those of the community and more 
linked to political parties as vehicles for their own political ambitions. On the other hand, 
there is another group of individuals who work with members of other groups to choose 
leaders dedicated to the common good. These persons are chosen for their admirable 
personal qualities and their willingness to work voluntarily without a monetary incentive 
or partisan political agenda. Given the differences in motivation and commitments between 
these two kinds of citizens, Gómez seems correct in recognizing that sometimes there are—
perhaps, insurmountable—barriers to cooperation.   
Consider some additional evidence from STI that intra- and intergroup cooperative 
functioning is weak if not altogether absent. Two PB attendees from the community 
Respaldo Manhattan reported that the president of their neighborhood council was on a 
trip on the date of the PB meeting and neglected—out of a lack of concern—to convey to 
his fellow group members that to win they needed to attend the assembly in large numbers 
so as to enhance their chance of winning a majority vote. This negative judgment coincides 
145 Gómez went further and suggested that STI communities have not yet begun to think about making 
alliances, let alone more robust kinds of inter-communal collaboration evident in SDE. 
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with that of Alfredo Matías 146  from Fundación Solidaridad who believes that STI’s 
neighborhood councils are, for the most part, inoperative due to leaders who lack the 
willingness to inform their fellow group members about the assemblies.  
How should we assess this evidence with respect to whether PB presupposes or is 
a likely factor in bringing about collaborative and reciprocal group functioning? 
Participation in PB brings to light the status of social relationships at the community level 
at the time of the assemblies, and its intra- and inter-group implications. As a “school of 
democracy,” participation in a PB is likely to lead to increased cooperative group 
functioning but only where some initial positive relationships already exist. This result may 
happen because members of community groups gradually become more experienced and 
able to create a modus operandi that helps them to better achieve their collective goals. 
This also implies that the better the groups function cooperatively, the more likely it is that 
their members can become better agents (or more effective agents) because the change in 
the world that can be brought about with PB are attained not solely with individual action 
but also with collective action. The opposite scenario is that PB and other innovations in 
democratic deliberation are likely to fail when individuals hate each other, seek revenge 
for past crimes, or are so diverse that they cannot forge common values. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more interestingly, is the fact that PB (as structured in 
the DR) appears to foster inter-group cooperation. Namely, someone may participate in PB 
and exercise agency but also be seeking the well-being of others, rather than merely her 
own. For the block process involves supporting a project that does not affect her 
community directly but benefits another group. Based on the observations of the dynamics 
146 Interview on 10/24/2012. 
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during the negotiations, as well as on the opinions expressed in the interviews, I argue, 
however, that even a participant who supports a different project than her own might very 
well also be seeking more well-being for herself and her group. This altruistic goal need 
not be just in terms of the directly intended consequences brought about by the PB project, 
but may also occur because a foreseen—if not intended by-product—is the betterment of 
wider social relationships and community networks. The other side of the coin is that even 
when prior cooperative group functioning exists, if the PB participation lacks collaboration 
and cooperation fails and self-interest and distrust prevail, the principles of reciprocity, 
publicity and accountability are inoperative and enhanced group cooperation is not likely 
to be attained. PB can then result in acrimony and egoism rather than solidarity.  
In order to better understand deliberative failures as well as successes, future 
research (which I lay out in Chapter 6) should focus on analyzing to what extent, if any, 
deliberative success benefits from prior intra-group cooperation and how that might be 
brought about.  
After having assessed all possible conditions, a more general point is pertinent: 
there may well be other features and enabling conditions of a PB arrangement and 
process—punctuality, location, duration, facilitator’s leadership skills—which may 
contribute to the realization of PB’s normative goals. Research on these and other 
organizational aspects is reserved for future work but are adumbrated in Annex 10.  
The current chapter helped to answer the question of whether PB in fact does (or is 
likely to) have the good consequences that its defenders claim it does (i.e., does it deliver 
the goods it claims to deliver?) and what are some of the conditions that might enable those 
normative results. I found that there are a number of conditions that are likely to play a role 
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in enabling PB to result in more agency, more and better democracy, more group 
cooperative functioning, and more and better development. Specifically, I conclude that 
fairness, inclusiveness, capacity for and actuality of effective change, deliberative 
democracy, and prior (and concurrent) cooperative group functioning are likely enabling 
conditions that explain why some assemblies are more successful than others in achieving 
PB’s theorized good consequences. Nonetheless, this list of conditions should not be 
thought to be either sufficient or necessary for the normative consequences. On the one 
hand, there may be other enabling conditions in the PB process that we have not yet 
uncovered. On the other hand, non-PB modes of civic engagement may be additional and 
even better ways to promote agency and well-being for all. 
Finally, it is pertinent to point out that results of this examination with respect to 
two PBs in DR cannot be generalized uncritically to other PBs in DR, let alone in other 
parts of the world. Indeed, I have discovered that the two PB processes analyzed differ 
among themselves and from PB in other countries. However, as Baiocchi et al. (2010) 
argue about differences among the four Brazilian PB processes that they study, this 
heterogeneity may be a strength, for it may attest to human creativity and agency as people 
freely adapt a general idea to unique contexts, make mistakes, and learn how to do better. 
Regardless of DR’s very unique approach to PB, after further assessment, lessons learned 
might be applied to similar participatory institutions in other countries, especially in 
regards to aspects that may be common to both processes.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusions, Policy Recommendations and Future Research 
Participatory budgeting is a process designed to drive beneficial change through the 
input of ordinary citizens and the selection of a well-being- and agency-enhancing projects. 
Ideally this innovative democratic process realizes its aim and thereby achieves authentic 
development. Included in these likely and normatively desirable outcomes are valuable 
subjective states and objective outcomes. Citizens who participate in PB feel like agents, 
community groups function more cooperatively, and the community exhibits more and 
better democracy.  
In Chapter 3 I argued and found support for the claim that participants in PB report 
higher levels of individual and collective agency vis-à-vis non-participants. More 
surprisingly, I also found that non-participants who were aware of the PB assemblies of 
their respective communities, reported higher levels of collective agency than those who 
were not aware of the meetings. My methodology was to use survey data pertaining to four 
municipalities in the Dominican Republic (SDE and STI as the PB cities, and SDO and 
LVG as the non-PB cities) and apply diverse forms of regression analysis. 
Trying to move from correlations of PB and desirable outcomes to an analysis of 
the enabling conditions that may be leading to such results, in Chapter 4 I argued that 
participation in PB is likely to translate into a number of good outcomes, as long as certain 
conditions and circumstances prevailed in the process. These conditions include fairness, 
inclusiveness, capacity for and actuality of effective change, deliberation, and prior 
cooperative group functioning. Using process tracing analysis for the PB cases of SDE and 
STI, I found that, in general, PB more or less increases democratic deliberation and other 
forms of participation but due to certain democratic deficits, PB has a mixed record with 
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respect to improvements in the other desired outcomes. Given case-by-case variation 
across assemblies regarding the presence and character of the putative conditions that 
would enable such valuable outcomes to be realized and until further evaluation is made 
about their comparability to other cases, these conclusions should not be generalized for 
all PB processes beyond the municipalities of SDE and STI. To address these democratic 
deficits and make the PB cases studied more relevant for other contexts, I make several 
policy recommendations, including citizen action to both incentivize informal citizen 
deliberation and improve the formality and democratic dimensions of PB procedures. The 
ultimate goal, of course, is PB assemblies that generate—or do so more fully—the desired 
outcomes. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 presents a final 
summary of the PB “diagnostic,” the probabilistic tracing of causal mechanism that result 
in our normatively assumed outcomes; Section 6.2 covers the policy recommendations; 
and Section 6.3 identifies some fruitful topics for future research.  
 
6.1 Final Normative Assessments 
In order to summarize further this study’s findings, circle back to this essay’s 
normative framework, and provide a final assessment of PB in the DR, I evaluate the 
evidence through the lenses of Crocker’s four normative principles of an agency-oriented 





Does PB enable individual and communal agency?  
PB enables communal agency for the participants who—after reasoned thought and 
action—win PB projects in an honest and non-coerced manner facilitated by the conditions 
discussed above, namely, fairness, inclusiveness, capacity and actuality of effective 
change, prior cooperative group functioning and deliberative democracy.  
The PB assemblies enable a type of agency-freedom that can be understood as non-
domination, since not only authorities are responsible for the decision-making, but ordinary 
citizens can choose to participate and have the freedom to be agents. We have also seen, 
however, that non-democratic leadership and local elites can in fact more or less violate 
this idea of agency equality (more on equality later on).  
Chapter 3 showed that not only PB participants feel like agents but so do many 
individuals who do not participate and yet are informed of a PB. This evidence implies that 
these informed non-participants are aware of their agency freedom even though they do 
not exercise it with the result of agency achievement. That is, agency freedom contributes 
to being empowered. Even if a person chooses not to vote in a democracy, having the 
freedom to vote is a part of being empowered (even if the person is unaware of what day 
the election will be held). In an authoritarian system, people have neither agency freedom 
or agency achievement with respect to voting (and other modes of participation), except in 
the potential sense of the freedom (sometimes) to bring about a system change. 
What about those communities that participate yet do not win projects?  Participants 
know of this possibility, of course, before they decide to attend the assemblies. Just as not 
winning a baseball game does not empty the players of individual and group agency, so 
not winning a project does not drain all agency from losing participants.  Rather, I believe, 
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trying to secure a project through participation in the assemblies has agency value in itself. 
Although the losing participant may not be able to reach the intended goal for the 
community (or the community with which a strategic alliance has been made), she will be 
(and might feel like) an agent for having cooperated in deciding on the values, goals, and 
means as well as in making efforts to achieve those goals. Among the agency “lessons” 
from this “school for democracy” is that a future PB might very well be more successful 
or that processes other than PB may be more effective in achieving the community’s goals. 
Among the strategies might be citizen pressure on a current government or electing a more 
responsive and effective one. 
And what about those who live in non-PB municipalities? The agency freedom of 
residents in non-PB municipalities is restricted due to the absence of PB and its process of 
deliberation as a decision-making tool and as a stepping-stone to influencing outcomes of 
their interest. There seems to be other means of exercising agency freedom and reaching 
agency achievement (which need to be studied further), but they are not as structured as an 
official PB. Yet, it may be that a non-PB community hears of PB and increase citizen 
agency in other communities and realizes that it may have agency freedom to establish its 
own version of this democratic process. 
 
Does PB provide real opportunities (capabilities) for well-being?  
In Chapter 3, I compared the PB cities of SDE and STI to the non-PB cities of SDO 
and LVG. With PB, the residents of SDE and STI acquire a capability (a real opportunity) 
that the residents of SDO and LVG do not have that enables the former citizens to achieve 
what they value within an urban planning context, and to gain decision-making power. If 
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participants in SDE and STI are successful in bringing about desired change, then they 
realize a dimension of well-being. These achievements are well-being enhancements: less 
garbage, better sanitation; local health clinics, better health; better roads, improved 
mobility; better trained police, improved human security. Given the chance, citizens are 
apt to choose projects that improve their beings and doings.  
However, the PB decision-making process can be a closed and exclusive meeting 
with only a few participants. Hence it might be an opportunity for agency achievement of 
only a few people (and a target for elite capture). One must be careful not to conclude that 
the mere practice of PB in SDE and STI promotes agency and well-being achievement or 
empowers all inhabitants. My evidence shows that participation in a PB—let alone non-
participation—does not necessarily translate into the power of individuals or even of the 
whole community fully to shape their own lives or feel they are doing so. Such failures 
occur because either a community loses out in the block vote or a winning community’s 
project fails to be executed by the local government. Since these obstacles to full realization 
have not been overcome, as a result, well-being achievement is enhanced partially, if at all. 
Hence, Crocker notion of agency is partially realized but greater empowerment does not 
occur because the “goods” (well-being achievement) are not delivered. Even when the 
means are available, as I showed in the previous chapter, barriers may block the full 
democratic quality of the process. The unfortunate possibility is that only partial agency 
and partial well-being achievement will result in long-term disempowerment. PB is 
promising and often helpful in improving citizen agency and well-being; but this is no 
silver bullet.  
Also noteworthy is that participants in a PB might become dissatisfied with the 
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experience and exit from the process. Why might they do so?  They might feel that they 
were not being treated as free and equal members. They might be dissatisfied that their 
group’s project was not a winner. They might be dissatisfied that the government failed to 
implement the project. They might be dissatisfied because the project was done 
incompletely, poorly, wastefully, or with corruption. In all these cases, dissatisfaction may 
lower well-being.   
Exiting from a PB, for whatever reason, indicates a failure of PB to promote agency. 
It should not, however, be taken as a criticism of the ideal of agency, for to exit a PB is an 
exercise of individual agency, a free society should not coerce its citizens to participate, 
and numerous exits of PB participants may spur the PB to be more democratic or more 
effective, for example, by giving more voice to the dissatisfied.147  
 
Does PB promote equality (as a threshold for agency achievement and well-being 
achievement)? 
In what sense, if at all, does PB promote equality? In principle, all members of the 
community are viewed and view themselves as free and equal citizens. This does not mean 
that they are equal economically or in political power; but it does mean that they have the 
equal freedom to participate in the PB process and in proposing, assessing, arguing, 
compromising, deciding, and implementing. However, it must be noted that even in PB 
cities, some individuals may have more well-being freedom than others. This inequality in 
political power has many causes, including economic ones, but one explanation is that 
147 For the classic statement of the values and disvalues of exit and voice, see Albert Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Organizations, Firms, and States, 1970. 
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some citizens are already involved in community matters and may be more aware of the 
PB option. Although some of the hitherto unaware individuals, upon hearing about PB, 
may still self-select out of participation, more awareness could reduce citizen inequality to 
be able to effect change.  
Equality also shows up differently in SDE and STI due to the structure of block 
assemblies. SDE promotes equality among competing communities, since they are all 
represented by an equal number of delegates. However, SDE fails to promote equality 
when chances of winning a project vary by the number of communities convened in each 
block assembly. Recall that some block assemblies might have, say, 18 communities 
participating, whereas another might have 30, and in both cases only five projects are 
selected. In STI the open-ended structure of the block assemblies promotes equality in the 
sense that anybody, regardless of their position and status in the community, can be a part 
of the decision-making process. But at the same time, this same open-ended feature reduces 
equality because host communities have an uneven advantage to secure more votes due to 
how easy and convenient it is for their community members to show up at the assembly 
site.  Thus, the result of our PBs, once again, is mixed. 
 
Does PB advance democracy?  
The existence of PB, when politically operational rather than merely a matter of 
rhetoric or propaganda, both exemplifies democracy and promotes other venues or forms 
of democracy. PB makes local governance more democratic in that rule by the people 
becomes more inclusive, treats more questions, is deeper, more balanced, and more 
progressively impactful than governance by one or more “guardians.” The kind of 
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democratic activities in which participants engage occur in a broad spectrum that extends 
from mere consultation or “input” to deep deliberation. And when PB fails, there is 
evidence that active citizens turn to other means to realize their goals. Regardless of its 
success in changing the world in the ways its citizens desire, the PB process still has 
intrinsic value that merits support. PB’s deficiencies call not for less democracy and more 
elite guardianship, but for more and improved democracy. Ways must be found to have 
better direct and representative self-government in the presence of a limited amount of 
resources as well as asymmetries of economic and social power. The more that PB is done, 
the more that citizens practice democracy and get a chance to choose what they most need 
and want, hopefully also achieving the goals of equality and just distribution. 
With respect to social and economic development, with a PB in place, it is citizens 
themselves who are protagonists of authentic development, rather than mere recipients of 
the actions of others or the mere effects of impersonal forces. Instead of a small group of 
men and women controlling the local government apparatus, ordinary citizens start existing 
politically and become capable of influencing the management of public affairs. 
In sum, the social creativity and innovation found in DR’s PB make it unique 
because, among other things, of its system of competitive deliberation. The kind of 
deliberation normally characteristic of PBs and other democratic forums features 
competition among proposals, but in the DR groups (of individuals or delegates) 
competitively propose their projects, rank them, and deliberate (mostly informally) and 
vote (formally) about which should the block accept. There are a few winners and many 
losers. Although PB in the DR still has its dangers and is in need of substantial 
improvement, I remain optimistic about the potential of this different alternative.  
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6.2 Policy Recommendations 
Given the mixed results of PB presented earlier, I suggest that we build on PB’s 
achievements and propose ways in which its deficits can be reduced.148 We should give PB 
a chance for self-improvement because while the most successful PB cases in the literature 
have been doing PB for over two decades, the DR has only been officially conducting PB 
since 2007. It takes time for a society’s government to learn how to facilitate a PB 
adequately and for its civil society to learn how to participate democratically and 
effectively.  
McNulty (2012) explains that there are only a few countries’ national 
governments—including Peru, Bolivia, and the DR— that have mandated a PB process to 
take place annually in the local governments. If such top-down ruling is understood as a 
genuine concern on the part of the government to support and advance the process, then I 
here suggest a number of specific tasks that policy-makers, who value the PB process, 
should focus on. To avoid excessive emphasis on recommendations for top down action, 
may recommendations include recommendations for bottom-up action and joint bottom 
up-top down efforts.  
a) Improve the structure of the PB assemblies to make them more inclusive and 
148 Solutions to PB issues might involve some important trade-offs. For example, expanding Crocker’s 
breadth dimension by involving more individuals and groups in PB may decrease the depth of democracy 
that each one of these individuals or groups can exercise. For example, given a fixed time allocated to 
assemblies, the larger the group the smaller the proportion of individuals or groups that are able to make 
individual contributions to a deliberation. How should these trade-offs be decided and who should decide? 
Although scholars and social critics can and should weigh in, the final decision on such trade-offs should be 
made democratically (or so I would argue).  
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representative. Doing so would reduce the risk that vulnerable and marginalized groups 
will be neglected and underserved in relative terms, as a result of their diminished chances 
of securing a PB project. Moreover, to ensure that the selection of representatives does not 
undermine inclusiveness, efforts from involved civil society members should be made to 
assure that communal PB participants have opportunities for ongoing interaction with their 
delegates and follow-up committees. 
b) Ensure that community leader/authority facilitate deliberation and refrain from 
manipulation and compulsion. Leaders should facilitate citizen deliberation and decision-
making rather than, as Przeworski (2010) argues, merely preventing people from doing 
some things they want to do and forcing them to do things they do not want to do. Positive 
freedom is as important as negative freedom. All citizens and not just leaders—always 
tempted to abuse their power—should safeguard orderly democratic processes.  If this is 
done, the principle of communal self-determination (from the evaluation criteria 
introduced in Chapter 2) is more likely to hold. Where leader manipulation occurs, agency 
is restricted. It might be the case that these participants will benefit from a project they 
believe they need, but benevolent action from above robs them of agency freedom they 
could have enjoyed had they participated in the assemblies without pressures from the top. 
The solution, then, partially depends not only on active citizens, but also on government 
facilitators guiding the assemblies in a way that maximizes inclusive and deep 
participation.  
Given the evidence of coerced participation and manipulated voting, a simple step 
that can be taken is always open up  “give and take” deliberations during the assemblies, 
so that the real voices can be heard, and all views publicly presented. While a manipulative 
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leader may exert pressures on people to remain quiet or get on his bandwagon, opening up 
genuine deliberations may bring to light repressed social divisions and unpopular ideas. 
With the right sort of democratic leadership and facilitation, assemblies can be more 
integral to the reality of the communities, rather than the reflection of an ambitious leader’s 
perspectives. They also can deter domination by governmental officials or powerful 
citizens. 
Implementing this policy recommendation would help make important—if not 
binding—the principle of reason orientation and deliberation.  Such a principle and one’s 
participation in a PB seems to be motivated by certain beliefs, such as what Sen (2014) 
calls “social deliberation, in an atmosphere of mutual respect” (p.19); moral commitments, 
such as one’s obligations and rights as a good citizen and neighbor; and enlightened self-
interest, which understands that PB promotes both personal well-being and communal 
cooperation. However, we have also seen times in which the PB process has been abused; 
leaders or elites dominate citizen choice and reduce citizen agency. Implementing the 
present recommendation would reduce this danger. 
c) Make it binding for government to implement assembly decisions. Participants 
in PB deliberate, decide, and take direct action with the objective to alter their world. 
However, if the government ignores the results of PB, temporizes, fails to deliver, or 
delivers in a partial or unacceptable way, then citizen agency is truncated and individual 
and communal well-being is less likely.149 According to the law, the local government 
149 In reference to the Brazilian experience with PB, Wampler (2007) finds that “PB programs flourish when 
citizens discover that the specific that the specific decisions they make in regional meetings will be 
implemented. The message is clear: when the government values participants’ time and energy by 
implementing specific projects participation rates will increase and public debates will flourish” (p. 63). 
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authorities are accountable for the execution of PB projects, but citizens have no real 
channels to apply pressure or hold authorities accountable. No legal sanctions for non-
compliance have been effective so far. That PB decisions are non-binding suggests that 
policy-makers do not care about the whole causal chain of the process. The fact that PB 
meetings are scheduled is due, at least to some extent, to governmental actions; but, when 
projects are not executed, participants’ decisions and actions come to naught. If assembly 
decisions were legally binding on governments for execution, the citizen agency would be 
more fully exercised and the world would be progressively altered. Governmental respect 
for the third stage of the PB process would guarantee participants’ agency achievement. A 
partial solution, in this regard, would be to increase the length of the PB cycle to 18 or 24 
months, so that governments have more time to prepare for and comply with a project’s 
timetable. Finally, and in the interest of enhancing local governance and making the 
municipal government more responsive, participant communities and civil society in 
general should seek more actively to exercise their right to demand accountability of their 
local public officials (i.e., more social accountability through enhanced space and 
opportunity for civil society to engage the government beyond the assemblies). 
d) Transform social visions. PB can and should serve as a platform for communities 
to articulate a block- or city-wide vision of social responsibility and strengthen positive 
social networks, rather than acquiesce to conflicting communities solely seeking unfair 
advantage over each other. This degree of integration from participant communities is 
likely to come about more organically once the PB system is restructured to make 
collective action more attractive (SDE is more advanced in this goal than STI, where 
cooperation and solidarity among groups was less apparent). To improve democratic 
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quality, STI should change their PB structure so that block assemblies are only attended by 
an equal number of representatives from each group, which, besides the obvious advantage 
of ensuring equal community representation, would facilitate symmetrical negotiations 
among them. Although some may argue that representation should be proportional to the 
population of each community or group, as things stand now, this would be difficult to 
arrange. The problem is that within one geographical space, there might be several groups 
registered at the municipal government (all eligible to participate). In order to factor in 
such proportional representation, a block or city-wide restructuration of the system would 
be necessary. I would support such restructuration in the future, so as to avoid over-
representation, and arrive at an even more balanced system of representation at the block-
level.    
Furthermore, the local governments while planning each PB cycle, could take steps 
that help mitigate current tensions: (a) forbid the presence of outsiders, especially when 
they are in positions of power that place their groups in an unfair advantage; (b) regularly 
and fairly rotate the assembly sites, so as to impartially distribute the benefits of hosting 
(this is especially pertinent to STI and its open block assemblies); and (c) ban—at least 
temporarily—from the PB process those groups who intentionally and clearly abuse 
community cooperation agreements. 
e) Transform the model of PB assemblies so that deliberation has even greater scope 
and importance.  Majority voting, while important, should only be something done for 
closure, accountability, and transparency purposes. As a closure device, voting and 
majority rule can be importantly democratic. But pre and post-voting deliberation, founded 
on a cooperative and rational discourse, should be the main means for the transformation 
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of preferences and the achievement of a common view with which most can concur. Based 
on normative grounds set out in Chapter 2, carrying out this recommendation would be 
valuable in many ways, among which are the following:  bringing more legitimacy to the 
political system, widening knowledge, acquiring reasoning skills, tolerating different 
views, promoting the common good, endorsing human dignity thanks to the expression of 
individual and collective agency across groups of people, and reducing initial diversity to 
a agreement with which at least a majority can concur.150  
f) Revise the PB menus. Given that PB menus excessively restrict community 
options, local governments and citizen groups, should jointly revise them—through 
inclusive deliberation. Debate among both the citizenship and the government, in this 
regard, will deepen democracy in a meaningful way. Specifically, such revision of the PB 
menus would expand real opportunities for well-being (capabilities) as well as for agency 
freedom. Excluded from current menus are projects that people may care about and might 
wish to execute through a PB, such as a community pool, or a health clinic. I suggest that 
communities should be involved not only in the revision of the menu, but also in the 
decision of dates, locations, distribution of assemblies, review of the rulings, and so forth. 
Furthermore, with opening up the discussion of the expansion of the menu to the 
assemblies, the citizenry, with deliberation, has an opportunity to deal with the root causes 
of the problems, rather than with mere cosmetic solutions.  
g) Improve system design. There are many other practical and simple steps that can 
and should be taken for the improvement of the PB system: (a) Based on the potential 
150 Policy-makers should consider conducting citizen and high school workshops to practice and enhance 
deliberative capacities and virtues, as a possible way of realizing this recommendation. 
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benefits of the spillover effects found in Chapter 3, efforts should be undertaken to make 
citizens more aware of the process by, for example, more advertising (so that ordinary 
citizens have a higher chance of becoming informed about the meetings). Moreover, a 
better explication of the process before the meetings start (so that all participants are on the 
same page) could prevent conflicts during the voting stages or during the selection of 
delegates. (b) Facilitators should follow a standard protocol to ensure that all meetings are 
conducted under the same conditions. (c) Meetings should start punctually and be held at 
an appropriate location in order to reduce the risk that people feel frustrated even before 
the process starts. (d) Gender quotas should be mandatory in the selection of delegates. 
With these recommendations and the earlier chapters in mind, I proceed to sketch 
a list of research tasks that extend the current study and, once performed, will hopefully 
generate both better data and more specific ways forward with respect to both research and 
civic engagement.  
 
6.3 The Way Forward 
There is a lot to be done as a follow up on the present study. One research activity 
would be to take further steps with respect to my work in Chapter 3 and examine—more 
rigorously and in ways that complement Chapters 4 and 5—the likelihood of a causal 
relationship between citizen participation and agency outcomes. To do so, better 
experimental data is needed. In a more ideal scenario one would have data on the 
respondent both before self-selecting into PB, and after PB. But, this would imply finding 
a city that has not yet started doing PB but which will do so in a next cycle.  
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Furthermore, advancing the works of Graham and Pettinato (2002), an interesting 
analysis would be to test whether the well-being freedom and achievement as well as the 
agency freedom and achievement that arguably comes through PB, and its outcomes, 
contribute to overall life satisfaction. To what extent would enhanced life satisfaction as a 
result of PB participation be an additional reason for valuing such participation?  
Another researchable question has to do with the spillover effect of PB awareness. 
In light of the empirical evidence found of such an indirect effect, it would be interesting 
to explore in depth, through interviews, if non-participants in other PB cities confirm or 
disconfirm what we have found, namely, that people claim that their own agency goals 
have been realized or their own sense of agency has been enhanced even though others 
have been responsible for the achievements in question. Even though passionate baseball 
fans may have nothing directly to do with their team’s achievement on the field, the fans’ 
agency (and sense of it) may be enhanced by the agency that others exercise. Once talking 
to non-participants, it also will be interesting to investigate in more depth the reasons why 
aware residents of PB cities choose not to participate. 
Likewise, it will be interesting to look at the significance of PB awareness in non-
PB cities. Particularly, future work should evaluate the implications for a resident of a non-
PB city who has heard about PB implemented in other cities. Questions of interest are: (a) 
Does knowledge of other PBs increases agency (at least agency freedom, if not agency 
achievement) because of a belief “that I can do what others can do”? Or (b) does such 
knowledge decrease agency because of frustration and passivity when one realizes that PB 
is unlikely in one’s city? (c) Do people in non-PB cities just feel intrinsically different from 
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residents of other cities due, for example, to the fact that they have experience benevolent 
or repressive local government? 
There are also other aspects of what goes on in non-PB cities that need further 
examination and assessment. One is learning more about the informal ways in which non-
PB cities and residents might be exercising agency. Recall that survey data in Chapter 3 
suggests high civic engagement in at least one non-PB city as well as the two PB cities. 
Given the lack of a formal participatory system with scheduled and advertised meetings in 
non-PB municipalities, an ethnographic-style research would be appropriate.  
Yet another way would be to investigate whether citizens in non-PB cities exhibit 
“adaptive preferences” in the sense that they have reduced their aspirations for social 
change because they have little hope of success. Are the subjective measures providing 
reliable estimates with respect to these normative assessments? Or is habituation implicit 
in peoples’ reported scores? For example, have people adapted their preferences to accept 
a local government of guardians? If so, should we cavalierly disregard self-evaluations on 
the grounds that such reports just reflect the habituation effects of not having PB or any 
other official participatory process that involves the residents and the government? Should 
we uncritically accept these perceptions, whether or not they are “adapted” as part of the 
person’s identity? Or is there a third way in which some adaptive preferences can be 
challenged without demeaning the person who has them? Investigating these questions 
would not only help to understand further the normative aspects of PB, but also potentially 
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contribute to the literature (presented in Chapter 3) of subjective agency measures and 
adaptive preferences.151  
We have shown that DR’s PB has had some democratic deficits and that the 
outcomes have not always resulted in more adequate well-being or full agency. But the 
democratic faith is such that the solution to shortcomings in democratic process or results 
is not less democracy but, rather, more and better democracy along one or more of its 
dimensions. With this commitment in mind, and following the recommendations above, a 
next step would be to examine in more detail ways in which PB’s democratic deficits (in 
procedure or results) could be repaired and whether those repairs can and should always 
be democratic.  
One particular task is to evaluate whether PB’s vulnerability to corruption can be 
reduced democratically and, more generally, whether broader and deeper democracy can 
and should play a role in combatting various types of corruption.152  
It would be interesting to analyze further the deliberation that goes on informally 
inside groups prior to the formal assemblies and its relation to formal deliberation. 
Specifically, is this informal session sufficiently inclusive and deliberative? Are potential 
dissenters excluded? Do those opposed to the emerging consensus merely go along or do 
they have a chance to challenge the group? Under what conditions could the informal pre-
group meeting either contribute to or diminish the formal meeting’s overall democratic 
quality? Similarly, under what circumstances and why should the publicity criterion for 
151 Consulting Serene Khader’s Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment, 2011, will be particularly 
useful when taking on such a task.  
152  Consulting Michael Johnston’s Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep 
Democratization, 2013, will be particularly useful when taking on such task.  
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deliberation be relaxed in either informal or formal deliberation? Would closed 
deliberations bring about less transparency and, if so, how bad would that be? Are there 
ways in which public deliberations can and should put limits on transparency? How does 
cooperative functionality among groups vary depending on the kind of deliberation 
practiced in their interactions? 
In order to better understand deliberative failures as well as successes within PB, it 
would be interesting to evaluate to what extent, if any, deliberative success benefits from 
prior intra-group cooperation and how that might be brought about. For example, what role 
might different sorts of leaders play? What role might group deliberation play with respect 
to the group’s basic goals (rather than addressing concrete problems)? What are the main 
differences in outcomes based on differences in patterns of group relationships (e.g., 
strategic negotiation vs. cooperative deliberations)?  
It also will be important to return to our DR municipalities and observe PB during 
one entire cycle and beyond. Recall that this study focused exclusively on analyzing 
whether participating individuals and communities or groups had the freedom or capability 
to make certain decisions and actually selected certain projects. Such actions, and our 
observations of them, relate only to the second stage of PB (public consultations). Future 
research should investigate the first and third stages of PB. During the planning and 
origination (first) stage, there is a knowledge gap to be filled, namely, understanding and 
evaluating of the way the idea of an planning for a PB evolved. (Here Baiocchi et al. (2010) 
have done good work for the Brazilian case). Important questions include the following: 
(a) How are resources allocated for PB? (b) How are resources divided among blocks? (c) 
How are communities assigned to blocks? (d) What is the logistical process for the 
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selection of locations and times for the assemblies? (e) Who does and should answer these 
questions and what methods should they use? And (f) Should citizens be involved and, if 
so, how?  
In regards to stage three, in the future it will be of the upmost importance to assess 
whether the government has executed the selected projects (which translates into more 
extensive impact in the world and enhanced well-being through tangible improvements in 
people’s lives). This will be an important task since to my knowledge no empirical studies 
have been made to study people’s perceptions of increased well-being once a PB’s 
decisions have been executed. 153   While performing this task, Drydyk’s briefly 
aforementioned vision of empowerment will be of relevance for it includes well-being 
achievements. Other questions of research interest related to stage three of PB would be: 
(a) What role, if any, might citizen groups play in ensuring, monitoring, and assessing 
implementation of projects? And (b) What role might citizens play in bringing about a 
change of government such that PB process and results are normatively better and more 
successful? Progressive changes depend on top-down, bottom-up, and joint governmental-
grassroots action. 
Finally, and with hopes of developing a more comprehensive research concerning 
the Dominican case, an important future research project involves an historical narrative 
and political economy of the DR, its government, municipalities, and civil society, as well 
153 Having conducted an empirical study of PB and well-being, Boulding and Wampler (2010) find, for the 
Brazilian case, that the presence of PB is not significantly associated with increased well-being, except for 
lower poverty rates. But again, my objective in future research would be to add value to this literature taking 
the relationship between participation and well-being forward by looking not at aggregate-level social 
indicators of well-being and comparing them across PB and non-PB municipalities, but continue looking at 
individual perceptions of well-being enhancement (or lack thereof) as a result of direct or indirect 
involvement in PB. 
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as their interaction and relevance for local governance. Such historical and systematic 
investigation, among other things, should examine: (a) How PB has evolved over the last 
decade? (b) Who have been key political and non-political actors in promoting (or 
restricting PB)? And (c) what have been their actions, successes, and failures? 
While we wait for answers to these and many more research questions, I believe I 
have given reason to believe that governments—at least in certain contexts—can and 
should promote PB and other forms of direct democracy. Although the challenges of doing 
PB right are many, the initial DR successes, added to longer-term PB successes in other 
countries, and other democratic innovations, show that if enough time and effort is given 
the benefits can be many. Among these benefits are those analyzed from the perspective of 












Annex 1. Definitions of Crocker’s Modes of Participation 
Definitions are based on Crocker (2009), and organized from the weakest to the 
strongest mode of participation. Relative strength is related to degree of agency exercised.  
1) Nominal Participation: This mode refers to: a) an individual who is a member of a group 
or organization but does not participate in the decision-making meetings, or b) an 
individual who is not a member of a group or organization and is unable to attend the 
meeting. 
2) Passive Participation: This mode refers to an individual or group of individuals (non-
elite) who attends the decision-making meeting but does nothing else than listening, 
reporting about the decisions that the elite makes, and making comments or questions (if 
at all). 
3) Consultative Participation: This mode refers to an individual or group of individuals 
(also non-elite) who is permitted to provide input to the decision-making but who does not 
make decisions. 
4) Petitionary Participation: This mode refers to an individual or group of individuals (also 
non-elite) who petition authorities to provide a solution to a particular problem; the 
elite/authorities have the responsibility to hear them and consider their petition but have no 
obligation to grant the petition. 
5) Participatory Implementation: This mode refers to a situation in which non-elites 
establishes the goals and means to achieve such goals, and the non-elites individuals 
implement the goals and may decide the tactics used to achieve them. 
6) Bargaining: This mode refers to non-elites bargaining with elites when both are 
motivated by self-interest and the result is affected by the power imbalances between them. 
7) Deliberative Participation: This mode refers to individuals or groups of individuals 
(non-elites) who cooperatively deliberate with each other (or with elites), making proposals 
and offering reasons in order to made a decision that most can accept.  
“The further we go down the list, the “thicker” is the participatory mode in the sense 





Annex 2. Santiago’s PB Positive/Negative Menu for the 2013 Participatory Budget 
Type of Project Yes No Repair Construction Expansion Buying 
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Equipment 
Public School √  √    
Electrification  √     
Latrine √  √ √   
Sanitation of cañadas √  √    
Library √  √ √  √ 
Community Center √  √ √  √ 
Public High School  √     
Clinics  √     
Dispensary  √     
Hospital  √     
Pavement Maintenance √  √ √   
Sport Court √  √ √  √ 
Baseball Field √  √ √  √ 
Municipal Park √  √ √  √ 
Playground √  √ √  √ 
Bridge for Vehicles √  √ √   
Bridge for Pedestrian √  √ √   
Sewer √  √ √   
Gutter √  √ √   
Cemetery √  √ √  √ 
Street Signs √  √ √   
Housing  √     
Aqueduct  √     
Well  √     
Fire Station √  √ √  √ 
Sidewalk and Curb √  √ √   
Local Road √  √ √   
Irrigation Canal  √     
Market √  √ √  √ 
Highway  √     
Police Station  √     
Cockfighting Arena  √     
Club √  √ √  √ 
Church  √     
Productive Infrastructure √  √ √  √ 
Civil Defense  √     
Red Cross  √     
Jail  √     
Solar Panel  √     





Annex 3a. Questionnaire for PB cities 
1.1 Imagine the best possible life. Think of a ladder with 10 steps: step 1 symbolizes the 
 199 
worst possible life, and step 10 the best possible life. Where, in this ladder, would you 
place your life today? 
Worst Life 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 Best Life     
 
1.2 Think about the freedom you have to make decisions about things that affect your life. 
Please indicate in a ladder from 1 to 10 how much control you think you have to make 
decisions. The first step in this ladder means that you have no control to make decisions, 
and the tenth step means that you have total control.  
No Control 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9   10 Total Control  
 
1.3 Please think now about your life in this community. Please indicate in this same ladder, 
how much control do you think the members of this community, in a collective manner, 
have in the decision-making of things that affect your life as a community. One in this 
ladder means that the community has no control in making decisions, and ten that it has 
total control. 
No Control 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9   10 Total Control  
 
1.4 In general, how would you qualify the current situation of this municipality? 
 5) excellent      4) good      3) average       2)bad    1) very bad   
      
1.5 Compared to this date last year, would you say that the current general situation of this 
municipality is: 
5) much better   4) somewhat better   3) the same   2) somewhat worse    1)much worse    
 
1.6 In the next 12 months, do you think that the general situation of the municipality will 
be: 
5) much better   4) somewhat better   3) the same   2) somewhat worse    1)much worse    
 
1.7 How would you describe your current economic situation and that of your family? 
5) excellent      4) good      3) average       2)bad    1) very bad        
 
1.8 In the next 12 months, do you think that your economic situation and that of your family 
will be: 
5) much better   4) somewhat better   3) the same   2) somewhat worse    1)much worse    
 
1.9 “Imagine a ladder with 10 steps, in which the poorest people are standing in the first 
step and the richest in the tenth step. Where would you place yourself in this ladder?” 
Poorest   1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 Richest         
 
2.1 How do you feel about the following statements: 
3) Agree 2) Partially agree 1) Disagree 
a) Democracy is always preferred to any other system of government ___ 
b) Some individuals or groups are excluded from political activity in this municipality____ 




2.2 Do you think there is freedom of speech in this municipality? 
1) Yes    0) No 
 
2.3 How do you perceive the relationship between the local government and your 
community? 
5) excellent      4) good      3) average       2)bad    1) very bad  
       
2.4 Imagine there was a total of 10 public servants in this municipality. Of those 10, how 
many would you say are corrupt? 
0    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 
3.1 Do you like living in this community? 
3) I like it    2) I do not care   1) I do not like it 
 
3.2 Do you belong to or do you participate in a civil society group or organization, whether 
it is related to politics, culture, sports, religion or any other theme? 
1) Yes     0) No 
 
3.3 Imagine that in this municipality live only 10 individuals. Now imagine that you lose 
your wallet and someone finds it. From these 10 individuals, how many do you think would 
return it? 
0    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 
3.4. How much participation do you think that women should have in public life compared 
to men? 
4) More participation than men 
3) Same participation as men 
2) Less participation than men 
1) No participation 
 
3.5 How much trust do you have in: 
a) The Mayor:  3) a lot of trust   2) some trust   1) no trust 
b) The president of your neighborhood council: 3) a lot of trust   2) some trust   1) no trust 
c) Your neighbors: 3) a lot of trust   2) some trust   1) no trust 
 
4.1 Generally speaking, in your opinion, what is the most important problem that your 
community faces? ______________________________________________________ 
 
4.2 Do you know how the decisions are made about the way in which the money transferred 
from the presidency is allocated and spent by the local government? 
1) yes      0) no 
4.3 Have you ever heard about Participatory Budgeting? 
1) yes      0) no     If yes, skip to 4.5 
 
4.4 Participatory Budgeting is a system that allows ordinary citizens to help decide how 
the municipality’s annual budget is spent. This is currently done in this municipality with 
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the public assemblies that are carried out during September/October of each year. During 
these assemblies, citizens have the right to voice their needs and vote for projects that they 
want to be executed in their communities. Now that you know this, do you think that you 
really knew of the process but you didn’t know that it was called Participatory Budgeting?  
1) yes      0) no 
 
4.5 Regardless of whether you knew or not about Participatory Budgeting, do you support 
the initiative of the local government to consult communities about how to invest a portion 
of the resources of the municipality? 
1) yes      0) no     If yes, skip to 4.61 
 
4.6 Which of these options justify better your reason not to support Participatory 
Budgeting? 
1) Budgets are too complicated for people like us 
2) Our voice would not make a difference 
3) I do not trust that the local government is going to execute the projects that the 
community votes for 
4) Other _____ 
 
4.61 Did you hear about the assemblies that were done in your community in the month of 
September (or October) of 2012? 
1) yes     0) no     If yes, skip to 4.63 
 
4.62 If you would have heard, would  you have gone? 
1) yes  0) no 
If yes, skip to 4.7 
If no, ask why and write answer here _____________ 
Now skip to 4.7 
 
4.63 Did you participate in your community’s assembly? 
1) yes  0) no     If yes, skip to 4.65 
 
4.64 Which of these options justifies better your reason not to have gone to the assembly? 
1) You forgot 
2) You did not have time 
3) You were not interested 
4) You trusted that your neighbors could represent your views faithfully and thus it was 
not necessary for you to be there 
5) You participated in a previous year and you ended up disappointed with the process 
6) Other _________    Skip to 4.7 
 
4.65 Were you selected as a delegate at the end of your community assembly? 
1) yes  0) no 
 
4.66 Did your community win a project through Participatory Budgeting this year? 
1) yes  0) no 
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4.67 Did you want to voice your opinions during the assembly? 
1) yes     0) no     If no, skip to 4.610 
 
4.68 Were you given the chance to do so? 
1) yes    0) no     If yes, skip to 4.610  
 
4.69 Why? 
3) You did not have much to say 
2) You had something to say but were afraid to talk in public 
1) Another person said the same thing you were thinking of 
 
4.610 How satisfied are you with: 
a) The voting process? 
4) very satisfied    3) satisfied    2) not very satisfied    1) not at all satisfied 
b) The list of projects allowed? 
4) very satisfied    3) satisfied    2) not very satisfied    1) not at all satisfied 
c) The way in which the facilitator from the local government led the assembly? 
4) very satisfied    3) satisfied    2) not very satisfied    1) not at all satisfied 
 
4.7 Have you participated in another year’s assembly, prior to last year? 
1) yes     0) no      If no, skip to 4.72 
 
4.71 Compared to previous years, you would say that last year’s assemblies were: 
4) better    3) the same    1) worse 
 
4.72 Do you think that all kinds of individuals participate in the assemblies, or only a select 
group? 
1) select group  0) everyone 
 
4.8 Do you think that participatory budgeting brings more transparency to the management 
of local governmental resources? 
1) yes   0) no 
 
4.10 In a scale from 1 to 5, how much do you think you as a citizen are contributing to 
making a difference in the way that the local government manages and uses its resources? 
One means that you are making no difference, and five it means that you are making a 
profound difference.  
No difference  1   2   3   4   5   Profound difference 
 
 
4.11 The collective version reads: Now think about your community. In this same scale, 
how much do you think that the community collectively is contributing to making a 
difference in the way the local government manages and uses its resources? One means 
that the community makes no difference, and five means that the community is making a 
profound difference. 
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No difference  1   2   3   4   5   Profound difference 
 
4.12 Have you done anything lately for the betterment of your community, something that 
you feel proud of?  
1) yes   0) no   If no, skip to 5.0 
 
4.13 What did you do? ___________________ 
 
5.0 Gender (do not ask) 
1) Male    0) Female 
 
5.1 Where were you born? (write town, province, country) ________________ 
 
5.2 For how many years have you and your family lived in this municipality?_______ 
 
5.3 For how many years have you and your family lived in this community? ________ 
 
5.4 What is your age? (write in the document) 
 
5.5 What is your civil status? 
4) married/co-habiting   3) single   2) separated/divorced  1) widowed   
 
5.6 Are you the individual in the house who most contributes to the family income? 
1) yes, is the head of household      0) no 
 
5.7 Have you and your family had difficulties paying for food or other basic necessities in 
the past 12 months? 
1) yes         0) no 
 
5.8 Who lives in this house? (write in the document the number and relationship to 
respondent of adults and children in the house) 
_______________________________________ 
If there are no children, skip to 5.10 
 
5.9 Are you able to send all of your children to school? 
1) yes         0) no 
 
5.10 What kind of education have you completed to date? 
1) None      2) primary school     3) high school     4) technical degree 
5) college education or more 
 
 
5.11 What is your current occupational situation? 
1) independent/self-employed 
2) salaried, public sector 





If respondent answers 6 “unemployed”, skip to 5.13  
 
5.12 How worried are you of losing your job in the next 12 months? 
1) very worried  2) worried  3) a bit worried   4) not worried at all   
 
5.13 In the past six months how would you say your physical health has been? 
1) very good   2) good   3) average   4) bad   5) very bad 
 
5.14 Do you have a leadership position in the community?  
1) yes         0) no 
 
5.15 What is the average monthly income of your household? ___________ 
 
Describe the house __________________________________________________ 
 
Annex 3b. Questionnaire for non-PB cities (PB section only (4)) 
4.1 Generally speaking, in your opinion, what is the most important problem that your 
community faces? ______________________________________________________ 
 
4.2 Do you know how the decisions are made about the way in which the money transferred 
from the presidency is allocated and spent by the local government? 
1) yes      0) no 
 
4.3 Have you ever heard about Participatory Budgeting? 
1) yes      0) no    If yes, skip to 4.5 
 
4.4 Participatory Budgeting is a system that allows ordinary citizens to help decide how 
the municipality’s annual budget is spent. This is currently done in this municipality with 
the public assemblies that are carried out during September/October of each year. During 
these assemblies, citizens have the right to voice their needs and vote for projects that they 
want to be executed in their communities. Now that you know this, do you think that you 
really knew of the process but you didn’t know that it was called Participatory Budgeting?  
1) yes      0) no 
 
4.5 Regardless of whether you knew or not about Participatory Budgeting, do you support 
the initiative of the local government to consult communities about how to invest a portion 
of the resources of the municipality? 
1) yes      0) no      If yes, skip to 4.61 
 
4.6 Which of these options justify better your reason not to support Participatory 
Budgeting? 
1) Budgets are too complicated for people like us 
 205 
2) Our voice would not make a difference 
3) I do not trust that the local government is going to execute the projects that the 
community votes for 
4) Other _____ 
 
4.7 Have you previously participated in a Participatory Budgeting assembly? 
1) yes     0) no 
 
4.8 Do you think that Participatory Budgeting would bring more transparency to the 
management of the local government resources? 
1) yes      0) no 
 
4.9 If this municipality started doing Participatory Budgeting assemblies, would you 
participate in the one corresponding to your community? Consider that you would have to 
invest approximately three hours of your time once or twice a year. 
1) yes      0) no 
 
4.10 In a scale from 1 to 5, how much do you think you as a citizen are contributing to 
making a difference in the way that the local government manages and uses its resources? 
One means that you are making no difference, and five it means that you are making a 
profound difference.  
No difference   1   2   3   4   5   Profound difference 
 
4.11The collective version reads: Now think in your community. In this same scale, how 
much do you think that the community collectively is contributing to making a difference 
in the way the local government manages and uses its resources? One means that the 
community makes no difference, and five means that the community is making a profound 
difference. 
No difference   1  2   3   4   5   Profound difference 
 
4.12 Have you done anything lately for the betterment of your community and that you feel 
proud of?  
1) yes      0) no      If no, skip to 5.0 
 
4.13 What did you do? ___________________ 
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Annex 4. Meta-Data 
Variable  Municipality No. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mdn Min Max Comment 
Personal Agency 
"agenciaper" 
SDE 250 8.99 1.87 10 1 10 
1 means no control, 10 means full 
control over life's decisions one 
cares about 
STI 278 7.97 2.10 8 1 10 
LVG 259 5.80 2.95 5 1 10 
SDO 245 8.64 1.28 9 1 10 
Total 1032 7.83 2.47 9 1 10 
Collective Agency 
"agenciacol" 
SDE 248 5.59 2.52 5 1 10 
1 means no control, 10 means full 
control (collectively) over 
community decisions 
STI 274 5.94 2.81 6 1 10 
LVG 258 3.95 2.51 4 1 10 
SDO 245 6.52 2.28 7 1 10 
Total 1025 5.49 2.72 5 1 10 
General Situation at 
Municipality "sitmuni" 
SDE 253 3.13 0.59 3 1 5 
1 very bad, 2 bad, 3 average, 4 
good, 5 excellent 
STI 277 2.97 0.68 3 1 4 
LVG 259 2.82 0.53 3 1 4 
SDO 245 3.00 0.47 3 1 4 
Total 1034 2.98 0.59 3 1 5 
General Situation at 
Municipality Compared 
to Previous Year "sitant" 
SDE 251 3.51 0.79 4 1 5 
1 much worse, 2 a bit worse, 3 the 
same, 4 a bit better, 5 much better 
STI 272 3.27 0.92 3 1 5 
LVG 255 3.17 1.04 4 1 5 
SDO 243 3.31 0.62 3 1 5 
Total 1021 3.31 0.87 3 1 5 
Expected General 
Situation at Municipality 
in Next 12 Months 
"sitfut" 
SDE 250 4.21 0.81 4 2 5 
1 much worse, 2 a bit worse, 3 the 
same, 4 a bit better, 5 much better 
STI 266 3.49 0.90 4 1 5 
LVG 260 3.41 0.95 4 1 5 
SDO 242 3.59 0.73 4 1 5 
Total 1018 3.67 0.91 4 1 5 
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Current Personal (and 
Family's) Economic 
Situation "sitecon" 
SDE 252 3.17 0.51 3 1 5 
1 very bad, 2 bad, 3 average, 4 
good, 5 excellent 
STI 276 3.08 0.72 3 1 5 
LVG 260 2.97 0.52 3 2 5 
SDO 245 3.43 0.65 3 1 5 
Total 1033 3.16 0.63 3 1 5 
Expected Personal (and 
Family's) Economic 
Situation in 12 Months 
"siteconfut" 
SDE 250 4.48 0.70 5 2 5 
1 much worse, 2 a bit worse, 3 the 
same, 4 a bit better, 5 much better 
STI 265 3.69 0.82 4 1 5 
LVG 260 3.77 0.66 4 2 5 
SDO 243 4.05 0.49 4 1 5 
Total 1018 3.99 0.75 4 1 5 
Economic Ladder 
"escaleraecon" 
SDE 250 4.64 1.26 5 1 10 
1 the poorest - 10 the richest 
STI 273 5.04 2.09 5 1 10 
LVG 259 3.82 1.88 4 1 10 
SDO 245 6.41 1.49 6 2 10 
Total 1027 4.96 1.97 5 1 10 
Democracy is Best 
"democracia" 
SDE 249 2.97 0.21 3 1 3 
1 disagree, 2 partially agree, 3 agree 
STI 275 2.77 0.55 3 1 3 
LVG 260 2.93 0.34 3 1 3 
SDO 244 2.82 0.53 3 1 3 
Total 1028 2.87 0.44 3 1 3 
Political Exclusion in the 
Municipality "exclusion" 
SDE 249 2.50 0.60 3 1 3 
1 disagree, 2 partially agree, 3 agree 
STI 261 2.15 0.85 2 1 3 
LVG 260 2.83 0.53 3 1 3 
SDO 245 1.47 0.66 1 1 3 
Total 1015 2.24 0.84 3 1 3 
Municipal Government 
Responsible with Basic 
SDE 248 2.37 0.81 3 1 3 1 disagree, 2 partially agree, 3 agree 
STI 272 1.68 0.70 2 1 3 
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Needs "ayuntresp" LVG 260 1.31 0.65 1 1 3 
SDO 245 1.61 0.62 2 1 3 
Total 1025 1.74 0.79 2 1 3 
Freedom of Speech 
"libopinion" 
SDE 253 0.95 0.22 1 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no 
STI 276 0.91 0.29 1 0 1 
LVG 258 0.83 0.37 1 0 1 
SDO 243 0.99 0.09 1 0 1 




SDE 254 3.54 0.70 4 1 5 
1 very bad, 2 bad, 3 average, 4 
good, 5 excellent 
STI 274 3.08 0.79 3 1 5 
LVG 258 2.68 0.75 3 1 5 
SDO 243 3.15 0.73 3 1 5 
Total 1029 3.11 0.81 3 1 5 
Perceived Number of 
Corrupt Local 
Government Officials    
"corrupto" 
SDE 253 4.90 3.30 5 0 10 
0-10 corrupt politicians out of 10 
STI 276 5.97 3.02 6 0 10 
LVG 258 6.42 3.14 7 0 10 
SDO 244 4.73 2.66 4 0 10 
Total 1031 5.52 3.12 5 0 10 
Feeling of Belonging to 
Community 
"agradocom" 
SDE 252 2.92 0.28 3 2 3 
3 I like it, 2 I do not care, 1 I do not 
like it 
STI 276 2.82 0.46 3 1 3 
LVG 260 2.93 0.30 3 1 3 
SDO 243 2.80 0.42 3 1 3 
Total 1031 2.87 0.28 3 1 3 
Membership / 
Participation in CSO                       
"partorg" 
SDE 253 0.64 0.48 1 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no STI 277 0.71 0.46 1 0 1 
LVG 257 0.66 0.48 1 0 1 
SDO 244 0.77 0.42 1 0 1 
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Total 1031 0.69 0.46 1 0 1 
Solidarity / Honesty             
"cartera" 
SDE 254 2.66 2.44 1 0 10 
0-10 people who return wallet out 
of 10 
STI 275 3.25 2.69 2 0 10 
LVG 256 2.59 2.08 2 0 10 
SDO 243 5.30 2.52 5 0 10 
Total 1028 3.42 2.68 3 0 10 
Women's Participation in 
Public Life "mujeres" 
SDE 254 3.16 0.43 3 2 4 
4 more than men, 3 same as men, 2 
less than men, 1 none 
STI 277 3.12 0.42 3 1 4 
LVG 259 3.15 0.44 3 2 4 
SDO 242 2.95 0.43 3 2 4 
Total 1032 3.10 0.44 3 1 4 
Trust in Mayor 
"confsindico" 
SDE 254 2.13 0.74 2 1 3 
3 a lot of trust, 2 some trust, 1 no 
trust 
STI 270 1.83 0.63 2 1 3 
LVG 260 1.57 0.66 1 1 3 
SDO 244 1.77 0.58 2 1 3 
Total 1028 1.83 0.68 2 1 3 
Trust in President of 
Community Group                           
"confjv" 
SDE 249 2.22 0.75 2 1 3 
3 a lot of trust, 2 some trust, 1 no 
trust 
STI 258 2.22 0.73 2 1 3 
LVG 252 2.08 0.75 2 1 3 
SDO 239 2.08 0.53 2 1 3 
Total 998 2.15 0.70 2 1 3 
Trust in Neighbors 
"confvecinos" 
SDE 254 2.44 0.58 2 1 3 
3 a lot of trust, 2 some trust, 1 no 
trust 
STI 275 2.43 0.57 2 1 3 
LVG 260 2.59 0.60 3 1 3 
SDO 245 2.15 0.49 2 1 3 
Total 1034 2.41 0.59 2 1 3 





STI 273 0.17 0.38 0 0 1 
LVG 260 0.02 0.12 0 0 1 
SDO 245 0.05 0.23 0 0 1 
Total 1031 0.10 0.29 0 0 1 
Heard of PB 
"escuchadopp" 
SDE 254 0.76 0.43 1 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no 
STI 277 0.49 0.50 0 0 1 
LVG 260 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 
SDO 245 0.53 0.50 1 0 1 
Total 1036 0.46 0.50 0 0 1 
Knowledge of PB after 
Definition "defpp" 
SDE 63 0.30 0.46 0 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no 
STI 135 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 
LVG 110 0.09 0.29 0 0 1 
SDO 113 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 
Total 421 0.18 0.39 0 0 1 
Support for PB 
"apoyaspp" 
SDE 252 0.99 0.09 1 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no 
STI 274 0.97 0.18 1 0 1 
LVG 261 0.98 0.12 1 0 1 
SDO 243 0.97 0.17 1 0 1 
Total 1030 0.98 0.14 1 0 1 
Heard of September 
Assemblies     "enterado" 
SDE 254 0.39 0.49 0 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no STI 278 0.37 0.48 0 0 1 




SDE 152 0.94 0.24 1 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no STI 171 0.86 0.35 1 0 1 
Total 323 0.90 0.30 1 0 1 
Actual Participation in 
PB Assembly 
SDE 100 0.52 0.50 1 0 1 1 yes, 0 no 
STI 99 0.84 0.37 1 0 1 
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"participaste" Total 199 0.68 0.47 1 0 1 
Selected as Delegate 
"delegado" 
SDE 53 0.47 0.50 0 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no STI 83 0.51 0.50 1 0 1 
Total 136 0.49 0.50 0 0 1 
Community Winning    
PB Project            
"ganoobra" 
SDE 53 0.68 0.47 1 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no STI 82 0.62 0.48 1 0 1 
Total 135 0.64 0.48 1 0 1 
Wanting to Speak       
Out Loud            
"vozalta" 
SDE 53 0.74 0.45 1 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no STI 83 0.45 0.50 0 0 1 
Total 136 0.56 0.50 1 0 1 
Turn to Speak   
"palabra" 
SDE 40 0.95 0.22 1 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no STI 37 0.54 0.50 1 0 1 
Total 77 0.75 0.43 1 0 1 
Satisfaction with    
Voting Process 
"votacion" 
SDE 53 3.08 0.51 3 2 4 
4 very satisfied, 3 satisfied, 2 not 
very satisfied, 1 not at all satisfied STI 82 2.65 0.87 3 1 4 




SDE 52 2.94 0.42 3 2 4 
4 very satisfied, 3 satisfied, 2 not 
very satisfied, 1 not at all satisfied STI 82 2.48 0.84 3 1 4 




SDE 52 3.17 0.51 3 2 4 
4 very satisfied, 3 satisfied, 2 not 
very satisfied, 1 not at all satisfied STI 81 2.72 0.79 3 1 4 
Total 133 2.89 0.73 3 1 4 
Participation in Previous 
Assembly "asamant" 
SDE 254 0.30 0.46 0 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no 
STI 274 0.29 0.46 0 0 1 
LVG 258 0.02 0.14 0 0 1 
SDO 245 0.25 0.43 0 0 1 





SDE 49 2.51 0.58 3 1 3 
3 better, 2 the same, 1 worse STI 71 2.45 0.69 3 1 3 
Total 120 2.48 0.65 3 1 3 
Selectivity in 
Participation "selectivo" 
SDE 192 0.95 0.21 1 0 1 
1 selective, 0 everyone STI 133 0.44 0.50 0 0 1 
Total 325 0.74 0.44 1 0 1 
Participation in 
Construction of PB 
Project "construccion" 
SDE 77 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no STI 80 0.41 0.50 0 0 1 
Total 157 0.32 0.47 0 0 1 
PB Assemblies Bring 
More Transparency 
"transparencia" 
SDE 251 0.93 0.26 1 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no 
STI 262 0.79 0.41 1 0 1 
LVG 260 0.97 0.16 1 0 1 
SDO 241 0.98 0.14 1 0 1 
Total 1014 0.92 0.28 1 0 1 
Individual Agency Local 
Budgeting 
"agenciapbind" 
SDE 251 2.72 1.59 2 1 5 
1 no difference - 5 profound 
difference 
STI 272 2.88 1.48 3 1 5 
LVG 259 3.80 1.72 5 1 5 
SDO 245 3.16 1.16 3 1 5 
Total 1027 3.14 1.56 3 1 5 
Collective Agency Local 
Budgeting 
"agenciapbcol" 
SDE 251 3.09 1.32 3 1 5 
1 no difference - 5 profound 
difference 
STI 274 3.07 1.30 3 1 5 
LVG 261 3.81 1.69 5 1 5 
SDO 245 2.53 0.94 3 1 5 
Total 1031 3.13 1.42 3 1 5 
Action for Community 
that Brings Pride 
"agenciaact" 
SDE 252 0.37 0.48 0 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no STI 270 0.44 0.50 0 0 1 
LVG 260 0.55 0.50 1 0 1 
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SDO 245 0.16 0.37 0 0 1 
Total 1027 0.38 0.49 0 0 1 
Gender "sexo" 
SDE 253 0.48 0.50 0 0 1 
1 male, 0 female 
STI 259 0.46 0.50 0 0 1 
LVG 259 0.77 0.42 1 0 1 
SDO 233 0.47 0.50 0 0 1 
Total 1004 0.55 0.50 1 0 1 
Years Living in 
Municipality 
"vividomuni" 
SDE 254 25.79 10.05 25 2 55 
number of years 
STI 269 30.66 16.12 30 1 70 
LVG 248 44.61 17.74 44.5 1 90 
SDO 244 32.50 14.84 33.5 1 74 
Total 1015 33.29 16.45 30 1 90 
Years Living in 
Community "vividocom" 
SDE 254 19.19 11.66 15 1 55 
number of years 
STI 275 21.53 15.09 19 1 67 
LVG 249 43.06 18.45 43 1 90 
SDO 153 27.58 17.68 27 1 62 
Total 931 27.64 18.44 25 1 90 
Age                          
"edad" 
SDE 251 41.84 12.88 40 19 75 
number of years 
STI 276 44.71 13.20 43 19 80 
LVG 260 40.20 13.90 40 18 75 
SDO 245 40.91 11.45 39 19 74 
Total 1032 41.97 13.01 41 18 80 
Estado Civil 
"casadovivi" 
SDE 253 0.60 0.49 1 0 1 
1 married or living together, 0 
otherwise 
STI 277 0.74 0.44 1 0 1 
LVG 256 0.52 0.50 1 0 1 
SDO 245 0.65 0.48 1 0 1 
Total 1031 0.63 0.48 1 0 1 
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Head of Household 
"jefehogar" 
SDE 245 0.50 0.50 1 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no 
STI 274 0.68 0.47 1 0 1 
LVG 238 0.64 0.48 1 0 1 
SDO 244 0.66 0.48 1 0 1 
Total 1004 0.62 0.49 1 0 1 
Difficulties to Cover 
Basic Needs 
"dificultades" 
SDE 251 0.21 0.41 0 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no 
STI 271 0.27 0.45 0 0 1 
LVG 230 0.24 0.43 0 0 1 
SDO 239 0.20 0.40 0 0 1 
Total 991 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 
Education        
"educacion" 
SDE 248 3.35 1.12 3 1 5 
5 college or higher, 4 associates 
degree, 3 high school, 2 elementary, 
1 none 
STI 277 3.59 1.25 3 1 5 
LVG 244 3.34 1.20 3 1 5 
SDO 240 4.08 0.99 4 1 5 
Total 1009 3.59 1.18 3 1 5 
Highly Educated 
"educado" 
SDE 248 0.31 0.46 0 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no 
STI 277 0.46 0.50 0 0 1 
LVG 244 0.41 0.49 0 0 1 
SDO 240 0.72 0.45 1 0 1 
Total 806 0.59 0.49 1 0 1 
Employment "empleado" 
SDE 248 0.84 0.36 1 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no 
STI 270 0.93 0.26 1 0 1 
LVG 259 0.97 0.16 1 0 1 
SDO 244 0.93 0.25 1 0 1 
Total 1021 0.92 0.27 1 0 1 
Worry of Losing Job 
Within Next Year 
SDE 206 2.81 1.32 4 1 4 4 not worried at all, 3 a little bit 
worried, 2 worried, 1 very worried STI 198 3.17 0.96 3 1 4 
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"preocupado" LVG 120 2.25 0.81 2 1 4 
SDO 178 3.38 0.85 4 1 4 
Total 702 2.96 1.10 3 1 4 
Health Status            
"salud" 
SDE 254 2.31 0.72 2 1 5 
5 very bad, 4 bad, 3 regular,  2 well, 
1 very well 
STI 273 2.38 0.87 2 1 5 
LVG 256 2.30 0.72 2 1 5 
SDO 245 2.07 0.53 2 1 4 
Total 1028 2.27 0.73 2 1 5 
Leadership Position in 
Community     
"liderazgo" 
SDE 249 0.71 0.46 1 0 1 
1 yes, 0 no 
STI 266 0.61 0.49 1 0 1 
LVG 256 0.46 0.50 0 0 1 
SDO 240 0.88 0.33 1 0 1 
Total 1011 0.66 0.47 1 0 1 
Average Household 
Income                
"ingreso" 
SDE 248 22258 13180 20000 2000 75000 
Amount in Dominican Pesos 
STI 244 23941 23325 18000 1500 150000 
LVG 252 18988 12950 15000 1000 80000 
SDO 211 28314 15290 25000 8000 120000 
Total 955 23163 17049 20000 1000 150000 
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Annex 5. Outputs for Matching Exercises 














































Annex 6. Ordered Logit Outputs: Association between Participation and PB Agency 
SDE/SDO Individual PB Agency 





STI/LVG Individual PB Agency 








Annex 7. Details of Meetings Observed and Assembly Codes 
Date Municipality Location of Assembly Type Code Observed by 




1 Bryan Tolentino 
09/18/12 STI Casa Club Reparto Kokette, Reparto Kokette Block 2 Bryan Tolentino 
09/20/12 STI Salón de Reuniones CEFASA, Gurabo Block 3 Alina Reyes 
09/21/12 STI 
Colegio Padre Emiliano 
Tardiff – Jardines del 
Yaque 
Block 4 Bryan Tolentino 
09/23/12 STI Casa Club Villa María, Villa María Block 5 Alina Reyes 
09/23/12 STI Escuela Juan Ovidio Paulino, Reparto Peralta Block 6 
Marie C. 
Vasquez 
09/25/12 STI Club AUG, Gurabo Block 7 Marie C. Vasquez 
09/25/12 STI Templo Bíblico R. J. Carter, Savica Block 8 
Marie C. 
Vasquez 
09/26/12 STI Casa Club Las Américas, Las Américas Block 9 
Marie C. 
Vasquez 
09/26/12 STI La Gallera, Cienfuegos Block 10 Marie C. Vasquez 
09/27/12 STI Club Fernando Garrido, Ensanche Espaillat Block 11 
Marie C. 
Vasquez 






A Marie C. Vasquez 
10/03/12 SDE Punta Torrecilla, Los Mameyes Community B 
Marie C. 
Vasquez 
10/05/12 SDE Villa Faro Community C Marie C. Vasquez 
10/05/12 SDE El Pescador, Villa Duarte Community D Marie C. Vasquez 
10/06/12 SDE Club Bello Campo Block E Marie C. Vasquez 
10/07/12 SDE Club Eduardo Brito, Los Mameyes Block F 
Marie C. 
Vasquez 
10/09/12 SDE Catanga, Los Minas Community G Marie C. Vasquez 
10/10/12 SDE Felicidad II, Los Minas Community H Marie C. Vasquez 





10/14/12 SDE Multiuso Los Tres Ojos, Los Mameyes (reposition) Block J 
Marie C. 
Vasquez 
10/17/12 SDE Brisas del Este Community K Marie C. Vasquez 
10/18/12 SDE Los Almirantes I, Los Almirantes Community L 
Marie C. 
Vasquez 
10/18/12 SDE Los Almirantes II, Los Almirantes Community M 
Marie C. 
Vasquez 
10/18/12 SDE Los Almirantes III, Los Almirantes Community N 
Marie C. 
Vasquez 
10/18/12 SDE Los Almirantes IV, Los Almirantes Community O 
Marie C. 
Vasquez 
10/21/12 SDE Escuela Patria Mella Block P Marie C. Vasquez 




















Annex 8. Questions/Topics Covered in Interviews 
a) Are there neighborhood councils holding frequent meetings throughout the year? If so, 
what are the topics discussed and how are people notified of the meetings? 
b) Are consultations public or by invitation? Which means of communication is used for 
advertising or inviting? 
c) How and when are citizens’ preferences gathered?  
d) Is there deliberation and reasons given about proposals before decisions are made? 
e) What have been the identified priorities of the community for the last couple of years?  
f) How satisfactory have the experiences in previous cycles been, both in terms of 
budgetary decisions and in terms of disbursement of funds for the execution of the chosen 
projects? 
g) How can the relationship between the municipal authorities and the community be 
characterized?  
h) Who initiates contact? 
i) Who are the main stakeholders? 
j) Have any groups or sorts of individuals been left out? 
k) Have any activities to bolster transparency and accountability been taken?  
l) Do citizens have direct control over the full process of developing options, deciding on 
action, raising funds for, and implementing projects or policy, as in social fund and 
community-driven development projects or do they only control a small part of the budget, 
enabling the mayor to raid the rest of it? 
m) What is the local government’s financial capacity to respond to the multiple needs of 
the citizens? 
n) How well connected is the exercise of PB with the medium- and longer-term 






Annex 9. Logic Model from Municipal Government’s Perspective using SDE and 
STI’s PB Experiences for 2013 
Inputs Activities/Process Outputs Outcomes/Impacts 
Budget allocation for 










distribution of funds 
per blocks based on 
budget (SDE and 
STI) 
 





31 projects approved 
(STI) 
a) Policymakers fund 
and maintain legislation 
that supports 
community priorities 
(SDE & STI) 
 
b) Attention to 
communities’ demands 
(SDE & STI) 
Social Planning and 
Development Assistants 
for the planning and 
public consultation 
stages and staff from the 
Municipal Government 
(SDE & STI) 
Planning, 
organization and 
hosting of PB 





hosting of PB block 
assemblies (STI) 
437 PB community 





29 PB block 
assemblies held  
(note: one assembly 
was a reposition) 
(STI) 
a) Increased knowledge 
among neighborhood 
residents of resources 
available from the local 
government for the 
solution of community 
issues (SDE & STI) 
 
b) Unknown number of 
participants from 437 
communities (18 
blocks) empowered for 
having been consulted 
(SDE) 
 
c) 5,021 participants 
from 28 blocks 
empowered for having 
been consulted (STI) 
Acquisition documents 
for the design, planning 
and execution of 
projects (SDE & STI) 
Execution of 90 
projects; 15% remain 
in construction or to 
be started (SDE)155 
 
Execution of 31 
projects; 38% remain 
under construction, 






14 projects (44%) 
completed156  




according to the 
purpose of each project 
(SDE and STI). 
154 When considering the allocated amount to PB for 2013 it must be noted that while such year’s PB cycle 
only approved 90 projects, there are 126 PB projects budgeted for 2013, which includes delayed projects 
from previous years.  
155 In the absence of exact percentages of project execution stages, these estimates are based on the SDE 
mayor’s declarations (Juan de los Santos) to the newspaper El Nacional on July 22nd, 2013 
(http://elnacional.com.do/construyen-700-obras-en-santo-domingo-este/). The status of the missing 5% was 
not alluded to in the article. 
156 As of report sent to me directly by the municipality on date Feb 20th, 2014. 
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19% will start soon, 
and 10% present legal 
or origin difficulties 
(STI) 
 
Annex 10. Condition/Causal Mechanism: Organizational Health of PB 
The following is a summary of evidence pointing out organizational problems that 
affect the overall quality of the PB meetings: 
 a) Chosen locations are not always appropriate: some assembly sites were either 
too small, too dark, too hot, or too open for enabling comfortable discussions and voting. 
For example, for Assembly 7 (STI), held at the clubhouse AUG, it was difficult to carry on 
the assembly because next to the open room where people were meeting, there were 
teenagers playing basketball in a court, and their noise interrupted the assembly. Assembly 
6 (STI), held at the public school Juan Ovidio Paulino, was supposed to occur in the multi-
use room of the local school However because the facilitators did not procure the key to 
the room ahead of time, the meeting ended up being carried out in the school yard with 
everybody spread across a large space. Similarly the block assembly P (SDE), held at a 
public school, was also supposed to use the school’s multi-purpose room, but a double-
booking issue prevented the municipal government from using the room. The meeting 
occurred instead in an elementary grade-level room, which was too small for the number 
of delegates, who had to sit in tiny chairs intended for third graders. Other inappropriate 
locations were the cock-fighting arena for Assembly 10 and the basketball court of Club 
Fernado Garrido for Assembly 11 (both STI). The assemblies E and J met in the club of 
Bello Campo and the multi-purpose room Los Tres Ojos, respectively, (both SDE) suffered 
from loud nearby music, since they were located next to bodegas that had high volume 
bachatas all afternoon. Although these communities are accustomed to something similar 
in daily life, such noise during an assembly can be disrupting.157 Assmeblies F and I (SDE) 
had also a temperature problem. People were suffocating due to an extremely hot weather, 
and so, wanted to hurry up the process to be able to leave as soon as possible.  
b) Registration process too tortuous: The registration process was too slow and 
unnecessarily disorganized in most assemblies in both municipalities. In SDE, the 
157 Although I wonder if it bothered me, the outsider, more than it did bother anybody else. 
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exceptions were the assemblies in which Mr. Edward was one of the facilitators. This 
leader employed a system of calling individuals one by one as their name appeared in the 
certificates, checked their IDs, and directed them to a specific chair. Other assemblies in 
SDE and STI did the registration after letting people inside the premises, and without 
asking people to get in a line or wait to be called. Due to the “open to all public” 
characteristic of STI’s assemblies, there was the problem of people trying to get in to vote 
after the registration process had closed. This effort brought lots of complaints and 
controversies. In another case, all participants from one community were late, supposedly 
due to a malfunction of the bus in which all were being transported to the assembly site. 
By the time they got to the meeting place the registration process had ended (voting had 
not yet started), and they were not allowed to participate, which generated a lot of 
complaints since the lack of flexibility made this community lose its chance to win a PB 
project. Another registration problem, particularly worrisome for STI’s model of open 
assemblies, is that it is impossible to verify if participants belong to a particular community; 
thus, some losing participants complain that other communities have won because they 
brought in residents from other locations so as to be able to attain the majority of votes that 
would enable them win.  
c) Meetings inexcusably delayed:  None of the assemblies I attended in either of 
the municipalities started on time. Many communities complained and were outraged, 
about how the municipal government had no respect for their time (especially in SDE 
assemblies, all of which kept people waiting for over an hour). One positive upshot from 
the delays is that delegates used this time to negotiate and strategize with fellow 
communities/organizations.  
d) Facilitators lacked proper training to lead assemblies effectively:  facilitators 
without good leadership skills and proper training were not able to facilitate meetings 
effectively.  This was evidenced in different ways: participants complained about 
facilitators starting the process without even introducing him/herself and his/her team; 
some facilitators were not able to keep the crowd quiet, and in order, and even needed to 
restore to preschool tactics used to make young children quiet down, remain seated, or wait 
for a turn to speak out.  Some facilitators completely skipped detailed explanations of the 
processes, which only led to confused participants during the voting, as well as deliberation 
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and negotiation stages. Such instructions would have been particularly helpful for first-
time participants. Some facilitators had no patience to deal with participants’ frustrations 
and confusions; rather than answering their questions, they rudely ignored them. Some 
facilitators, reluctant to opening up the meeting to public discussions, undermined the 
democratic process.  
 e) Other organizational problems (miscellaneous): 1) While some assemblies in STI 
did use microphones, all in SDE did not, and facilitators often times had to scream in order 
to be heard or to be able to control a disorganized crowd. 2) Wall signs for SDE assemblies, 
which include the list of candidate projects and communities could have been prepared 
prior to each assembly, instead of making people wait for about 20 minutes until an 
assistant finished writing it up (I was even asked to help with this in two assemblies in 
SDE).   3) In STI no control over the entrance of individuals to the assemblies was put in 
place, which therefore led to the presence of teenagers and children, who regardless of 
being ineligible to vote, ended up causing controversy at different times due to some 
participants’ beliefs that they had indeed voted (to the detriment of their own vote count). 
4) There is no mechanism to invalidate the community assemblies if quorum is not met, or 
if the level of desired representativeness is not reached.  5) Not allowing for substitutes 
delegates seems like a too strict rule. A suggestion would be to elect some alternate 
delegates in the community meeting in the event that one of the main four delegates cannot 
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